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ABSTRACT 
 Nigeria and Angola demonstrate a similar set of motive and permissive conditions 
for piracy based on the variables identified in the existing literature, yet the two countries 
have experienced very different levels of piracy. This thesis borrows from recent 
patrimonialism research that identifies the effect of rent management practices on 
developmental outcomes. In a similar fashion, this thesis engages in a qualitative, 
most-similar-systems comparative case study of Nigeria and Angola to investigate the 
role of a previously unexamined variable: the degree to which elite rent management 
strategies and patronage structures foster or inhibit a permissive environment in which 
piracy can flourish. Specifically, this thesis argues that decentralized rent management 
practices heighten the incentives for piracy in Nigeria, while highly centralized rent 
management discourages piracy in Angola. These results suggest that levels of piracy 
will remain high in Nigeria and low in Angola. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
1. Pirate Motivations ..........................................................................5 
2. Permissive Factors .......................................................................10 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, HYPOTHESIS, AND 
RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................26 
II. EVALUATING THEORIZED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN 
NIGERIA AND ANGOLA ..................................................................................33 
A. STATE WEAKNESS AND REGIME TYPE ........................................33 
B. DEMOGRAPHICS ...................................................................................36 
C. ECONOMIC VARIABLES ....................................................................39 
D. GEOGRAPHY .........................................................................................41 
E. THE ROLE OF OIL ................................................................................42 
F. ETHNIC FACTIONALIZATION AND ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY ..........................................................................................47 
G. THE ROLE OF NUANCED GEOGRAPHY, SECURITY 
FORCE CAPACITY, AND CORRUPTION IN THE 
AVAILABILITY OF PIRATE SAFE HAVENS ..................................48 
H. PRESENCE OF ARMED GROUPS, CRIME SYNDICATES, 
AND SMALL ARMS ...............................................................................53 
I. SUB-STATE DYNAMICS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, 
AND FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES .........................................55 
III. NIGERIA ..............................................................................................................59 
A. PATRONAGE STRUCTURE ................................................................59 
1. Decentralized Legacy of Colonialism .......................................60 
2. Independence, The First Republic, and Civil War (1960–
1970) ..............................................................................................62 
3. Post-war Military Federalism (1970–1979) ...............................65 
4. The Second Republic (1979–1983) ..............................................68 
5. Return to Military Rule (1983–1999) .........................................71 
6. The Fourth Republic (1999–Present) .........................................73 
B. PATRIMONIAL PIRACY ......................................................................77 
1. Rent-Seeking Piracy.....................................................................77 
2. Rent-Appropriating Piracy .......................................................100 
viii 
C. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................109 
IV. ANGOLA ............................................................................................................113 
A. PATRONAGE STRUCTURE ..............................................................113 
1. Introduction ................................................................................113 
2. Legacy of Colonialism................................................................114 
3. Post-Independence Centralization ...........................................118 
B. LINKS TO PIRACY ..............................................................................128 
C. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................136 
V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................137 
A. PATRIMONIAL PIRACY? ..................................................................137 
1. Nigeria .........................................................................................137 
2. Angola .........................................................................................138 
B. RISK OF FUTURE PIRACY ...............................................................139 
1. Nigeria .........................................................................................139 
2. Angola .........................................................................................140 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................143 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. “Stability Enabled” vs. “Anarchy as Opportunity”....................................18 
Figure 2. Predicted Count of Pirate Attacks Resulting from Variation in State 
Fragility and Regime Type ........................................................................35 
Figure 3. Number of Actual or Attempted Piracy Events in Nigeria and 
Angola (1991–2019) ..................................................................................38 
Figure 4. Colonial Nigeria at Unification in 1914.....................................................61 
Figure 5. Geopolitical Zone Delineations—Used Internally by the PDP to 
Balance National Office Appointments .....................................................76 
Figure 6. Niger Delta Militant Camps .......................................................................93 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
APC  All Progressives Congress 
ASAM  Anti-Shipping Activity Messages  
bbl  barrels 
bpd  barrels per day 
CINC  Composite Index of National Capability  
COCI  Composite Organized Crime Index  
DDR  decommissioning, disarmament, and rehabilitation 
DPA  distributable pool account 
FAA  Armed Forces of Angola 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization  
FAPLA  People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Forças 
Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola) 
FCC  Federal Character Commission 
FLEC  Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Portuguese: A 
Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda) 
FMG federal military government  
FPSO floating production storage and offloading unit 
FSO  floating storage and offloading unit 
GDP gross domestic product  
GWVSL  Global West Vessel Specialists Nigeria Ltd. 
IMB International Maritime Bureau  
INC  Ijaw National Congress 
IYC  Ijaw Youth Council 
JTF  Joint Task Force  
LGA local government area 
MEND  Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MOSOP  Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
MPLA People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or the People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Labour Party (Portuguese: 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido do Trabalho)  
MT metric tonnes 
xii 
NDA  Niger Delta Avengers 
NDDC  Niger Delta Development Commission 
NDPVF  Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
NDV  Niger Delta Vigilantes 
NGO non-governmental organization 
NIMASA  Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency 
NNOC  Nigerian National Oil Corporation  
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  
NPN  National Party of Nigeria 
OMPADEC  Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
PAP  Presidential Amnesty Program 
PDP  People’s Democratic Party 
PREG  Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups  
Sonangol  National Fuel Society of Angola (Portuguese: Sociedade Nacional de 
Combustíveis de Angola) 
UN United Nations 
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)  




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Recent government and academic interest in modern forms of piracy has been 
driven largely by the sudden proliferation and rapid evolution of sophisticated forms piracy 
off the coast of Somalia in 2007. In the years that followed, qualitative and quantitative 
analyses have begun to converge around a constellation of state, social, economic, and 
geographic variables that correlate to the incidence of piracy in cross-national research. 
Yet, despite the value these models have in identifying states that may be vulnerable to 
piracy, there is a growing recognition that previously unevaluated sub-state dynamics may 
also play a significant role in determining whether piracy takes root. With respect to the 
Gulf of Guinea, scholars frequently link pirate attacks to Nigerian actors operating out of 
the oil-rich Niger Delta, and often cite the negative externalities of the region’s oil 
resources as a key motivator. Angola is Nigeria’s only peer competitor in terms of oil 
production in Western Africa, and based on existing piracy models, Angola has a similar 
piracy risk profile to that of Nigeria. While piracy is pervasive in Nigerian waters—
accounting for 49.8% of all Gulf of Guinea incidents from 1991–2019—piracy incidents 
in Angolan waters account for a mere 2.3% over the same period.1 In an effort to explain 
this apparent dichotomy, this thesis engages in a qualitative, most-similar-systems 
comparative case study of Nigeria and Angola to investigate the potential role of a 
previously unexamined sub-state variable: the degree to which elite rent accumulation 
 
1 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends, Concerns, and 
Propositions,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 3 (2013): 275, https://doi.org/10.1080/
21520844.2013.862767; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—Annual 
Report: 1st January–31st December 1998 (Barking, Essex: ICC 1MB, 1999); International Maritime 
Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—2009 Annual Report (London: International 
Chamber of Commerce, 2010); International Maritime Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships—2011 Annual Report (London: International Chamber of Commerce, 2012); International 
Maritime Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—2015 Annual Report (London: 
International Chamber of Commerce, 2016); International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January–30 September 2016 (London: International Chamber of 
Commerce, 2016); International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Report for 
the Period 1 January–30 June 2018 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, 2018); International 
Maritime Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—2019 Annual Report (London: 
International Chamber of Commerce, 2020). 
2 
strategies and patronage structures foster or inhibit a permissive environment in which 
piracy can flourish. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the period that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, 
substantial attention turned to the threat that ungoverned spaces and non-state actors posed 
to physical security and prosperity in an increasingly interconnected world. Although 
piracy occurring near critical maritime chokepoints in Southeast Asia garnered some 
attention from policy makers and academics, a broader wave of analysis followed the spike 
in piracy off Somalia in 2007. This period of research produced valuable models of pirate 
incentives and environmental constraints, largely with an eye toward chokepoints where 
piracy could most readily inflict damage on global trade routes, particularly in Southeast 
Asia and the Horn of Africa. Piracy “hotspots” that did not immediately threaten critical 
nodes and corridors of the global economy understandably received less analytic attention; 
however, the costs of piracy in these areas remains detrimental to local development and 
has wider knock-on destabilizing effects to both neighboring states and global commercial 
activity. 
Particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has an enormous impact on regional 
economic development due to the critical role that maritime commerce plays with respect 
to access to, and integration with, the global economy.2 Analysis suggests that 50–80% of 
piracy events go unreported, which complicates the measurement of economic costs.3 
Nevertheless, the 2014 U.S. Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan estimates 
that the Nigerian economy alone loses approximately $18 billion per year due to maritime 
 
2 The “Gulf of Guinea” is inconsistently defined in scholarly literature, but for the purposes of this 
thesis, the Gulf of Guinea refers to Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory 
Coast (Côte d’Ivoire), Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
3 Martin N. Murphy, “Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters,” Foreign Policy Research Institute 
Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 432, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.011; White House, United 




criminal activities.4 The indirect costs stemming from the loss of international investment 
and commerce are more difficult to establish, but a natural experiment in Benin provides a 
useful example. Within a year of piracy incidents being reported in Benin’s waters, 
shipping insurance premiums rose drastically, driving a 70% decrease in commercial 
maritime traffic to Benin’s port of Cotonou, and resulting in a 28% decline in state revenue 
for the year.5 The costs imposed by piracy also extend to inland West African states—
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and the Central African Republic—that rely heavily on 
land routes to Gulf of Guinea ports for access to international markets.6 Thus, as rapidly 
expanding youth populations in West Africa demand viable economic prospects, the scale 
of opportunity loss imposed by piracy elevates the risks of domestic violence, trans-
national terrorist recruitment, and mass migration across the region.7 Despite its significant 
costs to local economies, and destabilizing regional effects, Gulf of Guinea piracy is 
unlikely to attract the kind of costly international counter-piracy operations witnessed off 
 
4 White House, 3. 
5 Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo, “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” Africa Security Brief, no. 30 
(February 2015): 3; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Maritime Piracy: Part I—An 
Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications (New York: United Nations, 2014), 22, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2013d1_en.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment (Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013), 51, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/
West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf. 
6 Ban Ki-moon, “Letter dated January 18, 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of the Security Council,” 5, 11, 15, United Nations, 2012, https://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/45; J. Paul Dunne, “‘Order at Sea’ and Landlocked Countries in Africa,” 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2, 2015, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/
blog/2015/order-sea-and-landlocked-countries-africa.  
7 Matthias Flückiger and Markus Ludwig, “Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict: Causal Evidence from 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 9 (2018): 1952; Freedom C. Onuoha, Why Do 
Youth Join Boko Haram? (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2014), 9; Sirkku Hellsten, 
Radicalisation and Terrorist Recruitment Among Kenya’s Youth (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 2016), 3; Aderanti Adepoju, “Migration in West Africa,” Development 46, no. 3 (2003): 
37–38; Grant T. Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” Atlantic Council Africa Center, 
May 2017; Nicholas Cook et al., Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues, Challenges, and U.S. Responses, CRS 
Report No. R44793 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1; Angel Rabasa et al., 
Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2017), 102–106; Thomas Gries and Margarethe Redlin, “Pirates—The Young and the Jobless: The Effect 
of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence and Peace Economics 
(2017): 2. 
4 
the coast of Somalia.8 United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions 2018 and 2039 
place the onus for combatting Gulf of Guinea piracy on the region’s individual states while 
the international community’s direct investment is limited.9 While Gulf of Guinea states 
are gradually building maritime patrol and enforcement capacity, the root causes of piracy 
remain on shore.10 The effective application of limited international and local anti-piracy 
resources therefore requires a nuanced understanding of piracy’s complex causalities on 
land.11 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 2003, Johnson and Pladet coined the term “piracy studies” in an effort to attract 
more serious attention to the phenomenon.12 Their efforts to structure the field, combined 
with renewed attention that accompanied the Somalia piracy surge in 2007, resulted in a 
considerable proliferation of piracy research. In 2011, the annual International Studies 
Association conference included 30 presentations on piracy, while in the three years that 
followed, more than 200 books and articles on piracy were published.13 The piracy 
literature that has emerged spans multiple disciplines and includes a range of explanations 
and interpretations. The field’s initial work largely relied on qualitative case studies in 
high-piracy regions to identify potential pirate motivations and permissive environmental 
factors. Subsequent works examined these variables in large-N cross-sectional analyses to 
identify statistically significant explanatory factors. A debate emerged over whether piracy 
 
8 Serge Rinkel, Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of Guinea: Experience-Based Analyses of the 
Situation and Policy Recommendations (Kiel, Germany: Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-
Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel (ISPK), 2015): 4; Pakiribo S. Anabraba, “Multinational Counter-Piracy 
Operations: How Strategically Significant Is the Gulf of Guinea to the Major Maritime Powers?” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 17–21, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790411; Onuoha, 
“Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, 269. 
9 White House, United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan, 9. 
10 Martin N. Murphy, “The Troubled Waters of Africa: Piracy in the African Littoral,” The Journal of 
the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 1 (2011): 66. 
11 White House, U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: White House, 2012), 3–
4), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf. 
12 Christian Bueger, “Piracy Studies: Academic Responses to the Return of an Ancient Menace,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 49, no. 3 (2014): 407. 
13 Bueger, 407. 
5 
was “anarchy-enabled” or “stability-enabled,” and efforts to reconcile these competing 
findings have highlighted the limitations of existing large-N models and the need for 
further qualitative attention to sub-state dynamics.  
1. Pirate Motivations 
The most significant pirate motivations are the subject of ongoing academic debate; 
however, the explanatory factors can be divided into three broad categories: economic, 
social, and political. A number of piracy researchers have borrowed from organized crime 
literature in their classification of pirates as “rational actors who maximize their expected 
returns subject to constraints.”14 For scholars who ascribe to this cost-benefit approach, a 
strong consensus states that poverty and economic disruptions are leading incentives for 
piracy.15 A number of authors demonstrate an inverse correlation between gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and piracy, which makes the intuitive case that poverty 
incentivizes pirate activity; however, empirical evidence from broader subsequent studies 
 
14 Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “Decentralization, Institutions, and Maritime Piracy,” 
Public Choice 169, no. 3 (December 2016): 360; P. T. Leeson, “An-aargh-chy: The Law and Economics of 
Pirate Organization,” Journal of Political Economy 115, no. 6 (2007): 1049–1094; P. T. Leeson, “Pirational 
Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
76, no. 4 (2010): 497–510; Stephen Ellis and Mark Shaw, “Does Organized Crime Exist in Africa?,” 
African Affairs 114, no. 457 (2015): 505–528; Ursula Daxecker and Brandon Prins, “Insurgents of the Sea: 
Institutional and Economic Opportunities for Maritime Piracy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 6 
(2013): 940–965, doi:10.1177/0022002712453709; Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime 
Terrorism: The Threat to International Security (New York: Routledge, 2007), 12–13; Shelly Whitman and 
Carla Suarez, The Root Causes and True Costs of Marine Piracy, Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project: Marine 
Affairs Program Technical Report #1 (Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, 2012), 89, 
http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Publications. 
15 Jon Vagg, “Piracy, Corruption and the Rule of Law: Some Correlations,” Trends in Organized 
Crime 3, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 72; Jon Vagg, “Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in South East Asia,” 
British Journal of Criminology 35, no. 1 (1995): 63–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/
oxfordjournals.bjc.a048489; Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 21; Ong-Webb, “Piracy in 
Maritime Asia,” 37–94; Ursula E. Daxecker and Brandon C. Prins, “The New Barbary Wars: Forecasting 
Maritime Piracy,” Foreign Policy Analysis 11, no. 1 (2015): 26–27; Eric Frécon, “Pirates Set the Straits on 
Fire … Causes and Context of Pirate Arsons in the Malay Archipelagos Since the Nineties,” in Covering 
Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia, ed. Werner Vom Busch and Tobias Rettig (Singapore: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2005), 17–42; Stefan Eklöf, “Piracy: Real Menace or Red Herring?,” Asia Times 
Online, August 4, 2005; Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (2013): 545; Murat Iyigun and Watcharapong Ratisukpimol, Learning Piracy on 
the High Seas (Boulder : University of Colorado, 2010); Ryan S. Jablonski and Steven Oliver, “The 
Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
57, no. 4 (2013): 682–708. 
6 
demonstrate additional variation that cannot be explained by GDP per capita alone.16 
Jabloski and Oliver therefore go on to examine economic opportunity cost and the effect 
of commodity prices in low-skill industries on piracy events.17 They find decreases in the 
price of labor-intensive commodities—like rice and sugar—cause a decrease in wages and 
make piracy a more appealing alternative.18 Conversely, they find that in capital-intensive 
industries—such as oil production—increase commodity prices and reduce worker real 
wages while simultaneously making commodity theft more lucrative, which thus provides 
dual incentives to engage in piracy.19 In a similar vein, Daxecker and Prins show that when 
the production volume of coastal fisheries decreases, which puts negative pressure on 
fishing wages, piracy increases.20 Meanwhile, Murphy, Percy and Shortland, Regan, and 
Vagg, illustrate the scale of piracy’s economic incentive with figures that show that the 
take-home pay of a single act of piracy can range from $500–$20,000 per pirate, and can 
therefore vastly exceed the $600–$2000 annual per capita GDP found in many of the 
countries where piracy occurs.21 Regan also demonstrates a positive correlation between 
the rate of piracy and unemployment, particularly among young males.22 Related to 
Daxecker and Prins’s research on the link between fishery production and piracy, Vagg, 
Murphy, and Ong-Webb argue that shifting market conditions in which workers lose their 
jobs—both due to economic modernization and periods of market contraction—also cause 
an increase in piracy.23 Murphy, Frécon, and Burnett find that this effect is particularly 
 
16 Iyigun and Ratisukpimol, Learning Piracy on the High Seas, 18–19; Joshua Regan, “The Maritime 
Piracy Index” (PhD diss., University of New Haven, 2018), 11; de Groot, Matthew D. Rablen, and Anja 
Shortland, “Gov-aargh-nance–’Even Criminals Need Law and Order’,” Economics of Security Working 
Paper 46 (2011), 17–18; Jablonski and Oliver, “The Political Economy of Plunder,” 686. 
17 Jablonski and Oliver, 686–687. 
18 Jablonski and Oliver, 695. 
19 Jablonski and Oliver, 688, 692. 
20 Iyigun and Ratisukpimol, Learning Piracy on the High Seas, 18–19; Jablonski and Oliver, 700–
701; Daxecker and Prins, “The New Barbary Wars,” 26–27; Daxecker and Prins, “Insurgents of the Sea,” 
960. 
21 Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 44; Percy and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy 
in Somalia,” 546; Regan, “The Maritime Piracy Index,” 11; Vagg, “Rough Seas?,” 73–74. 
22 Regan, 106–107. 
23 Vagg, “Piracy, Corruption and the Rule of Law,” 75–76; Murphy, 25; Ong-Webb, “Piracy in 
Maritime Asia” 48. 
7 
acute when economic disruptions to sectors employing skilled maritime labor occur—
fishing, commercial shipping, port handling—since it provides a pool of recruits who 
already possess the nautical competency to become successful pirates.24  
While these authors provide compelling evidence to suggest a causal link, Vagg 
and Hansen argue that poverty and economic displacement taken in isolation are 
insufficient to explain all piracy incidents or pirate motivations.25 Hansen shows 
inconsistencies in the relationship between poverty and piracy in Somalia in relation to 
geographic and temporal variables, while Vagg demonstrates how economic displacement 
was tied to piracy spikes in China and Indonesia in the 1990s, but was not a causal factor 
in the piracy found in the Philippines around the same time, which he instead attributes to 
government weakness.26 Based in part on the differences he observed between piracy in 
China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, Vagg was among the first scholars to dedicate 
serious attention to the non-economic aspects of piracy motivations.27 Writing in the mid-
1990s, he observed that not every country that had coastal economic shocks produced 
piracy, and hypothesized “recognition of piracy as an available cultural or subcultural 
possibility” as a necessary social precondition.28 While little progress has been made in 
quantifying the cultural acceptability of piracy for large-N statistical analysis, more recent 
qualitative analyses from Murphy, Whitman and Suarez, Hastings and Phillips, Bueger, 
and Hansen echo Vagg in recognition of what Hansen calls the “social legitimacy of 
piracy.”29 However, some of these later works—notably Hansen, and Whitman and 
Suarez—have taken Vagg’s social observation a step further in arguing that social factors 
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may themselves become motive forces that supersede economic calculations.30 Whitman 
and Suarez assert that in socially and economically marginalized populations, particularly 
in ethnically divided states with high wealth inequality, piracy presents a mechanism for 
upward mobility that the prevailing social order does not otherwise permit.31 That piracy 
provides an opportunity to overcome social inequality alters cost-benefit calculations in a 
way that attracts a larger portion of the population than in areas with a similarly low GDP 
per capita but with more favorable social standing.32 
In addition to economic and social motivations, several authors have made the case 
that piracy can have political motivations. Heller-Roazen argues that since pirates operate 
outside the norms of national and international law and without regard for the delineation 
between states, they blur “the distinction between criminal and political” and therefore 
“cannot be considered common criminals… but they also cannot be represented as lawful 
enemies [of the state].”33 Since pirates do not fit neatly within the structures of either the 
international state system or domestic affairs, they have historically been appealing proxy 
agents for political entrepreneurs on the local or international stage. In that vein, Thomson 
and Colás and Mabee trace how governments of the 1600s came to endorse privateers 
(state-sanctioned pirates), in an effort to disrupt political competitors in the international 
arena, which in turn, fueled piracy’s “golden age” of the 17th and 18th century.34 As pirates 
proliferated, however, their ambiguous role as neither state nor non-state actors posed a 
growing challenge to the legitimacy of the governments that had promoted their growth in 
the first place. As a result, states shifted from sanctioning privateers to trying to eradicate 
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them, and in the process, helped develop the modern conception of sovereignty and 
international relations where pirates exist outside of the framework as “the enemy of all.”35 
Colás and Mabee suggest that modern piracy is unlikely to be driven by political 
motivations since the “structural conflation of wealth-creation and seaborne violence” that 
caused piracy to bloom in the “golden age” is absent in a post-mercantilist world economic 
system.36 While this assertion may be true in highly developed, modern states, it ignores 
states that are not well integrated into the world economy or do not fully satisfy the 
violence-monopolizing prerequisite for Weberian sovereignty. Therefore, Vagg is among 
several scholars who contest Colás and Mabee’s assertion, and show that in many cases, 
modern piracy continues to be “sponsored, condoned, or protected by local elites.”37 Ellis 
and Shaw add that in areas where piracy has grown into an organized crime network, the 
distinctions between “political, economic, and social actors,” become less distinct.38 Prins, 
Phayal, and Daxecker reinforce these conclusions by illustrating that, in some cases, 
insurgents have turned to piracy as a funding strategy in an analogous manner to trading in 
conflict-fueling resources like diamonds and drugs.39 
The emergent conclusion from this diverse array of scholarship is that no single 
source of motivation—be it economic, social, or political—can be taken in isolation to 
explain piracy incidents.  
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2. Permissive Factors 
Regardless of why an individual is motivated to become a pirate, a variety of factors 
related to geography, social characteristics, and state strength and structure have been 
hypothesized to affect whether the environment is conducive to act on these desires. Piracy 
is inherently distinct from other forms of land-based crime due to the peculiar requirements 
of operating on the sea, and as a result, geography is seen to play a major role in defining 
pirate constraints and cost-benefit analyses. In addition to geography, a region’s unique 
social patterns have been argued to influence whether individuals choose to engage in acts 
of maritime crime. Others suggest that even in areas where geographic and social factors 
are highly permissive, these factors are balanced against the strength that the state is able 
to exert in the area. 
Numerous authors emphasize the role of “favorable geography” as an enabler for 
maritime criminals, while debating which geographic characteristics best correlate to 
maritime crime.40 In both qualitative and quantitative analyses, Daxecker and Prins, 
Murphy, and Ong-Web all assert that states with longer coastlines have a greater incidence 
of maritime crime.41 Nincic finds that relationship to be statistically insignificant in her 
model, while Gaibulloev and Sandler find coastline length to be statistically significant in 
only some of the 16 statistical models they constructed.42 In a more recent iteration of the 
debate, Daxecker and Prins argue that the correlation between coastline length and piracy 
is significant, controlling for state weakness.43 
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Contributing to the poor reliability of coastline length as a predictor of piracy 
incidence is the variable’s disregard of geographic nuance. For example, the previous 
models do not account for the difference between coasts with harsh geographical features 
and archipelagic regions that possess better natural sheltering from high seas, poor weather, 
or state intervention. Nor do the models account for the presence of navigable inland 
waterways that offer similar protections and opportunities for maritime criminals. 
Although these factors have yet to be reliably incorporated into quantitative analyses, they 
have featured prominently in qualitative work. Murphy stresses the necessity of “safe 
havens” to shield maritime criminals both from the hazards of the sea and state interference, 
while analyses by Wombwell, Ong-Webb, and Vagg highlight the importance of inland 
waterways and “small islands, bays, coves, and inlets” in supporting prolonged historical 
episodes of piracy in China, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia by 
providing safe havens for maritime criminals.44  
While coastline lengths, the presence of inland waterways, or archipelagic 
geography are immutable terrain characteristics, their permissiveness to maritime crime 
appears to vary relative to the manner in which humans interact with that geography. Nincic 
shows that countries that have established more port facilities tend to have higher levels of 
piracy, particularly where those ports serve as access points to additional inland 
transportation networks.45 Several authors also argue that the extent to which favorable 
geography facilitates piracy is moderated by the density of nearby commercial maritime 
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shipping lanes, particularly when economic incentives funnel them through nearby 
geographic chokepoints.46 
Taking a different approach, Daxecker and Prins operationalize Boulding’s “Loss 
of Strength Gradient” and Herbst’s “authority over distance” theories in large-N modeling 
to demonstrate that in countries with recorded piracy incidents, the distance at which they 
occur from the capital is a function of government effectiveness, length of the country’s 
coastline, and the overall territorial mass of the country.47 Although a strictly geo-spatial 
approach to measuring the projection of state power remains contested by competing 
qualitative models of state power, like that of Mamdani—Daxecker and Prins’ quantitative 
large-N analysis, demonstrates a positive correlation between these three geographic 
variables and the incidence of piracy, independent of the theoretical framework employed 
to explain this statistically significant effect.48 
Though geographic factors are argued to wield heavy influence in determining 
opportunity and permissibility for maritime crime, social characteristics have also been 
found to play a critical role. As previously discussed with respect to pirate motivations, 
Vagg’s argument enjoy widespread support that a necessary social precondition for 
maritime crime is that the perpetrators find “raiding ships at sea [to be] culturally 
‘thinkable.’”49 Even in cases where pirates are free of social grievances and motivated by 
purely economic incentives, Hastings and Philips argue that criminals are still constrained 
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by a set of social norms influenced by local customs.50 Leeson notes that it is particularly 
true for contemporary maritime criminals that tend to live within “normal” land-based 
societies after brief excursions at sea; a stark contrast to the “golden age” pirates of the 
1600s and 1700s who spent long periods of time at sea in isolated social microcosms where 
they developed unique self-governing behavioral constraints.51 As a result, Bueger and 
Murphy argue that maritime crime’s acceptability within local norms is a critical factor in 
determining if otherwise motivated individuals will act on their desires.52 
Another social factor that can catalyze or restrict maritime crime is the prevalence 
of existing maritime skills among the population, what Murphy calls “a cultural affinity for 
the sea.”53 All but the most rudimentary forms of maritime crime require boat handling 
and navigation skills, docking and storage availability, and maintenance knowledge that 
form a barrier to entry for would-be pirates in societies without existing maritime 
traditions.54 Fortifying this claim, several authors demonstrate historical examples where 
economic shocks to fishing industries have led to a corresponding increase in maritime 
crime.55 Murphy notes that this barrier to entry is not absolute; in cases of decaying 
political, social, or economic conditions, incentives to engage in maritime crime may 
sufficiently motivate otherwise inexperienced actors to invest the needed start-up costs to 
develop maritime skills.56 To that end, Bueger, Iyigun and Ratisukpimol, Nincic, and 
Murphy show that once groups achieve even low-level success in maritime crime, they 
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demonstrate iterative growth and learning characteristics that tend to develop into 
increasingly sophisticated criminal networks.57 In quantitative modeling, de Groot, 
Rablen, and Shortland confirm that “higher-value crime develops from lower-value forms 
of crime,” but only in countries where government officials are receptive to bribes, which 
thus allows the complexity of criminal acts to evolve unchecked.58 
In addition to geographic and social permissibility, state strength and structure have 
been argued to regulate the degree to which maritime crime can occur. Wide consensus 
states that weak states present a more permissive environment for piracy than strong states; 
however, the body of piracy literature since 2007 includes an evolution of causal arguments 
as to how the different facets of state power influence maritime crime. The earliest 
arguments in this field understandably sought to relate the rate of piracy to the ability of a 
state’s security force to interdict pirates. Using this simple metric, useful for inter-state 
comparison, Daxecker and Prins observe an intuitive, inverse correlation between the size 
of security forces and the prevalence of maritime crime in territorial waters.59 Although 
this conclusion parallels Murphy, Liss, and Hansen’s qualitative assertions that under-
resourced security forces provide a more permissive environment for maritime criminals, 
other research suggests that Daxecker and Prins’ metric may not account for several 
important security force characteristics beyond sheer size.60 
In her research on Piracy in Southeast Asia, Liss illustrates how the lack of internal 
cooperation or coordination between various state security agencies often undermines that 
state’s ability to combat piracy despite the aggregate size of their combined security 
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forces.61 In addition, Murphy argues that effective maritime interdiction “requires boats 
well equipped with radar, communications and...shore-based command and control 
facilities with access to dependable information.”62 Murphy notes that the costs for such a 
force vastly exceed the costs of standard terrestrial security forces, which suggests a need 
to distinguish between the size of terrestrial and maritime security forces in quantitative 
research.63 In contrast, Hansen argues that effective land-based security forces can achieve 
maritime security by targeting pirate support networks ashore even when a state does not 
have sizeable maritime security forces.64  
Yet even in states with large, well-equipped, security forces, several other factors 
have been identified that can limit their capacity to discourage piracy. Hansen, Vagg, 
Bueger, and Murphy observe that corruption, even within large security forces, can 
continue to foster hospitable conditions for piracy.65 Corrupt officials can permit pirates 
to circumvent enforcement mechanisms, and in some cases, have driven piracy levels even 
higher by actively funding or planning maritime criminal activity.66 In addition, several 
scholars point out that even if security forces are sizable, honest, and have the tools to 
reliably apprehend maritime criminals—on land or sea—they will only discourage piracy 
if their efforts are complimented by a legal system that can effectively prosecute pirates 
and avoid what Kraska calls a “catch and release” cycle.67 Compounding these challenges, 
Wombwell and Murphy demonstrate in historical and qualitative assessments that 
permissive environments for piracy can persist even in the face of effective judicial systems 
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if the attention of security and law enforcement officials is diverted to handle other forms 
of internal or external conflict.68 Researchers have also identified the presence of armed 
groups, organized crime syndicates, and the availability of small arms as indicators of 
existing conditions that are hospitable for the emergence of piracy.69 
Even when considering these state security force effectiveness variables, the role 
of security forces falls short of satisfactorily determining the permissive relationship of 
state power to piracy incidents on its own. Examining a broader set of state-strength 
variables—to include World Bank Governance Indicators, the Failed/Fragile State Index, 
Polity IV dataset, and other multi-factor indicators—a number of authors observed that 
while “failed” states provided a conducive environment for simple maritime crimes, 
sophisticated acts of kidnapping-for-ransom, cargo theft, and hijacking are enabled by at 
least minimally functional state capacity due to their provision of permeable markets and 
infrastructure.70 Subsequent research therefore increasingly draws distinctions between 
unsophisticated and sophisticated piracy, where unsophisticated maritime criminal activity 
varies inversely with economic opportunity, while sophisticated piracy is treated as a 
maritime corollary of traditional organized crime with a parasitic dependency on a weak-
state host.71  
Although a number of authors describe the ways in which weak states facilitate the 
evolution of sophisticated piracy, Coggins provides one of the most comprehensive 
summaries in four subparts.72 First, weak-but-stable states can provide a secure haven that 
reduces the cost of defending their hostages, ships, or cargo against rival profit-seekers, 
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while a functional communications infrastructure enables them to coordinate their 
activities and conduct ransom negations.73 Second, state collapse generally discourages 
nearby commercial shipping, which thus reduces the number of profitable targets compared 
to non-failed weak states.74 Third, poorly regulated, but functional commercial and 
financial markets, along with passable transportation infrastructure, provide easier access 
to the supplies pirates need to mount a sophisticated attack, the ability to sell stolen cargoes 
quickly, and a reliable way to receive and absorb ransom payments.75 Fourth, governments 
with corruptible state officials present a number of opportunities for pirates to reduce their 
operating costs, particularly when bribes allow them to identify lucrative targets, evade law 
enforcement, or even buy state protection from rivals.76 Adding to the applicability of the 
stability-enabled piracy model, Percy and Shortland go on to demonstrate that even where 
a state has collapsed at the national level—as in Somalia—local or informal governance 
structures can often provide necessary levels of stability and infrastructure to achieve a 
stability “sweet spot” that allows sophisticated pirate networks to succeed.77 
While the weak-state-enabled piracy model provides a compelling narrative and 
enjoyed widespread credibility based on qualitative case evidence, a subsequent large-N, 
cross-national qualitative analysis conducted by Daxecker and Prins in 2013 rejected the 
model’s validity and caused a schism in the field. Daxecker and Prins observed that 
previous case studies suffered from selection bias due to a dominant focus on countries 
with existing piracy cases, and consequently structured their model to evaluate a range of 
variables against every coastal country in the world.78 Their results show that “state 
weakness consistently increases the incidence of all piracy events,” both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated, in a near-linear, monotonic fashion that contradicts the “stability-enabled” 
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hypothesis in favor of what Coggins calls an “anarchy as opportunity” model, as seen in 
Figure 1.79  
 
Figure 1. “Stability Enabled” vs. “Anarchy as Opportunity”80 
In addition, Daxecker and Prins open a new dimension of inquiry by looking 
beyond state strength and suggesting that regime type also plays a role. They hypothesize 
that autocratic states have little incentive to combat maritime criminals who do not pose a 
challenge to their continued hold on power, while democracies—being accountable to their 
citizens for the provision of public goods—have greater incentive to combat this activity.81 
While they find that democracies experience measurably fewer hijacking incidents, the 
overall rate of piracy events remained consistent with their autocratic counterparts.82 
However, they demonstrate that state strength and regime type are interactive; among 
strong states, democracies had fewer piracy events than autocracies, but in weak states, 
democracies exhibit higher levels of piracy than autocracies.83 Extending their 
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examination of democracies to a sub-state level in Indonesia, they find that piracy events 
spike around competitive local elections as pirates seek to signal their relevance to local 
politicians, assert dominance over competing pirate factors, and maximize profits before a 
potential change in their existing permissive political relationships. Supporting these 
findings, their study shows greater levels of piracy within 55 km of local elections that 
have narrow electoral margins of victory.84 They apply this approach to a cross-national 
analysis of all states that have experienced piracy. Despite limited data on sub-state 
variation, they find that the effect of electoral timing is at least weakly significant in 
predicting piracy incidence at a national level, which suggests that the development of sub-
state datasets like the one they developed for Indonesia may yield more robust correlation 
and additional insights.85  
Further pursuing the relationship between national and sub-national government 
structures, Gaibulloev and Sandler evaluate government structures across 93 countries and 
find higher levels of piracy in states with more numerous tiers of government and where 
the lowest echelons of government are responsible for larger territories. However, they also 
find that in states whose subnational governments are elected, vice appointed by the central 
government, and where lower tiers of government they enjoyed greater autonomy and 
fiscal decentralization, piracy levels declined.86 Taking a different approach, Hastings and 
Phillips show that piracy in Nigeria and Somalia emerged in ways that reflected the formal 
and informal rules governing each country’s respective governance and economic activity 
norms ashore, and that sub-state variation in these norms can produce differing levels of 
piracy within the same country.87 
Capitalizing on the distinction between “macro (state) and micro (sub-state)” 
variables, Coggins provides a means to reconcile the tension between the “stability-
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enabled” and “anarchy as opportunity” models of piracy.88 Coggins argues that despite 
inconsistent coding and incomplete data on macro-level variables, Daxecker and Prins’ 
monotonic relationship can identify vulnerable states, but in comparing sub-state variation 
in Somalia and Yemen, shows that the “stability-enabled” model retains analytical utility 
in determining where piracy can emerge based on hospitable sub-state dynamics.89 
Hastings and Phillips make a complementary argument in their comparison of piracy in 
Somalia and Nigeria by showing how certain local institutions enable the evolution of 
sophisticated forms of piracy, local infrastructure defines the type of piracy that emerges, 
and local culture imposes constraints on its ultimate scale.90 Coggins therefore suggests 
that progress in establishing a more accurate piracy model relies on the development of 
more effective metrics of sub-state authority.91 To that end, Daxecker and Prins have 
begun constructing a sub-national database for Indonesia, Somalia, and Nigeria where their 
initial findings indicate that piracy thrives in regions that have weak state-level governance, 
but sufficient local governance and infrastructure to provide havens, markets, and 
corruptible security forces.92 Despite this contribution, Daxecker and Prins acknowledge 
that further examination of sub-national variables will be required to develop better 
predictive models of piracy behavior.  
Finally, scholars have identified a diverse array of theoretical causal pathways to 
explain how oil encourages piracy in the Gulf of Guinea specifically. First, oil extraction 
in the region creates piracy-enhancing grievances, notably with respect to environmental 
degradation and perceptions of inequitable resource distribution. Oil-related environmental 
degradation is primarily the result of oil spills and gas flaring, which can severely 
undermine agricultural soil fertility, contaminate drinking water, kill off fish stocks, and 
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cause harmful levels of air pollution.93 This oil-related environmental damage undermines 
the local fishing and agriculture industry, which in turn, leads to higher levels of 
unemployment and resentment towards the oil industry and government.94 Central 
government control of oil revenues also results in at least partial redistribution away from 
oil-producing regions, which naturally presents an opportunity for resentment that can lead 
to armed conflict; an effect that Ross argues is amplified in low-income countries like the 
ones found in the Gulf of Guinea.95 In addition, oil-producing states tend to derive the 
majority of their revenue from oil rents instead of traditional taxes, which gives 
governments wide latitude to act independent of citizen demands and exacerbate citizen 
grievances.96 While oil-related grievances do not guarantee an increase in piracy, they do 
enhance the motivations for populations in oil-producing regions to engage in attacks 
against oil infrastructure—on land and at sea—while improving the likelihood that piracy 
will satisfy the precondition of becoming culturally “thinkable.”97 In addition, Hastings 
and Phillips suggest that pirates employing a counter-oil grievance narrative can continue 
to enjoy cultural acceptance even when their actions evolve past the narrative’s logical 
bounds.98 
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The second mechanism by which oil is argued to encourage piracy is downward 
pressure on local employment opportunities and the creation of alternative illicit prospects, 
which favor pro-piracy cost-benefit calculations. The loss of agricultural and fishing sector 
jobs due to environmental degradation is often compounded by the oil industry’s “enclave 
nature,” whereby oil companies import sophisticated equipment and skilled labor that 
provides relatively few, generally low-skilled, job opportunities for local populations to 
offset oil-related economic losses.99 At a macroeconomic level, oil exports tend to produce 
“Dutch disease,” which raises exchange rates and makes imports cheaper, which 
consequently undermines the development of domestic manufacturing sectors and further 
limits job prospects.100 Oil, in itself, is a valuable commodity whose inelastic demand, 
vulnerability to theft, widespread black markets, and relative ease of laundering for re-
entry into licit markets all create lucrative incentives for illicit activity.101 Fuel subsidies, 
common in oil-producing states, encourage profitable cross-border smuggling of 
subsidized fuel for sale at market prices in neighboring countries; this smuggling can in 
turn lead to domestic shortages that drive the development of black markets to fill unmet 
demand that yields more profits for illicit suppliers.102 The lack of oil production revenue 
transparency decreases public accountability of oil management, which permits higher 
levels of corruption and allows thieves to steal fuel in large quantities without 
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recognition.103 Higher levels of corruption also provide increased opportunities for oil 
thieves, including pirates, to gain reliable entry to licit markets where they can sell stolen 
oil at significant profit.104 These factors combine to create an environment in which pirates 
can be reasonably assured that oil theft at sea will yield sizable profits and therefore tip 
cost-benefit calculations in favor of piracy. Although these conditions make the prospects 
of piracy more attractive, barriers to entry still require organization and financing. 
However, the oil industry inadvertently plays a major role in diverting politically motivated 
insurgents towards organized criminal pursuits. Some of the most lucrative oil-related 
support contracts available to local populations involves the protection of the oil 
infrastructure, and in many cases, these contracts merely involve paying formerly hostile 
armed groups to stop their attacks.105 While this strategy has been effective for oil 
companies to mitigate attacks in the short term, it has created a new criminal ecosystem in 
which already armed and organized groups receive a steady income on the condition that 
they merely turn their attention from politically motivated attacks on oil infrastructure to 
other pursuits, such as covert methods of oil theft, a range of smuggling activities, and 
sophisticated forms of piracy.106 As a result, piracy for the sake of oil theft became a 
common occurrence in the Gulf of Guinea.107 Whether oil is stolen from land-based 
pipelines or from pirate attacks, the illicit nature of the transaction incentivizes 
international buyers to dispatch tanker vessels with large quantities of cash to purchase and 
load this stolen cargo without leaving traceable financial records.108 However, researchers 
have pointed out occasions when competing criminal networks learn about such pending 
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transactions and mount their own pirate attacks that target the illicit cash, or the illicit oil, 
knowing that the attack is likely to be both profitable and unlikely to be reported to 
authorities.109 
The third causal pathway by which oil production can lead to piracy involves the 
activation of political incentives to include the use of piracy to manipulate electoral 
outcomes, influence the government’s distribution of oil resources, fund the continuation 
of oil-inspired insurgent activity, and conduct insurgent political signaling. The immense 
potential for personal enrichment associated with political office in oil-producing states 
creates powerful incentives to gain and retain political power.110 One strategy employed 
by political opposition candidates has been to demonstrate an incumbent’s inability to 
provide sufficient security, and in some cases, opposition candidates have done so by 
intentionally bankrolling high-profile pirate attacks and other militant activity.111 In 
addition, several examples of political entrepreneurs can be shown to provide militant 
groups with funding, weapons, and promises of political cover for future criminal activity 
in exchange for militants’ political support and violent suppression of a political rival’s 
support network.112 Once in office, political figures at the sub-national level are 
incentivized to find novel ways to compete for greater shares of the state’s centrally 
managed oil resources.113 In some cases that has involved covert political support for high-
visibility militant activity to demonstrate a need for the central government to provide 
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greater revenue distribution to the affected region.114 As with militants executing security 
contracts for oil companies, these politically protected militants are subsequently able to 
engage in more sophisticated forms of criminality with little fear of state reprisal.115 While 
it can manifest into a range of criminal activities, it creates conditions that are also well-
suited to the organizational and logistical requirements for piracy. For insurgents with oil-
related grievances who are actively fighting against the central government, piracy 
represents a means to fund their activities, an opportunity for high-visibility political 
signaling, and a way to achieve political objectives.116 In addition, the global 
interconnectivity of the oil market makes pirate hijackings of oil tankers, and attacks on oil 
platforms, an activity that can garner international attention and result in a reduction of 
foreign investment, which in turn, makes it an attractive activity for insurgents seeking to 
leverage political concessions from an oil-producing state.117  
In addition to the numerous oil-related incentives for piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, 
illegal fishing and toxic dumping have also been argued to play a significant role. The 
waters of the Gulf of Guinea have rich fishing stocks, but the governments of Gulf of 
Guinea nations have poor capacity to regulate international commercial fishing vessels in 
their waters.118 The Gulf of Guinea’s fishing industry accounts for nearly 6 million jobs 
and more than $1.5 billion in exports, but illegal fishing is estimated to cost the region an 
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additional $1 billion in lost revenue.119 The environmentally destructive fishing techniques 
used by predominantly foreign illegal fishermen, and their unchecked over-fishing, are 
leading to declines in fish stocks that threaten the viability of the industry.120 As a result 
of the diminishing size and profitability of their fish catches, a growing number of 
fishermen in the region are forced to look for an alternate vocation, many of whom 
subsequently turn to piracy.121 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, HYPOTHESIS, AND RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
As shown in Chapter II, Nigeria and Angola demonstrate a similar set of motive 
and permissive conditions for piracy based on the variables identified in the existing 
literature, yet they have experienced very different levels of piracy. This dissonance 
suggests a shortcoming in existing explanations of piracy and suggests the need to explore 
additional factors. This thesis therefore borrows from recent scholarship regarding rent 
centralization in explaining divergent developmental outcomes in neo-patrimonial states 
that display otherwise similar levels of rent accumulation and patronage. Specifically, this 
thesis argues that decentralized rent management practices heighten the incentives for 
piracy in Nigeria, while highly centralized rent management mechanisms discourage piracy 
in Angola. 
The existing literature on rent centralization is focused on neo-patrimonial regimes 
in developing countries where scholars predicted poor economic performance yet observed 
growth in some countries and stagnation in others. Understanding this literature requires a 
brief review of key theoretical terms. Neo-patrimonial regimes contain the legal-rational, 
bureaucratic mechanisms typical of modern states in the Weberian mold, yet they distort 
or circumvent formal state processes with the informal and discretionary exercise of 
personalized power to distribute state resources through patron-client networks that serve 
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as the true basis of their political legitimacy. In such a system, patrons appropriate 
politically controlled state resources for distribution to their clients in exchange for political 
support, while prospective clients are incentivized to engage in competitive rent-seeking 
to secure preferential access to patronage, prebends, and rents. “Patronage” can connote 
any patron-endowed benefit to a client, but often takes the form of privileged access to 
state services, public sector jobs, licenses, state-backed financing, and foreign exchange. 
A “prebend” is a unique form of patronage in which a patron vests control of a state office 
or authority to a client who is subsequently permitted to exploit it for personal financial 
gain with minimal state oversight. Another mode of patronage is access to a state-
controlled “rent.” The term “rent” is defined in economic literature as an inefficient market 
condition that generates “excess income” above an optimized condition of market 
operation. Rents typically arise from the market distortions associated with monopolies, 
tariffs, subsidies, natural resource management, and corruption, among others. Meanwhile, 
“rent-seeking” activities create additional market inefficiencies as individuals or groups 
expend effort and resources to secure advantageous access to rents, generally through 
persuasion efforts—whether legal or illegal—like lobbying, political contributions, 
bribery, extortion, protests, violence, etc.122 
Given the market inefficiencies associated with rents and rent-seeking 
characteristic of neo-patrimonial systems, developmental state theorists and policy 
practitioners had largely coalesced around the conclusion that neo-patrimonial regimes 
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were fundamentally incompatible with long-term economic growth.123 However, Khan 
and his colleagues note that rent-seeking and rent distribution have been pervasive not only 
in more slowly developing Asian countries but also in some of the most rapidly developing 
ones. Their research suggests that the solution to this puzzle lies in variations in rent 
centralization within patrimonial structures in developing Asian countries, rather than 
variations in the extent of rent-seeking and rent distribution. Where control of always-
pervasive rent is more centralized, rent tends to be used more productively, which then 
leads to better economic development outcomes.124 Lewis extends the analysis cross-
regionally and argues that the development of centralized rent management practices in 
Indonesia, and decentralized rent mechanisms in Nigeria, produced starkly different 
economic outcomes for the two countries despite similar developmental starting points in 
the early 1960s and comparable endowments of oil resources thereafter.125 
Kelsall et al. follow these works with an analysis of rent centralization across a 
range of African cases to conclude that centralized control over rent distribution, in 
combination with long time horizons of elites, have been associated with greater economic 
development in African countries going back to the 1970s in what they describe as 
“developmental patrimonialism.” In their preliminary work, they identify five African 
cases that meet the parameters of their concept for “developmental patrimonialism” and 
note that four were “dictatorial single-party regimes” while the fifth was a “dominant party 
regime [with] a reputation for political intolerance.” They also suggest that “vigorous 
multi-party competition” and presidential term limits are likely to undermine positive 
developmental outcomes of patrimonial regimes since they undermine elite incentives to 
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discipline rent management “by encouraging leaders to take a short-term view of rent 
allocation.”126  
The body of rent centralization literature therefore suggests that a centrally 
disciplined approach to rent distribution guided by long-term objectives—even if these 
objectives are narrowly self-serving of elite interests—tends to promote more productive 
use of state-controlled rents while limiting counter-productive or unsanctioned rent 
activities, and thereby, achieve positive developmental outcomes.127 Although these 
observations have worrying implications for proponents of African democracy—especially 
given the tendency for African democracies to derive their legitimacy from diffuse 
clientelist distributions—this literature illuminates the relevance of an important new 
dimension of regime structures that can have broad impacts on elite behavior, modes of 
clientelist distribution, and economic outcomes. 
Slater adds a complementary line of research to discern the motivations that drive 
elites to adopt either centralized or decentralized rent strategies by illustrating contrasting 
models of elite “protection pacts” versus “provision pacts.” On one hand, when elites share 
a common perception of endemic threats to their “property, privilege, and persons,” they 
tend to unite in “elite collective action” behind what Slater calls a “protection pact.” In 
protection pacts, elites cede individual power to centralized, strong, and durable 
mechanisms of state power—typically under authoritarian control—to suppress long-term 
threats. In doing so, they submit to a degree of agency to a central authoritarian to enable 
their long-term interests. Conversely, when factional elites lack a shared conception of a 
protection imperative, centralized control is only maintained by reversing the power 
dynamic, where the central authority derives legitimacy based on patronage distributions 
to buy support of a governing coalition from elite factions. In this case, what Slater calls a 
“provision pact,” elites tend to engage in short-term, zero-sum competition for patronage 
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spoils. Slater also notes that the elite recognition of mutual interests is grounded in “critical 
antecedents” provided by pre-independence “social and territorial cleavages,” which 
influences elite disposition towards the adoption of either protection or provision pacts. 
Where elites fail to unify in protection pacts, provision pacts provide an inherently less 
stable mode of central rule, yet when supplied with a centralized pool of resources, such as 
oil revenues, they can persist while adaptively responding to competing elite interests, 
albeit at a heavily discounted level of patronage efficiency. Slater’s model therefore 
provides analytical utility in its illustration of elite collective action incentives, or lack 
thereof, in identifying the rent centralization patterns.128 
Building from these insights, this thesis explores the hypothesis that the variation 
in elite competition and modes of clientelist distribution that stem from a state’s approach 
to rent management strongly influences piracy outcomes. Specifically, it investigates the 
hypothesis that Nigeria’s decentralized, competitive, and short-term rent management 
environment is indicative of an elite provision pact that permits or even promotes piracy as 
both a form of rent-seeking and subsequently as a prebendal mode of stabilizing patronage 
distribution. Conversely, it explores how Angola’s centralized, longer-term, rent 
management environment is founded on a protection pact that inhibits the development of 
piracy, despite environmental motive and permissive conditions that may otherwise prove 
hospitable. In sum, this thesis presents a hypothesis that the centralization of rent 
management is inversely correlated with piracy incidence. 
To investigate this hypothesis, this thesis conducts a qualitative, most-similar-
systems comparative case study of Nigeria and Angola. Chapter II shows that Nigeria and 
Angola have similar values on the explanatory variables identified in the existing piracy 
literature, which therefore cannot account for their divergent piracy incidences. The rest of 
the thesis then examines the key variable on which their values differ—rent 
centralization—and traces its relationship to piracy incidents. Chapter III sketches the rent 
accumulation and distribution system in Nigeria and analyzes its relationship to piracy 
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incidence, and Chapter IV does the same for Angola. Chapter V draws comparative 
conclusions based on the findings in Chapters III and IV, assesses the risk of future piracy 
in Angola, and offers policy recommendations. Source material for this work is composed 
predominantly of secondary scholarly research. 
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II. EVALUATING THEORIZED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN 
NIGERIA AND ANGOLA 
Out of 1,104 actual or attempted attacks recorded by the International Maritime 
Bureau in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991 to 2019, 49.8% (550) occurred in Nigerian waters, 
while only 2.3% (25) occurred in Angolan waters.129 Similarly, a database of Anti-
Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) maintained by the U.S. National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency lists 1,227 incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991 to 2019, of which 
57.9% (711) come from Nigeria and compared to 1.5% (19) from Angola.130 Of note, these 
figures do not include recorded instances of Nigerian pirates conducting attacks in the 
waters of Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Togo; 
widespread consensus states that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is predominantly a 
phenomenon of Nigerian origin.131 Existing research points to a constellation of variables 
that correlate with an increased risk of piracy; however, virtually all these variables predict 
either similar levels of piracy in the two countries, or higher levels in Angola. The 
following sections examine the theorized variables most closely related to piracy 
incidence—state strength, demographics, economic indicators, and geography—for both 
Nigeria and Angola to demonstrate that they do not explain sufficiently the difference in 
the observed rate of piracy in the two countries. Both quantitative and qualitative theories 
fail to account for the wide disparity in the countries’ piracy incidence. 
A. STATE WEAKNESS AND REGIME TYPE 
In their large-N study evaluating all coastal states globally from 1991–2010, 
Daxecker and Prins conclude that the most significant predictive variable for piracy 
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incidence is state weakness, as measured by the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility 
Index.132 The State Fragility Index measures a state’s relative strength or weakness based 
on eight sub-variables and ranks countries on a 25-point scale from “no fragility” to 
“extreme fragility.”133 From the first report in 1995 to the most recent report in 2018, 
Angola and Nigeria had nearly identical average fragility values of 18.67 and 18.92, 
respectively.134 Daxecker and Prins’s model predicts that a fragility difference of 0.25 
should yield a difference of 0.031 more piracy incidents in Nigeria in a given year, other 
variables being held equal. In reality, Nigeria has averaged 19.7 more incidents than 
Angola each year from 1995–2018.135 State fragility therefore explains virtually none of 
the difference in piracy incidents between Nigeria and Angola. 
Daxecker and Prins also demonstrate an interactive relationship between state 
fragility and regime type in which strong democracies experience marginally less piracy 
than autocracies; however, among weak states, the impact of regime type is reversed and 
indicates a more significantly prominence of piracy in weak democracies than in weak 
autocracies. The POLITY5 database used in Daxecker and Prins’ model to measure the 
strength of democratic and authoritarian regimes rated Angola as a consistently 
authoritarian regime from 1975–2018, while Nigeria is rated as a weak democracy after 
the transition to civilian rule in 1999 and strengthens slightly after the democratic transition 
of power in 2015.136 Taking the average values from the aforementioned State Fragility 
Index, and interpolating the regime type effects predicted on the chart from Daxecker and 
Prins in Figure 2, the interactive effect of state fragility and regime type should account for 
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0.3 more piracy events each year in a weak Nigerian democracy than a weak Angolan 
autocracy, far short of the observed average annual difference of 19.7 incidents. While both 
the independent effect of state fragility and its interactive effect with state regime type 
indicate that Nigeria should have slightly more piracy than Angola, they only predict a tiny 
fraction of the actual difference.137 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Count of Pirate Attacks Resulting from Variation in 
State Fragility and Regime Type138 
 
137 Daxecker and Prins, 955–960. 
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B. DEMOGRAPHICS 
In quantitative analysis of countries with recorded piracy incidents and all 
countries with coastlines, Daxecker and Prins find a positive correlation between the 
natural log of total population and piracy incidents with coefficients of 0.200 and 0.546, 
respectively.139 Taking the natural log of population values in Angola and Nigeria from 
1995–2018 and multiplying them by the aforementioned coefficients indicates that 
Nigeria should have an average of 0.39 to 1.06 more piracy incidents per year than 
Angola, other things being equal; however, in reality, Nigeria averaged 19.7 more 
piracy events per year than Angola from 1995–2018.140 The difference in total 
population size could explain only a tiny fraction of the difference in piracy incidents 
between Nigeria and Angola. 
In a study of 144 coastal countries using piracy data from 1990–2015, Gries and 
Redlin find that a 1% increase in the “youth bulge”—the percentage of males and 
females aged 15–24 within the total population—corresponds, on average, with a 16.8% 
increase in the rate of piracy.141 According to the UN World Population Prospects 
dataset used by Gries and Redlin, Nigeria’s youth population (ages 15–24) made up an 
average of 19.4% of the total population from 1990–2015, while Angola’s youth 
population averaged 19.5% over the same period.142 Since the “youth bulge” in Angola 
is 0.1% larger than in Nigeria, Gries and Redlin’s model suggests that Angola should 
have marginally higher (1.68%) piracy incidence. The youth bulge cannot explain 
actual cross-national differences in Nigerian and Angolan piracy. 
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In a second model, Gries and Redlin find that “youth bulge” interacts with the 
degree of youth male “labor force participation,” where higher levels of employment 
reduce the impact of large youth populations on piracy.143 Gries and Redlin’s model 
predicts that the 0.1% increase in the Nigeria’s “youth bulge” between 1990 and 2015 
(from 18.8% to 18.9%) interacting with a corresponding 32.9% youth labor force 
participation should be associated with a 3% increase in piracy, while the 0.5% increase 
in Angola’s “youth bulge” (from 18.8% to 19.3%) interacting with a 55.7% youth labor 
participation should be associated with a 5% increase in piracy.144 However, the chart 
of International Maritime Bureau (IMB) data in Figure 3 shows that piracy incidents in 
Nigeria grew at an approximate rate of 30% per year from 1991–2015, while piracy 
incidents in Angola remained stagnant over the same period. Thus, even accounting for 
Angola’s higher labor force participation rate, “youth bulge” still fails to explain the 
differences in Nigerian and Angolan piracy. 
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Figure 3. Number of Actual or Attempted Piracy Events in Nigeria and 
Angola (1991–2019)145 
In his evaluation of the effect of 11 purported piracy-inducing variables on 
temporal variation in the intensity of pirate activity in 11 piracy-affected countries over a 
period of 30 years, Regan finds only four to be statistically significant. In line with Gries 
and Redlin and Daxecker and Prins, the first two of these are male youth (15–24) 
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unemployment rates and population growth.146 He finds that every 1% increase in the rate 
of male youth unemployment results in 3.05 additional pirate attacks.147 Based on World 
Bank data from 1991–2019 for Nigeria and Angola, Regan’s model predicts that male 
youth unemployment should cumulatively account for 17.0 additional attacks in Angola 
and 3.1 in Nigeria over the 1991–2019 period.148 IMB data from 1991–2019 shows a 
cumulative total of 25 attacks in Angola and 550 in Nigeria; thus, Regan’s model cannot 
explain the observed variation in the dependent variable over time. 
Regan also finds that each one million increase in population is associated with 
0.61 more piracy attacks in each subsequent year, other things being equal. World Bank 
population data from 1991–2018 shows an average annual population growth of 
approximately 0.7 million in Angola and 3.6 million in Nigeria, which implies an annual 
increase of 0.41 piracy incidents per year in Angola and 2.19 incidents per year in 
Nigeria.149 In reality, IMB data from 1991–2018 shows the average change in year-to-year 
incidents in Angola is 0.05 and in Nigeria 1.31. Thus, population growth could explain the 
difference in annual growth of piracy in the two countries better than other variables in the 
literature. Still, it overpredicts growth in Angolan piracy by an order of magnitude (and in 
Nigeria by only 67%), which indicates that it does not account well for the reality of very 
limited and stagnant piracy in Angola.150 
C. ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Regan’s third and fourth significant variables are economic. His study shows that a 
decline of total fish export values and absolute GDP correlates with increases in piracy 
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incidents.151 With respect to fish export values, Regan shows that a one million dollar 
decrease in fish export values results in a 0.02 increase in piracy incidents.152 Data from 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) from 1991–2017 shows an 
average annual increase in fishery export value of $2.9 million per year in Angola and $1.3 
million per year in Nigeria.153 These fish export increases should therefore correspond to 
decreases in annual piracy incidents at an annual rate of 0.58 in Angola and 0.26 in Nigeria. 
The effects of the fish export values suggest greater downward pressure on piracy growth 
in Angola than Nigeria, but the scope of the prediction again can explain only a tiny fraction 
of the actual variation in difference in piracy growth between the two countries, where 
Nigeria averaged 19.5 attacks per year from 1991–2017, and Angola averaged just 1.8 
attacks annually.154 Regan also finds that for every one million dollars of annual GDP 
decline, a corresponding 0.021 increase occurs in piracy events.155 According to World 
Bank data from 1991–2018, Angola had an average GDP growth of $3.52 billion per year, 
while Nigerian GDP grew by $12.89 billion per year.156 Regan’s model would therefore 
suggest that Angolan piracy should be declining at an average rate of 74.0 events per year 
from 1991–2018, while Nigerian piracy should decline at 3.7 times that rate (270.8 
incidents per year). This decline does not help us understand the actual pattern of much 
more rapid growth in piracy in Nigeria.157 
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Daxecker and Prins find the natural log of GDP per capita to have statistically 
significant negative correlation with piracy incidents.158 However, summarizing the 
anticipated piracy effect of GDP per capita from 1991–2018, the model only predicts a 
cumulative total of 4.5 more piracy incidents in Nigeria.159 GDP per capita thus accounts 
for less than 1% of the observed difference in piracy incidents between Angola than Nigeria 
from 1991–2018.160 
D. GEOGRAPHY 
Across several different studies, Daxecker and Prins identify three statistically 
significant geographic variables: the length of a country’s coastline, the size of its overall 
land area, and the average distance from its capital to its coastline.161 They find that piracy 
incidence positively correlates with coastline length (natural log of kilometers) with a 
coefficient of 0.242.162 The Angolan coastline is 1,600 km, while the Nigerian coastline is 
853 km (natural logs 7.38 and 6.75, respectively), which should yield 9.3% more piracy 
incidents in Angola than Nigeria (3.13 compared to 2.86).163 As this length predicts greater 
piracy in Angola than Nigeria—the inverse of actual levels—coastline length does not help 
explain the difference of piracy levels between Angola and Nigeria. 
Daxecker and Prins also find a positive coefficient of 0.623 for a correlation of total 
land area (natural log of kilometers squared) and piracy incidents.164 With Angola’s land 
mass measuring 1,246,700 km2 and Nigeria’s measuring 923,768 km2 (natural logs of 
14.04 and 13.74, respectively), the model predicts a 2.2% greater piracy in Angola than 
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Nigeria.165 As with coastline length, the model predicts the inverse behavior of actual data, 
and as a result, does not contribute to an explanation of the difference between the two 
countries. 
Lastly, Daxecker and Prins find positive a correlation between the rate of piracy 
incidents and the natural log of distance between state capitals and their coastline, where 
this variable is calculated based on the average of two values for each state: first, the closest 
distance to the coast (zero in the case of Angola where the capital, Luanda, is on the coast), 
and second, the distance from the capital to the furthest coastal point in the country’s 
territory.166 Angola’s capital-coastline distance is 525 km, while Nigeria’s is 474 km 
(natural logs of 6.26 and 6.16, respectively), which should yield a 1.6% greater rate of 
piracy in Angola than Nigeria.167 As with the other two geographic variables, capital-
coastline distance predicts the inverse of the real-world relationship between Angolan and 
Nigerian piracy levels. Therefore, in aggregation, geographic variables consistently predict 
lower piracy in Nigeria and Angola. 
E. THE ROLE OF OIL 
As discussed in the literature review, several qualitative studies have hypothesized 
that oil-producing states face numerous incentives for piracy. The central government’s 
control of and reliance upon oil rents—common to both Nigeria and Angola, where oil 
profits have respectively accounted for 68% and 72% of government revenues from 2001–
2017—obviates the need to tax the population, which thereby undermines government 
responsiveness to citizen demands and raising the prospect of grievance-driven piracy that 
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targets the oil industry.168 Even as Nigeria and Angola have sought to diversify their 
economies to reduce their reliance on the unpredictable swings in oil revenues, by 2018, 
they still accounted for 89% of Angolan exports and 87% of Nigerian exports.169 Nigeria 
and Angola continue to suffer the macroeconomic effects of the “Dutch disease,” which 
has degraded the economic development of non-oil industries. The resulting economic 
shocks that accompany sharp declines in oil prices—like the crash in June 2014 where oil 
prices unpredictably fell from $106/barrel to $45/barrel in less than six months and 
continued to fluctuate around the $45/barrel for the next six years—have driven the 
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Nigerian and Angolan governments to reduce government spending drastically on public 
goods, which produces economic hardship that disproportionately affects lower income 
populations, who are in turn, more susceptible to criminalization. As global oil prices 
impact Nigerian and Angolan oil sales relatively uniformly (barring minor variations from 
the region-specific chemical variations and nuances related to marketing practices and 
long-term contracts), and because both governments are equally reliant on oil revenues, the 
resulting grievance and greed-driven incentives for piracy should be similar in both 
countries.  
Another factor highlighted in the literature review is the enclave nature of the oil 
industry, which tends to minimize the development of skilled employment opportunities 
for local populations, who, in the absence of alternate forms of economic development, 
tend to remain dependent on traditional forms of subsistence like agriculture and fishing. 
However, these traditional means of subsistence tend to be disproportionately affected by 
environmental degradation, which is common to oil extraction. In the oil-producing regions 
of Nigeria’s Niger Delta and Angola’s Cabinda province, local populations have 
complained that oil spills have undermined the viability of farming and traditional fishing 
grounds. The scale of environmental devastation is well documented in Nigeria, where the 
World Wildlife Fund reported that the Niger Delta has experienced the equivalent oil 
spillage as the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, repeated every year for each of the first 50 
years of oil production in Nigeria.170 As a result, the viability of both farming and fishing 
activity in the Niger Delta has been undermined, which has caused widespread popular 
grievances focused on the oil industry and driven displaced local workers to search for 
alternate forms of subsistence that has thereby heightened popular acceptance of criminal 
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pursuits. In several cases, Nigerian pirates have explicitly cited environmental degradation 
as a motivating factor for their attacks.171 
In the case of Angola, government suppression of unfavorable media and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) reporting and a pronounced sensitivity towards oil 
industry interference have made it difficult to measure the comparative scale of 
environmental degradation. While international awareness of the Angolan oil industry’s 
environmental impacts falls well below the attention paid to Nigeria, the limited reporting 
assembled in recent years suggests that the impacts are no less devastating to local 
populations in Angola’s Cabinda province. Angola’s oil production is predominantly 
concentrated offshore of Cabinda, and although a comparatively lower visibility of 
offshore spills has occurred, their effects on the marine and coastal environment are often 
more significant than land-based spills due to their wide dispersal. In that vein, local 
artisanal fishermen in Cabinda—where fishing is a primary source of livelihood and 
protein consumption for a sizeable portion of the local population—have seen fishing 
stocks plummet since oil slicks began washing ashore in the 1960s and 1970s. Growing 
food insecurity has corresponded with a rise in alcoholism and drug use in fishing 
communities, yet, unlike Nigeria, these communities have so far not turned to piracy in the 
face of similar oil-induced social and economic destabilization.172 
Another characteristic common to oil-producing states that may encourage piracy 
is the common practice of subsidizing fuel for their populations. While this practice enjoys 
broad popular support as one of the few ways average citizens can benefit from oil export 
profits, it creates incentives to smuggle the subsidized fuel into neighboring states to sell 
at a profit. The resulting smuggling networks give pirates a readily accessible market in 
which to offload large quantities of fuel obtained in tanker hijackings quickly. For decades, 
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both Angola and Nigeria subsidized refined petroleum products to price levels far below 
those found in their neighboring states. From 1998–2018, subsidized Nigerian refined 
petroleum products were 47% cheaper than the average price in neighboring states of 
Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, while subsidized Angolan products over the same 
period were 55% cheaper than the average price in its territorial neighbors of Zambia, 
Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo. Thus, Nigeria 
and Angola share comparable levels of both cross-border smuggling incentives and illicit 
petroleum market access, thus illicit market availability does not appear to account for the 
divergence between their rates of piracy incidence.173 
Lastly, existing literature suggests that the redistribution of oil revenues away from 
oil producing areas is a source of communal grievance that can serve as a motivating factor 
for piracy. In this regard, Nigeria and Angola appear to present similar piracy incentives. 
In Nigeria, oil-producing states and localities have been constitutionally entitled since 1999 
to retain 13% of oil revenues produced within their territories. Similarly, in Angola, the 
government consented in 2006 to direct 10% of the region’s oil revenues back to Cabinda, 
up from 1%. In both cases, widespread complaints were raised that these (limited) funds 
are diverted by elites and provide little benefit to local populations, which thereby fails to 
alleviate resource distribution grievances. As a result, conflict over “resource control” has 
been a consistent element of insurgent narratives in the Niger Delta and has been explicitly 
cited as a motivating factor by pirates attacking the region’s oil infrastructure to press the 
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government to increase local revenue retention.174 Angola’s Cabinda separatists have also 
cited the diversion of oil revenues as a core grievance and they have used attacks on oil 
company pipelines to articulate these grievances. Thus far, these attacks have not extended 
to piracy as a mechanism to or as a challenge to the state to alter resource distributions.175 
Thus, while the qualitative arguments that resource distribution inequality is a source of 
communal grievance in oil-producing regions hold true in both Nigeria and Angola, it does 
not sufficiently explain why these grievances contribute to piracy in Nigeria, but not 
Angola. 
F. ETHNIC FACTIONALIZATION AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
As discussed in the literature review, qualitative studies have hypothesized that 
high levels of economic inequality and ethnic factionalization encourage societal 
acceptance of, and motivations, to pursue piracy as an alternate mechanism for upward 
social mobility in countries with few other options. However, comparable levels of ethnic 
factionalization and income inequality can be found in Nigeria and Angola. Each country 
contains three primary ethnic groups whose interaction has defined political competition 
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since at least independence. Empirical measurements used in cross national comparisons 
show nearly equal levels of ethnic factionalization in Nigeria and Angola, with Posner’s 
measure of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) across 42 African countries ranking 
Nigeria and Angola as the fifth and six most fractionalized, respectively.176 
Meanwhile, both countries are notorious for their income inequality, which can be 
seen in their GINI coefficients, where a score of 1.0 represents a theoretical worst case in 
which a single person controls all national wealth and where a 0.0 is a perfectly equal 
distribution of wealth across the total population. Although GINI coefficients have been 
measured at irregular intervals, both countries have similar scores and have also been 
progressively trending towards greater income inequality. Angola scored 0.427 in 2008 
while Nigeria scored 0.430 in 2009; by 2013, Nigeria had increased to 0.488, and by 2018, 
Angola had increased to 0.513. These analogous levels of ethnic factionalization and 
economic inequality should therefore exert comparable levels of pro-piracy influence in 
both countries.177 
G. THE ROLE OF NUANCED GEOGRAPHY, SECURITY FORCE 
CAPACITY, AND CORRUPTION IN THE AVAILABILITY OF PIRATE 
SAFE HAVENS 
The availability of protected havens from which pirates may safely operate has 
featured prominently in qualitative analyses; however, large-N piracy studies have yet to 
instrumentalize the role of nuanced geographic features, such as inland waterways, 
protected coves, and scattered islands hypothesized to protect pirate activity. In this regard, 
the extensive system of creeks, islands, and waterways associated with the Niger Delta 
appears at first glance to be more hospitable to pirates than the comparatively exposed 
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coastline of Angola’s Cabinda province. However, this distinction is mitigated to a degree 
by Cabinda’s proximity to the Congo River, separated by a mere 25-mile swath of coastline 
belonging to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Congo River—whose southern banks 
are Angolan territory—provides numerous inland creeks and waterways that can provide 
suitable pirate havens. Although not immediately co-located with Cabinda’s existing 
separatist organizations, the Angolan side of the Congo River’s mouth is marked by one of 
the few Angolan onshore oil production sites outside of Cabinda in the municipality of 
Soyo. The population of this region faced extensive violence from actors on both sides of 
civil war; thus, lingering resentment and an enduring sense of oil disenfranchisement seem 
to provide a receptive atmosphere for the area’s use as a pirate haven. Lastly, in the wake 
of declining fish stocks from offshore oil spills, fishermen from Cabinda have been 
increasingly traversing to the mouth of the Congo River in search of better fishing 
prospects that indicates an existing proficiency with the maritime operational requirements 
needed to leverage pirate bases there. In sum, although the Niger Delta does present more 
immediate access to geographically suitable havens, the Congo River should provide 
similarly accessible geographic havens to would-be Angolan pirates.178 
At the core of the argument that certain geographic features promote a hospitable 
environment for piracy is the notion that these features hinder the penetration of state 
power, which in turn, reduces perceived risk and cost to conduct pirate operations. Thus, 
while geographic features may play a role in protecting pirates by hindering state 
intervention, if state security forces demonstrate the capacity to overcome these geographic 
barriers, their advantages to pirates are diminished, if not lost entirely. From this 
standpoint, Nigeria and Angola again display similar characteristics. Both countries have 
large militaries with approximately 130,000 personnel in Nigeria and 108,000 personnel in 
Angola with roughly equivalent military expenditures, which quantitative models suggest 
 
178 Reed, Crude Existence, 7–8, 70–76; Baumüller et al., The Effects of Oil Company Activities on the 
Environment, Health and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 20–21. 
50 
a comparable capacity to suppress piracy with marginally less piracy in Nigeria than 
Angola, contrary to the observed outcome.179  
A more multi-faceted measure of military capacity is the Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC), which demonstrates statistical significance in modeling by 
Daxecker and Prins. The CINC accounts for both military size and expenditure levels but 
also includes measures of iron and steel production, energy consumption, total population, 
and urban population to establish an overall metric of prospective military power. In this 
regard, the CINC model is admittedly biased towards metrics for industrialized inter-state 
warfare rather than the types of internal security operations directed at countering pirates. 
By these metrics, the most recent set of CINC data from 2012 indicates that Nigeria 
possesses 0.91% of total global capacity compared to Angola’s 0.24%, respectively 
ranking 21st and 55th globally out of 195 measured polities. In Daxecker and Prins’ 
modeling, this ranking suggests that Nigeria, with greater material power, should 
experience measurably less piracy than Angola, which fails to bear out in observed piracy 
levels.180 
Noticeably absent in existing quantitative piracy modeling is an inclusion of non-
military security forces, such as police, border patrol, customs officials, and the like. 
Qualitative analyses suggest that these forces play a significant role in determining state 
permissiveness toward piracy; however, quantitative data is not readily available for many 
countries, including Angola. While reliable numbers for the size of national police forces 
in Angola are not publicly available, their personnel budget exceeds that of the military, 
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and overall manpower is likely at least equivalent to the Angolan military’s 100,000+ 
personnel, while off-budget expenditures for intelligence services, special-purpose 
enforcement units, and private security forces, further increase the aggregate size of 
Angola’s state security forces considerably. Meanwhile, the Nigerian police force is among 
the largest in Africa with roughly 377,000 personnel. Thus, although a direct quantitative 
comparison of state security forces is not possible with current data, available information 
suggests similar state enforcement capacity in both countries fails to account for the 
divergent piracy outcomes.181  
Beyond the overall size and capacity of each country’s security forces, their manner 
of employment and effectiveness in piracy-prone regions has been established in 
qualitative studies as a key factor to determine the viability of pirate safe havens. In this 
regard, Nigeria and Angola are again similar in that they have each deployed large 
contingents of security forces to their coastal oil-producing regions. In Angola’s Cabinda 
province, an evolving mix of Cuban forces, mercenaries, and state security forces have, 
since independence in 1975, protected critical oil infrastructure against threats from both 
Cabinda separatists and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) (UNITA) rebels. Most recently, 
after the military defeat of UNITA rebels in 2002, the Angolan Armed Forces deployed a 
contingent of 50,000 soldiers to Cabinda to crush any lingering prospects of separatism. 
For their part, Nigerian forces deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) to quell Niger Delta unrest 
in 2003 that, while smaller than the Angolan deployment to Cabinda, has remained a 
dominant force in the region since then. The JTF has demonstrated a capacity to track 
militant movements, identify and destroy their strongholds, and map out the sites of illegal 
oil refineries and pipeline taps. However, despite their ability to track illicit activities and 
mobilize overwhelming force against them, press reports and academic field studies 
routinely cite JTF complicity in organized criminal activities that allow oil smugglers and 
pirates to operate with minimal interference. Thus, while the quantitative metrics to 
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measure the strength of state security forces suggest a similar capacity to eliminate pirate 
safe havens in both Nigeria and Angola, the failure of Nigerian security forces to employ 
their forces effectively to mitigate piracy suggests that piracy outcomes are mediated by 
other factors that extend beyond security force capacity.182 
Another enabler of piracy discussed in the literature relates to the corrupt practices 
of public officials that enable a permissive environment for the transfer of illicit products 
to licit markets, the unimpeded operation of illicit parallel market, or the impetus by corrupt 
politicians to sponsor piracy as a means to divert state fund for personal profit. With respect 
to this type of corruption and the operation of parallel markets, conventional metrics 
suggest that Nigeria and Angola have similar characteristics. The 2018 Corruption 
Perceptions Index rates Nigeria and Angola among the least effective countries in the world 
at controlling corruption, ranking 144 and 165, respectively, out of 180 countries. In a 
similar fashion, the World Justice Project’s 2019 Rule of Law Index, out of 126 countries, 
Nigeria ranked 106 while Angola ranked 111, which places both among the weakest law 
enforcers in the world. Supporting these findings and highlighting widespread social 
acceptance of illicit activity, the prevalence of illicit parallel markets is well documented 
in both Angola and Nigeria while government officials in both countries are notorious for 
demanding bribes for basic access to government services, a gasosa in Angola, or a “dash” 
required to “settle” an official in Nigeria. Higher levels of corruption—including selective 
access to lucrative government contracts, business licenses, and preferential financing 
opportunities—are similarly reserved for politically connected elites in both countries. 
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These elites in both Angola and Nigeria commonly use the authority of their positions for 
personal financial gain.183 
H. PRESENCE OF ARMED GROUPS, CRIME SYNDICATES, AND SMALL 
ARMS 
As noted in the literature review, several studies qualitatively suggest that the 
presence of armed groups, organized crime syndicates, and the availability of small arms 
may indicate suitable existing conditions for the emergence of piracy.184 Nigeria and 
Angola both have long histories of independent armed groups. Compared to Angola, 
Nigeria’s 1967–1970 civil war was relatively short and further removed from recent events; 
however, in the decades since, robust international arms trafficking and domestic 
production have ensured that small arms remain readily accessible, while prolific militant 
groups have been routinely instrumentalized by competing sub-state political interests and 
criminals alike. A 2019 study cataloged the locations of 35 militant camps in the Niger 
Delta, overseen by at least 28 independent commanders, many of whom enjoy formal 
government recognition and stipends as the result of the 2009 amnesty program while 
continuing criminal activities with relative impunity. The Switzerland-based Small Arms 
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Survey estimates that in 2017, Nigeria had roughly six million small arms in private 
circulation, enough to supply a weapon to three out of every 100 people in the country.185 
Contrasting with Nigeria, Angola’s civil war stretched for nearly 30 years from 
1975 until 2002. During the war, armed opposition to the People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola, or the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Labour 
Party (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido do Trabalho) 
(MPLA)-led government based in Luanda was largely unified under the competing UNITA 
movement, which as late as the mid-1990s, was able to control 80% of Angola’s territory. 
As a result of the lengthy war, firearms remain pervasive among the civilian population. 
Although the total estimate of civilian-held weapons in Angola is half that of Nigeria, at 
roughly three million, given Angola’s smaller population, civilian weapon density is at 
least three times larger than Nigeria, with more than 11 weapons for every 100 people. In 
the years following the war, organized militant groups with identifiable camps have 
remained in Cabinda, while less visible forms of armed criminal activity have proliferated 
widely.186 
To assess the prevalence of organized crime, a 2006 study across 156 countries 
measured perceptions of organized crime, the prevalence of high-level corruption, 
indications of money laundering, the extent of black-market activity, and rates of unsolved 
murders. The resulting Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI) ranked Nigeria and 
Angola 4th and 8th highest, respectively, globally. In more recent work, the 2019 “Africa 
Organized Crime Index” tracks 14 indicators of criminality and 12 resilience variables for 
all African countries. In this study, the range of criminal actors is divided into mafia-style 
groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors, and foreign actors. The index rates 
Nigeria as having higher levels of mafia-style groups, criminal networks, and foreign 
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actors; however, Angola is rated as having more state-embedded actors involved in 
criminal activity.187 Thus, both countries meet the broad qualitative definitions set out in 
existing literature to provide piracy-enhancing environmental conditions. The following 
case studies in Chapters II and IV show that the different forms of armed groups and 
organized crime in the two countries are a result of the level of rent centralization, and that 
the forms of networked criminal behavior that emerge from these different structural 
incentives help explain piracy outcomes. 
I. SUB-STATE DYNAMICS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND FORMAL 
AND INFORMAL RULES 
As discussed previously, Gaibulloev and Sandler argue that the number of tiers of 
government and the average territorial size of the lowest government echelons correspond 
to higher levels of piracy, while local government elections, autonomy, and fiscal 
decentralization reduce piracy.188 Angola and Nigeria each have two tiers of subnational 
governance—18 provinces and 162 municipalities in Angola compared to 36 states and 
774 local governments in Nigeria—implying no difference in expected piracy rates based 
on the number of government tiers. Meanwhile, with respect to the territorial size of the 
lowest-tier governance unit, Angola’s municipalities are, on average, more than six times 
larger than are those of Nigeria’s local governments, which should correlate to greater 
piracy levels in Angola.189  
With respect to the factors that Gaibulloev and Sandler’s model correlate with 
lower levels of piracy—local government elections, autonomy, and fiscal 
decentralization—the conditions in Nigeria should favor lower levels of piracy than in 
Angola. Although the Angolan government formally committed to decentralizing the 
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government and hold local elections with the 1999 Local Administration Decree, it has 
repeatedly delayed local elections on the basis of administrative limitations while the 
president continues to appoint provincial governors and municipal leaders.190 Following a 
similar pattern, Nigeria’s 1999 constitution calls for the election of local leaders; however, 
a widely exploited procedural loophole gives state governors the ability to suspend 
elections or elected officials and place appointed caretakers in their place. As a result, 
locally elected officials control only slightly more than half of local government 
councils.191 Despite only partially satisfying the criteria for local elections, Nigeria’s 
comparatively higher level of local elections would still suggest, according to Gaibulloev 
and Sandler’s model, that this variable should favor higher levels of piracy in Angola than 
Nigeria. 
For local government autonomy—defined as having the authority to manage the 
local delivery of at least one public good—Nigeria and Angola have similar conditions in 
which local governments are constitutionally charged with various authorities, but are 
rarely resourced or staffed to carry out those responsibilities effectively.192 As a result, the 
minimal differences in local government autonomy should have a null effect on the 
difference in piracy outcomes. Regarding fiscal decentralization, Angolan provinces and 
municipalities collectively account for only 12–15% of government spending, while 
Nigerian states and local governments constitute between 38–55% of overall 
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expenditures.193 The greater level of fiscal decentralization should therefore reduce piracy 
levels in Nigeria below those of Angola, the reverse of the actual outcome. 
Contrasting with Gaibulloev and Sandler’s conclusion that states conducting local 
elections incentivize more effective local governance, and thereby, have lower levels of 
piracy, Daxecker and Prins examine temporal and geographic sub-state variation of piracy 
levels in Indonesia and find that local elections correspond to increased levels of piracy, 
especially when a high degree of competition produces a narrow margin of victory. They 
suggest that election-related increases in piracy are based on the relationship of pirates to 
local government actors whose complicity facilitates their operations. As elections 
approach, Daxecker and Prins argue, pirates increase their activities to demonstrate their 
political relevance as security spoilers, compete with other would-be pirates to retain 
privileged political relationships, and maximize profits in advance of a possible defeat of 
facilitator incumbents.194 
In the absence of available sub-state datasets for local elections across other states, 
they also show a parallel but weaker effect in their cross-national analysis of state-level 
elections suggesting that the effect of sub-state variables likely has applicability beyond 
Indonesia.195 Looking at Nigeria’s coastal states, all but one (with the shortest coastline 
among them) currently has regular cycles of local electoral competition.196 A more 
extensive analysis of the precise temporal and geographic coding of each piracy event 
relative to local election locations and timing, which occur at irregular intervals in each 
state, would be required to verify the piracy-enhancing effect of local elections predicted 
by Daxecker and Prins. Although the scale of that analysis exceeds the scope of this work, 
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the fact that extensive local government electoral competition occurs along the Nigerian 
coast, and that Angola lacks any local electoral competition does suggest that this 
distinction may carry some utility in explaining the higher levels of piracy in Nigeria and 
Angola. However, the case studies show that the incentives Daxecker and Prins identify to 
explain increased pirate activity near elections—relevance signaling, competitor 
domination, and profit maximization—are in fact a byproduct of decentralized patronage 
management norms, rather than electoral competition itself. 
In a similar regard, the case studies show that Hastings and Phillips’s argument that 
formal and informal state rules play a role in facilitating or constraining pirate activity also 
has explanatory utility relative to the different piracy outcomes in Nigeria and Angola. 
Specifically, this thesis argues that the formal and informal norms of Nigeria’s and 
Angola’s patronage systems are linked to the degree of each system’s centralization and 
explain their divergent piracy outcomes. The case studies show how Nigeria’s 
decentralized patronage system incentivizes competition between pseudo-autonomous 
sub-state actors, who in turn, seek to instrumentalize piracy in a manner parallel to 
European sovereigns in piracy’s “golden age” of the 1600s and 1700s; while in Angola, 
tight central control over sub-state actors inhibits this process.197 
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III. NIGERIA 
A. PATRONAGE STRUCTURE 
At independence in 1960, the Nigerian state was an unwieldly amalgamation of 
three highly autonomous regional blocs, each dominated by one of the country’s three 
largest ethnic groups, to the exclusion of ethnic minorities. These regions were mutually 
distrustful, and the central government was therefore designed with limited authorities. 
The authorities who did remain with the central government were quickly dominated by 
the more populous northern region, which led to two military coups and a devolution 
into a brutal civil war that lasted from 1967–1970 and claimed the lives of between one 
and two million people. Following the war, successive iterations of military and civilian 
governments attempted to dilute hegemonic ethnic political blocs and build a governing 
framework that could mitigate the centrifugal tendencies of the multi-ethnic nation. To 
accomplish this, the central state engaged in parallel efforts to centralize revenue 
collection and subdivide the country into smaller administrative blocs. These smaller 
blocs served complementary objectives of increasing ethnic minority representation and 
resource access while diluting the autonomous capacity of substate units to either 
capture the central government or secede. As a result of this evolutionary process, the 
stability and legitimacy of the modern Nigerian state came to rely on a provisioning pact 
in which it buys governing consent from substate elites in 36 states and 774 local 
government areas in exchange for a mix of statutory and discretionary patronage 
allocations from a pool of centrally managed resources. Although this framework has 
proven successful in preventing a return to civil war, ethnic domination, or secession, 
the distribution of state resources remains a highly contentious issue. The resulting 
competition has led to violent forms of rent seeking and illicit modes substate of 
accumulation, both of which have evolved to include piracy.198 
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1. Decentralized Legacy of Colonialism  
The geographic boundaries of the modern Nigerian state originated with an act 
of colonial administration in 1914 that “amalgamated” the formerly distinct colonial 
regions under a unified “Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.” Although the consolidated 
colony had a single governor, it was sub-divided into north, east, and west sub-regions 
(Figure 4), each with a semi-autonomous lieutenant governor managing affairs through 
a system of indirect rule. By design, each of the colonial regions was dominated by a 
different primary ethnic group—Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbo 
in the east—though each region also contained a multitude of minority groups. The 
intentionally uneven application of decentralized colonial administration in the already 
dissimilar ethnic regions reinforced ethnic and regional differences.199 
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Figure 4. Colonial Nigeria at Unification in 1914200 
In the mid-1950s, the British began to deliberately to prepare their colonies for 
independence and adopt governance structures for their self-rule. The “traditional rulers” 
empowered by colonial administrators in each region, and the clientelist networks they had 
established, would form the backbone of the dominant political parties to emerge in each 
region. The northern region enjoyed a population advantage but given the colonial 
deference to their retention of an Islamic-based education system, lagged behind the 
southern regions in both economic development and in the development of a 
technocratically competent body of civil servants. Northerners therefore feared that 
southern civil service and economic interests would dominate a centralized national 
government, while southerners feared electoral cooption by the more populous north. As a 
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result, initial British-led efforts at designing a unitary government met strong resistance 
from a factionalized cadre of national elites who, fearing domination by a competing 
regional power that might disrupt their established regional networks of authority, 
preferred a decentralized federal model in which the central government remained weak 
and the regions retained a high degree of autonomy. These fears were so pronounced that 
each region considered secession as independence approached; however, the northern 
region recognized its dependence on the southern regions for economic access to oceanic 
trade, while all three regions saw the international relations advantages of membership in 
a country with a larger territory and population.  
2. Independence, The First Republic, and Civil War (1960–1970) 
In response to the preference of regionalized elites with a mutual distrust of central 
state power, the First Republic devolved the preponderance of power to regional 
governments. Prior to independence, regional elites agreed upon a fiscal allocation system 
that limited both the central government’s budget and its discretion over financial flows. 
The regions maintained independent tax jurisdictions to collect income internally and 
produce sales taxes, and where they recognized that the central government would more 
efficiently collect import and export revenues, these proceeds were statutorily distributed 
back to the regions. The largest sources of government revenue were therefore 
constitutionally guaranteed to flow to the regional governments, either directly to the 
region of origin (in what was known as the “derivation principle”) or through the 
“distributable pool account” (DPA) that served to balance regional income levels to 
account for differential levels of development. Meanwhile, the federal government funded 
its operations based on 60% share of less significant “other import duties” not claimed by 
the regions, and a 20% share of mining rents and royalties. The latter was perhaps the most 
significant concession to the federal government at independence, which gave it a 20% 
stake in the nascent but promising growth of oil revenues, while 50% was allocated directly 
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back to the region of origin, and the remaining 30% was balanced equally among the 
regional governments through the DPA.201 
Mirroring efforts to decentralize fiscal authority away from the central government, 
the First Republic adopted a centrally weak British-style parliamentary system in which 
representation was determined based on population and power was vested in a majority 
political party.202 Despite the limited fiscal authority of the central government, the 
departure of British administrators had opened a wide array of civil service jobs to be filled, 
and political contestation for central control was therefore consequential. Political party 
organization in all regions remained closely aligned to the dominant ethnic identity of each, 
and even if they professed platforms with cross-regional appeal, the core leadership 
distinctly coalesced around the dominant, ethnically defined elite networks of each region. 
At independence, the northern region contained 54% of the population, and as southerners 
had feared, northern interests established a dominant position in the new government and 
disproportionately benefitted from an “affirmative action” program to include them in the 
civil service at the expense of more qualified southerners. The north’s population 
advantage grew larger in two highly contentious (and clearly corrupted) census attempts in 
1962 and 1963, which further exacerbated southern fears of political domination, inflamed 
ethnic tensions, and ultimately resulted in an Igbo-led military coup in January 1966.203  
The Igbo-led military government disbanded the legislature and political parties 
while attempting to consolidate national power in a unitary system; however, less than 
seven month later, northern and middle-belt elements of the army staged a countercoup to 
revert to the First Republic’s decentralized model of federalism, albeit under military 
control. The coup and counter-coup precipitated widespread ethnic violence against 
southerners living in the north, against northerners in the south, and within the armed 
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forces. The escalating violence and the Igbo rejection of the counter-coup government 
ultimately prompted the attempted secession of the eastern region. In an attempt to prevent 
secession, and the potential for a further fracturing of the country, the northern-dominated 
military government split the existing regions into 12 smaller states, each led by a military 
governor, to dilute the power of the regional blocs relative to the central government, break 
up northern hegemony, and fracture support for the Igbo secession. The new states were 
allocated a prorated share of the statutory allocations of the regions from which they had 
been carved out, while the federal government decreased its share of mineral rents by 5% 
to be distributed among the new states. Although the changes did not ultimately prevent 
the eastern region from seceding, or the Biafran War that followed (1967–1970), the state 
creation exercise was effective in depriving Igbo secessionists of support from several 
minority groups in the oil rich Delta that earned independent state recognition, as 
intended.204 
The creation of the new states began a distinct centralizing shift away from the 
regional autonomy of the First Republic. Although the military government continued to 
apply the pre-coup formulas for decentralized revenue sharing, each of the more numerous 
states naturally controlled fewer resources than their regional antecedents, while their new 
state governors were centrally appointed and therefore answerable to the central 
government. Despite their displacement from controlling powerful regional blocs, elites 
from the northern and western region remained influential figures in the new framework 
and aligned behind the federal military government (FMG) to end the Igbo separatist 
movement and preserve the economic and international advantages that had justified a 
unified state at independence. These incentives were magnified by the prospect of 
nationally shared incipient oil revenues from the eastern region, which had begun 
substantial growth in 1958. As a result, the war had a centripetal effect that prompted 
regional elites (excluding those in the breakaway east) to accept reduced regional 
autonomy in favor of greater centralized political power. However, as the war came to an 
end, its unifying effect on regional elites began to wane. Fortunately, the end of the war 
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coincided with an enormous growth of oil revenue that permitted the reestablishment of a 
provisioning pact with expanded formal revenue allocations and discretionary patronage 
distributions to aligned the interests of legacy elites, military leaders, state bureaucrats, and 
the general population.205  
3. Post-war Military Federalism (1970–1979) 
The brutality of the Biafran War motivated military leaders to develop a 
government framework that would mitigate the structural failures of the First Republic and 
prevent a return to violent ethnic conflict. The military government therefore embarked on 
an effort to institutionalize central state authority and develop a framework for a less 
fractious form of civilian rule. However, doing so required it to satisfy the short-term 
interests of legacy elites, military leaders, the civil service, and the general population. To 
this end, it was aided by the rapid growth of state oil revenues that allowed it to 
substantially expand formal and informal channels for revenue distribution. 
The end of the war coincided with a massive influx of government oil revenues 
owing to regulatory changes that increased the state’s share of profits relative to 
international oil companies, a rapid increase in oil production volumes, as well as an 
increase in the global price per barrel. The year prior to the civil war, Nigerian agricultural 
exports still accounted for 76% of foreign exchange. While oil production had slowed 
during the war years due to the proximity of oil fields to the conflict, as the war approached 
an end, oil production began to expand quickly well beyond pre-war levels. As the war was 
winding down in 1969, the federal government issued “Nigerian Petroleum Decree No. 
51” and established the 1969 Petroleum Act, which began a process by which the federal 
government would claim an increasing equity share of oil production activities. From 1959 
until the 1969 decrees, state oil revenues consisted of a 50% share of the final profits 
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realized by international oil companies and 12.5% royalty; however, inspired by a global 
trend of state nationalization of oil resources, and joining OPEC in 1971, the government 
established the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) to take an equity ownership 
share in the volumes of extracted oil, which could in turn be used for domestic consumption 
or sale abroad. By 1975, the Nigerian government owned 55% of all extracted oil volumes 
while increasing royalties to 20% and the petroleum profit tax to 85% of whatever 
remaining revenues the international oil companies were able to achieve. At the same time, 
production volumes had increased from a pre-war high of 420,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 
more than two million bpd. The revenue influx was further magnified by a steady increase 
in the price per barrel on the world market from less than $4/barrel in 1973 to nearly $40/
barrel in 1980. Therefore, by the end of the war in 1970, oil exports had begun to exceed 
the value of non-oil revenues for the first time, and by 1975, they accounted for 93% of 
foreign exchange and 81% of government revenue.206 
From 1970–1975, the military government leveraged the influx of revenue to adjust 
the federal revenue allocation formulas in favor of greater central government, at the 
expense of fiscal autonomy at the state level. In 1970, it shifted the allocations of the 
distributable pool to a new formula in which 50% of the funds were distributed based on 
population, and the remaining 50% equally among the states; a shift away from the more 
population-centric approach that had been applied previously. In 1971, all offshore oil 
revenues (the fastest-growing revenue stream) were excluded from the derivation principle 
and the distributable pool to be allocated exclusively to the federal government. In 1974, 
the central government assumed responsibility for collecting a nationally standardized 
income tax, and although these revenues remained statutorily allocated to the states, the 
elimination of produce sales taxes in the same year gutted the states’ internal revenue 
generation capacity and increased their reliance on centrally collected and distributed 
revenues. In 1975, all derivation-allocated funds, except for 20% of mineral resources, 
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were diverted to the distributable pool. At the same time, the federal government deferred 
its control over offshore oil rents and royalties to the distributable pool, although it retained 
100% of both the petroleum and company profits taxes. While these changes represented 
a shift in fiscal authority to the center, they faced little resistance as the growing pool of oil 
revenues led to a four-fold increase in state budgets between 1973 and 1977.207 
While state budgets grew considerably during military rule, regional autonomy was 
further eroded by the appointment of military officers to serve as state governors who were 
accountable to the central government instead of their state constituencies. The governors 
had wide discretion over their state’s statutory allocations of federal resources and were 
therefore able to develop their own clientelist networks. The entry of these new military 
pseudo-elites into the patronage landscape generated understandable friction with legacy 
regional elites; however, the expanded pool of resources allowed them to deploy palliative 
patronage distributions broadly. These patronage opportunities included preferential 
contract awards that accompanied the proliferation of state owned enterprises, generous 
import subsidies on agricultural and manufacturing inputs, selective access to arbitrage 
opportunities made possible with fixed exchange rates, opportunities to skim overhead 
from foreign-owned businesses with front-companies in “indigenization” programs, side-
payments and “mobilization fees” to connected individuals on government contracts, and 
privileged access to commercial banking opportunities.208 
Despite the expanded pool of state resources, the military government’s hold on 
power remained tenuous in the face of legacy elites whose power over extensive and 
potentially disruptive regional clientelist networks was only reinforced by the patronage 
distributions. As a result, the military government faced escalating demands from diffuse 
and competing networks, which made it difficult to develop a long-term strategy by which 
they could discipline rent allocations, achieve more targeted developmental outcomes, or 
build a tighter circle of coherent elites. Amidst the competing pressures, the military 
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government resorted to shortsighted and ad hoc patronage distributions that ultimately 
reinforced the counter-productive rent-seeking behaviors of a broad group of competing 
elites. The failure of the regime to discipline the patronage allocation process resulted in a 
failure to achieve productive economic outcomes while the unpredictable and haphazard 
allocation of patronage increased elite fragmentation and competition. As a result, elites 
continued their unproductive drain on state resources with the sole interest of amassing 
their own power, wealth, and local clientelist networks.209 
The fragility of this seemingly insatiable provisioning pact became evident in a 
bloodless July 1975 coup and a failed countercoup less than a year later. The fraying of 
government stability prompted the new military regime to begin another deliberate effort 
to scale back patronage excesses, downsize the bloated civil service, and recommit to a 
transition to civilian government. It began drafting a new constitution for the Second 
Republic, while making a concerted effort to mitigate the centrifugal forces that led the 
First Republic to civil war.210 
4. The Second Republic (1979–1983) 
Although the Second Republic would only last from 1979–1983 before reverting to 
military rule, the 1979 constitution would have several lasting impacts on patronage 
distribution strategies and structures. First, the constitution sought to ameliorate minority 
ethnic grievances with greater administrative sub-division of the states. It increased the 
number of states from 12 to 19, and created a new tier of sub-state governance, called “local 
government areas” (LGAs), to distribute representation and resources to previously 
excluded groups.211 These structural changes coincided with a shift in the fiscal allocation 
formula that further expanded the statutory allocations of federally collected revenues to 
state and local governments while simultaneously increasing the dependence of these 
substate units on the federal center. The distributable pool was replaced by a substantially 
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expanded state joint account into which all federal revenues were collected, including the 
sizeable oil profit revenues that had been previously excluded from state distributions. 
From this consolidated pool, the federal government retained 60%, the states were 
allocated 30%, and local governments were allocated 10% (to be channeled through their 
respective states). In its first fiscal year of implementation (1979–1980), the new formula 
provided states with 37% more revenue than under the old formula while the budget of 
local governments (which had been created in 1976 and begun operations on discretionary 
federal grants) doubled. The new states and local governments were therefore well funded 
to hire an expanded class of civil servants to populate their expanding administrations.212 
To guide this expansion, the constitution formally adopted a “federal character 
principle” that required the composition of all elements of central, state, and local 
government—including cabinet-level positions, the civil service, and the armed forces—
to reflect the ethnic make-up of the (national, state or local) territory. The principle was 
intended to prevent state domination by larger ethnic groups, but in a country with more 
than 250 distinct language groups, it opened formal state institutions and informal 
patronage channels to constant competition between minority groups seeking entry into, or 
a greater share of, the provisioning pact. The creation of new states and local governments 
therefore provided expanded civil service rosters to be exploited by local power brokers 
and establish new and more diffuse clientelist networks, while the federal character 
principle added a layer of ethnically articulated competition to the process.213 
Second, the 1979 constitution abandoned the parliamentary structure of the First 
Republic—whose winner-take-all majority governance would always favor northern 
control of the central government—and instead adopted an American-style system that 
centralizes state authority around nationally representative political parties. This system 
was intended to mitigate the power of ethno-regional political blocs by shifting power from 
parliament toward a directly elected president and balance the population-based authority 
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of the lower legislative house with an equally powerful upper house with uniform 
representation for each state, regardless of population. To ensure that the Second 
Republic’s stronger central institutions avoided ethnic domination, political parties were 
barred from organizing around ethnic identities and presidential candidates were required 
to secure 25% of the vote in two thirds of the states to be elected. Unfortunately, instead of 
producing programmatic national political parties as intended, the requirements simply 
pushed existing ethno-regional political machines to attract new support bases beyond their 
core constituencies. Incumbents did this through distribution of rents and rent-seeking 
opportunities, while challengers did it through promises of future access to rent. Without 
coherent party ideologies, short-term patronage distribution strategies were employed to 
attract and retain enough non-core political allies to form a broad-enough electoral 
majority; however, the short-term nature of these election-driven transactions created 
unstable party structures that fostered continuous competition to gain, retain, or expand 
patronage access.214 
While the constitution’s provisions served their intended purpose of undermining 
secessionist tendencies and national-level conflict, their broader efficacy was dependent 
upon the upward trajectory in oil revenues. Expanding revenues had allowed the patterns 
of unproductive patronage allocations to harden in the absence of a centralized force for 
discipline. The transition to civilian rule therefore did not represent a fundamental change 
in the provisioning pact, but rather a transfer of its custody from military rulers to the 
northerner-dominated political coalition whose political machine, the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), captured the new civilian government. The new legislative assemblies 
became a clearinghouse for discretionary federal patronage and quickly decimated the 
coherence of opposition parties by coopting their members with short-term incentives. The 
collapse of oil prices in 1981 cut state revenues in half while the NPN struggled to sustain 
its opposition payoffs. Unrestrained distributive politics in the context of an imploding 
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resource base lead to the collapse of the Second Republic in a mostly peaceful coup on 
December 31, 1983.215  
5. Return to Military Rule (1983–1999) 
Despite the attempts of new military rulers to reign in the patronage excesses of the 
Second Republic, their hold on state power remained dependent on the provisioning pact 
that necessitated continued distributions to key elites. In addition to preserving elite 
acquiescence, the military government sought to maintain popular support with 
demonstrable efforts to rectify the unforeseen vulnerabilities of the 1979 constitution as it 
prepared for a return to civilian rule. Their chief concern was again the mitigation of ethnic 
tensions that could lead to another civil war. Despite the failure of the Second Republic, 
“federal character,” nationally structured political parties, expansion of administrative sub-
divisions, and formulaic distribution of state revenues remained central to these efforts, 
even as focus shifted to breaking the entrenched political machines and perverse 
distributional pressures that had derailed their implementation.216 
The military regime attempted to break the dominance of legacy political elites with 
further administrative sub-division and a state-controlled framework for political 
mobilization. It created 17 new states and 473 LGAs (bringing the totals to the current 36 
and 774, respectively), and shifted significant resources from legacy elites to their formerly 
excluded political rivals. It attempted to create a two-party political system and the only 
two legal parties, wrote the parties’ (center-left and center-right) manifestos, made 
significant investments in building office space, financed the organizational framework for 
each party to operate in all states and LGAs on an equal footing, and banned all politicians 
of the First and Second Republics from direct participation in these parties or holding key 
offices. To buy their acquiescence to political marginalization, the military government 
directed extensive financial resources to these legacy elites.  
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Once again, the logic of the provisioning pact swallowed the reform effort. The 
popular, patronage-rich, administrative sub-division made the pact more inclusive—and 
more expensive. Meanwhile, the “old guard” politicians did not resign themselves to 
marginalization, but instead used their considerable—and recently supplemented—
resources to adopted a strategy of political “godfatherism” in which they sponsored 
surrogate candidates to represent their interests, preserve their access to resources, and 
sustain their respective clientelist networks. The competition already built into the 
provisioning pact now extended to the very top; the political godfathers had the resources 
to compete with those doling out oil rents from inside the central state. Although the Third 
Republic was immediately aborted by another military coup following the 1993 elections, 
a diverse and decentralized set of political godfathers became an entrenched feature of 
political competition and patronage distribution from this time.217  
As the oil-bust lingered into the 1990s, economic austerity measures, which further 
shrunk distributable state resources, became unavoidable. With few state resources 
available for redistribution, the military government clung to power by turning a blind eye 
as politically connected elites engaged in oil theft, fuel smuggling, heroin and cocaine 
trafficking, money laundering, and international commercial fraud. While these avenues of 
illicit enrichment had a palliative effect in the short term, they were a highly inefficient 
means of patronage distribution that established channels of decentralized resource 
accumulation that the state had little capacity to regulate or discipline. This devolution from 
the relatively high-level elite diversion of state resources toward decentralized criminal 
accumulation channels would further reduce the dependence of elite clientelist networks 
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on central state-controlled resources, and lead to increasingly exotic rent-seeking and rent-
accumulation strategies that would eventually include piracy.218 
6. The Fourth Republic (1999–Present) 
The 1999 constitution drew heavily from the 1979 constitution and its emphasis on 
federal character, nationally structured political parties, administrative sub-division, and 
formulaic distribution of central state revenues. It carried forward the 36 states and 774 
local government councils from the 1996 additions and preserved the requirement for 
presidents to demonstrate national representation with 25% or more of the vote in at least 
two-thirds of the states. It extended the same provision to state governors that needed to 
win at least 25% of the votes from 2/3 or more of the LGAs. The 1999 constitution also 
consecrated the Federal Character Commission (FCC), which gave the central government 
a powerful formal mechanism of patronage distribution through the apportionment of civil 
service posts at all levels of government. In a similar vein, it also required that the revenue 
sharing formulae be adjusted to establish broad, statutory revenue distribution channels to 
state and local governments, especially in oil producing regions, which would now retain 
13% of all oil revenues from their territories.219 After the deduction of the 13% derivation 
component of oil revenues, the states get a statutory distribution of 26.72% of the 
remaining federation account incomes (from oil revenues, customs and excise duties, and 
corporate taxes) and 50% of the national value added tax (VAT) while LGAs receive 
20.60% of the federation account and 35% of the VAT. That these distributions are now 
protected from central government interference by law, and substantially larger than at any 
point in Nigerian history—especially the in the Niger Delta, where the budgets of top oil-
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producing states can now exceed $1 billion per year—provide enormous incentives for the 
capture of now openly contestable state and local offices.220  
As in the Second Republic, prospective party leaders had to establish an ordering 
framework that could attract enough influential power brokers to form a dominant 
governing coalition while remaining sufficiently broad to meet the minimum standards of 
national character laid out in the constitution. However, unlike the Second Republic, 
political parties of the Fourth Republic did not have robust, existing electoral machines to 
rely on after 16 years attrition during military rule, especially given the deliberate efforts 
of successive military governments to dismantle that electoral machinery with the state-
created parties in the lead up to the failed Third Republic. As a result, parties competing 
for dominance in the Forth Republic were faced with an expansive and highly 
fractionalized constellation of elites composed of “old guard” politicians, military elites 
who had built their own clientelist networks over 16 years of military rule, and new political 
entrepreneurs.221 
To recruit a sufficient number of established godfathers and minority elites to build 
a dominant national coalition, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) established a set of 
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internal power-sharing rules that exceeded constitutional requirements and attracted broad 
support from both existing elites and minority aspirants. Specifically, the PDP employed 
an internal geopolitical zoning system by which it would rotate access to the most senior 
party positions (president, vice president) between electoral cycles among six zones 
(Figure 5) and balance the remainder of its patronage-allocated positions among the 
remaining zones. While competitive access to senior power positions was not new, the use 
of the internally applied system of geopolitical zoning was new in the way it opened 
opportunities for ethnic minority leaders to scale the party ladder and achieve national level 
offices previously reserved for the largest three ethnicities. To help the PDP minimize the 
resources it had to expend to attract enough minority elites to satisfy the national character 
requirements it implemented a system of “open elite recruitment” by which it relied on 
local elites to self-identify their potential value to the party by establishing dominant 
clientelist networks at the local level. This approach was equally important to the PDP in 
states in which it was in the minority, since attracting a sufficient number of local-level 
adherents who could dominate local elections would build the required base of support 
needed to meet the “25% in 2/3rds” rule for both state and national elections. The PDP 
therefore encouraged regional godfathers to act in a similar fashion to local party bosses to 
recruit prospective local elites and help them mobilize successful campaigns. Given the 
new stakes involved for both meeting minority representation requirements, and the 
financial incentives tied to the capture of statutory state revenues in state and local 
governments, political competition for LGA elections became defined by ethnic identities 
and quickly escalated to overt militant mobilization along these lines. As this militarization 
was occurring, the PDP had incentives not to interfere, even where militants began to take 
a life of their own as unpredictable but politically protected rogue actors, because 
ultimately, these militants were critical to the local political mobilization the PDP relied 
upon to build its governing coalitions at the state and national level.222 
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Figure 5. Geopolitical Zone Delineations—Used Internally by the PDP to 
Balance National Office Appointments223 
Therefore, despite its apparent similarities with the Second Republic, the Fourth 
Republic’s revised framework interacted with the informal organizing principles of the 
ascendant PDP—and parallel frameworks of the All Progressives Congress (APC) that 
displaced the PDP in 2015—in a way that would shift the locus of political competition to 
local governments as the necessary building blocks to capture patronage resources at all 
levels of government. Political entrepreneurs able to demonstrate local political dominance 
were rewarded with broad statutory resource distributions and the prospects of upward 
political mobility for even more lucrative rewards at the state and national level. This 
political ordering framework thereby generated powerful incentives for local entrepreneurs 
to partner with wealthy godfathers and mobilize ethnically aligned militias that could 
dominate local elections as a means to demonstrate merit for inclusion in the PDP’s elite 
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provisioning pact. These militants have subsequently become an enduring feature of 
Nigeria’s political landscape and are thereby afforded political latitude to engage in 
disruptive criminal activities that the state would otherwise be incentivized to suppress. It 
is in this unique framework that militants have been able to engage in sophisticated rent-
seeking and rent-appropriating forms of patrimonial piracy.224 
B. PATRIMONIAL PIRACY 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea began to attract international attention after it 
surpassed levels of Somali piracy in 2012; however, instances of piracy in the region have 
been on an upward trajectory since the mid-1990s. As of this writing, the Gulf of Guinea 
remains the world’s most piracy-prone region, accounting for 95% of global maritime 
kidnapping incidents through the first nine months of 2020. Most of the region’s piracy 
events are concentrated in Nigerian waters, and many of the other attacks—as far away as 
Côte d’Ivoire and Angola—have been carried out by Nigerian pirate syndicates that 
demonstrate high levels of operational sophistication. To account for this phenomenon, this 
section argues that several features unique to Nigeria’s decentralized system of patronage 
creates powerful incentives for both rent seeking and rent appropriating forms of piracy.225 
1. Rent-Seeking Piracy 
The legitimacy of the Nigerian state is, by design, predicated on an elite 
provisioning pact that broadly distributes centrally collected resources to satisfy a diverse 
array of competing ethno-regional demands. Formal resource distributions to state and 
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local governments are made on a statutory basis, while the central state retains 
discretionary and informal patronage mechanisms it can allocate to connected elites or 
employ to pacify disruptive grievances. The central state has very little capacity to interrupt 
statutory budget allocations or regulate how substate units employ them; thus, substate 
actors are empowered to apply these resources toward rent-seeking activities in 
competition for contestable forms of discretionary and informal resources. The stability of 
this provisioning pact is therefore predicated on the ability of central authorities to 
consistently deliver resources to core constituencies while moderating distributional 
grievances without disenfranchising existing beneficiaries. This careful balancing act relies 
heavily on a reliable supply of oil revenues derived from mining operations concentrated 
in the Niger Delta. Shocks to this revenue stream have historically undermined regime 
stability, and the state is therefore highly sensitive to disruptions. Rent-seeking piracy has 
exploited this vulnerability by conducting disruptive attacks against critical offshore oil 
infrastructure, hijacking support vessels, and kidnapping oil company employees to 
drastically reduce oil production and thereby force the Nigerian government to respond 
with palliative forms of patronage. 
Rent-seeking piracy is a costly and organizationally sophisticated endeavor. 
Although Nigeria’s patronage system is designed to respond to grievance, it has coercive 
institutions that are its recourse of first resort. Using piracy to convince central state 
authorities to concede to patronage demands therefore requires a persistent campaign of 
attacks to demonstrate a credible capacity to impose sustained costs that exceed the expense 
of the demanded rent settlement or coercive measures that might suppress such attacks. 
Pirate attacks to support such an objective are generally designed to maximize financial 
and reputational costs to the government by reducing production, and thus are unlikely to 
be profitable in their own right (as rent appropriation attacks, discussed as follows, are). A 
campaign of this nature therefore requires a high level of organizational sophistication that 
includes substantial financing for operational expenses, technically competent personnel, 
havens from which to operate, and effective public messaging of distributional demands. 
Given the extensive entry barriers to conducting a successful rent-seeking piracy campaign, 
they are understandably rare; however, at least two organizations have successfully used 
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piracy operations to yield patronage concessions from the Nigerian government. The 
following case studies highlight how Nigeria’s decentralized patronage system enhanced 
the incentives and capacities for substate actors to leverage piracy to achieve patronage 
distribution goals. 
a. Precursors to Piracy: Patterns of Rent Seeking and Rent Appropriation 
in the Niger Delta 
The question of “resource control” and the “derivation principal” remain 
contentious topics in the oil-producing Niger Delta and are deeply woven into the 
narratives of both rent-seeking and rent-appropriating pirates. As noted previously, at 
independence in 1960, 50% of oil revenues were retained by the regional (and subsequently 
state) governments of origin under the derivation principal. As oil revenues grew 
exponentially after the civil war, the derivation component of statutory revenue allocations 
was reduced in favor of a more balanced distribution across the country, initially dropping 
to 20% in 1975 then broken into separate “derivation” and “development of mineral 
producing areas” components totaling 5% in 1981, 3.5% in 1982, and 2.5% in 1990.226 
Until the early 1980s, the growing oil revenues offset the reduction in derivation percentage 
so that states saw continuously increasing budgets. As a result, the derivation principle did 
not evolve into a widely held source of overt public grievance until after the 
implementation of austerity measures that accompanied the 1986 Structural Adjustment 
program, which caused nationwide economic hardship as the national currency (naira) was 
devalued by two thirds while social programs, civil service jobs, and state-owned 
enterprises were slashed. Out of this economic despair, unemployed youths began to 
mobilize around ethno-community self-help groups that quickly took on a political 
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character and served as an impetus for the articulation of resource control grievances that 
would grow into rent-seeking and rent-appropriating piracy.227 
One of the first organized rent seeking movements in the Niger Delta was the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), founded in 1990. It led a 
campaign of peaceful but disruptive activism that included the mobilization of 300,000 
protesters in 1993 to occupy flow stations, which ultimately forced Shell to shut down its 
extensive oil operations in Ogoniland indefinitely. The federal government responded 
swiftly with a brutal military occupation, which razed villages, killed hundreds of people, 
and employed divide-and-conquer tactics to fractionalize the movement with devastating 
efficacy. By 1995, nine Ogoni leaders had been captured and executed after a hasty military 
tribunal. Thus, at this stage, the Nigerian state appeared to mirror the will and capacity 
displayed by the Angolan state (see Chapter IV) in applying overwhelming coercive force 
to suppress minority grievances that threatened the state’s oil revenues.228 
During the same period, an ethnic Ijaw movement began that would eventually 
spawn some of the most effective pirates in the region, began to take root. The Ijaw are the 
largest of the Niger Delta’s “minority” groups, and the fourth largest ethnic group in 
Nigeria, which accounts for nearly half of the Delta’s 30 million inhabitants. By 
administrative design, they were divided up into political minority populations across 
multiple Niger Delta states and thereby marginalized from political power. Thus, following 
in the example of MOSOP, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), and later the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC), came together to advocate across existing administrative lines for the 
creation of three homogenous Ijaw states, an upward adjustment of the derivation principle, 
and economic compensation for the oil industry’s environmental degradation. Like 
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MOSOP, they proactively engaged in disruptive measures to pressure the government for 
concessions.229 
With growing restiveness and an increasing frequency of oil output disruptions 
caused by these ethnic movements in the Niger Delta, both the military regime and the 
newly elected civilian regime continued deployments of military forces, while applying 
new forms of palliative patronage distributions. In 1992, the central government created 
the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), later the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC), as a mechanism to funnel patronage-based 
contracting opportunities to select elites. The portion of the federal budget allocated to oil-
producing states was increased from 2.5% to 4% in 1992, before being set at 13% by the 
1999 constitution.230 Lastly, the first Ijaw-majority state, Bayelsa, was created in 1996, 
along with a new “Warri South” LGA in neighboring Delta state. The state and LGA 
creations, along with the 13% derivation revision, provided major channels of statutory 
state funding allocations to Ijaw-controlled regions for the first time.231  
The “Warri Crisis” (1997–2003) originated in a dispute over whether the 
headquarters of the Warri South LGA would be in an Ijaw or Itsekiri town. This seemingly 
minor issue grew into a long and deadly conflict to control the statutory revenues associated 
with the LGA. The conflict was amplified in the 1999 and 2003 election cycles, as local 
elites sought to demonstrate their local dominance and viability for upward mobility in the 
PDP party structure. Given the highly political issue, regional godfathers and state 
politicians also became actively involved in the conflict, and funded a myriad of militia 
units to help secure political control of the statutory resource flows and demonstrate their 
own salience to the PDP. Thus, unlike the earlier ethnic mobilizations by organizations like 
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MOSOP and the INC, the Warri Crisis was highly destructive and militarized. As the 
conflict went on, ethnic militants were increasingly well armed and able to mount repeated 
organized attacks against each other and federal forces. When federal forces attempted to 
intervene against the Ijaw, Ijaw militants attacked land-based oil infrastructure and shut in 
as much as 300,000 bpd of oil production. As a result, the federal government relented and 
moved the LGA headquarters to an Ijaw-controlled town. One of the lessons that militants 
took from the Warri Crisis was that large-scale oil disruptions were a viable rent seeking 
strategy for ethnic minorities seeking to secure greater access to state patronage. The first 
appreciable spike in IMB-recorded piracy attacks in Nigeria began with four attacks in 
1996 and escalated to 39 by 2003. While most of these early piracy events were criminal 
in nature, they were an outgrowth of militant mobilization surrounding the Warri Crisis, 
and these militants would later mobilize both rent-seeking and rent-appropriating forms of 
piracy.232 
In response to the distributive incentives to capture statutory resources flowing to 
state and local governments, and to signal political relevance and compete for party-
allocated patronage at the state and federal level, Niger Delta power brokers sponsored 
extensive militant mobilizations for the 2003 election as they had done in the military 
organized transitional election of 1999. As a result, the 2003 election cycle 
overwhelmingly favored PDP incumbents. President Obasanjo’s re-election in 2003, a 
constitutional two-term limit, and the PDP’s zoning rotation policy, created an expected 
opening for a southern vice presidential nominee in 2007. Having established their party 
loyalties in 1999 and 2003 with extensive militant mobilizations behind PDP candidates, 
two leading Niger Delta power brokers—Rivers State Governor Peter Odili and prominent 
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Ijaw godfather, Chief Edwin Kiagbodo Clark—each began to align the region’s various 
militant groups in support of opposing bids for the vice presidential nomination and to keep 
the region’s grievances at the forefront of national dialogue to pressure the PDP to choose 
a candidate from the Niger Delta’s “South-South” region. Thus, two dominant militant 
camps emerged behind the rival political sponsors. “Mujahid” Dokubo-Asari led the Niger 
Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) aligned to Chief Clark and his bid to secure the 
PDP vice presidential nomination for Bayelsa State Deputy Governor Goodluck Jonathan, 
while Ateke Tom and his Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) aligned behind Governor Odili’s 
personal bid for the vice presidency.233  
Illegal oil bunkering as a form of illicit rent appropriation by military government 
elites had been going on since the late 1970s. Following the 1999 elections, the militants 
who had been employed as political enforcers for successful candidates (or their 
godfathers) were given political protection to take over and vastly expand oil-bunkering 
networks, kidnap oil workers, and run localized protection rackets for oil companies. The 
government’s tolerance of these illicit rent appropriation activities was tied to the role these 
militants played in assuring electoral victories for supported party members, and by 
extension, national electoral success, and thus control of state resources. By 2004, NDPVF 
and NDV were engaged in open conflict to control the region’s lucrative oil bunkering 
networks, which were siphoning 10–20% of Nigeria’s oil production in what was rapidly 
becoming a multi-billion dollar enterprise of illicit rent appropriation.234 
With illicit revenue streams fueling the conflict, the battling militant oil kingpins 
satisfied the political objectives of their godfathers; Niger Delta grievances remained 
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highly visible and politically relevant. As the violence threated to grow beyond his control, 
in June 2004 Governor Odili called for the support of federal forces to suppress it, which 
led Asari to announce an all-out war to destroy the Niger Delta’s oil infrastructure 
systematically. Asari’s threat caused a spike in international crude oil prices and prompted 
President Obasanjo to summon the leaders of the NDPVF and the NDV to the capital for 
negotiations. The militant leaders agreed to a ceasefire in exchange for amnesty and the 
president’s consent to organize a national forum to address the Delta’s distributional 
grievances. Although the resulting 2005 forum ended in a deadlock over demands for 
increasing the derivation percentage from 13% to 25%, Niger Delta opposition groups took 
note that a credible threat of large-scale disruption to federal oil rents was an effective way 
to compel central government negotiation on critical distributional issues.235  
The rise of the militant leaders from obscurity to national political recognition in 
less than a decade was a peculiar byproduct of the political mobilization incentives that 
emerged from the post-1999 resource distribution and competition framework. Buoyed by 
the system’s incentives to push ethnic outbidding down to the local level, these militants 
became a vital component of successful political mobilization and patronage capture. As a 
result, they came to enjoy political protection to engage in otherwise counter-productive 
forms of illicit accumulation that gave them some capacity to balance against the central 
government. This balancing capacity was magnified by militant proximity to, and ability 
to disrupt, the country’s vulnerable oil infrastructure. Militants therefore quickly found 
themselves in a position to exert credible threats against the government’s primary revenue 
stream, which gave them a degree of independent political relevance as proto elites in the 
political and patronage environment. As the militants ventured into rent-seeking piracy, 
this relevance would only expand. 
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b. Rent-Seeking Pirates and Provisioning Pact Inclusion: The Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (2006–2009) 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was formed by 
multiple militant factions in Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa states following the late 2005 arrest 
of several prominent Ijaw figures, including Asari, which they saw as a direct assault on 
the Ijaw community and its agitation for greater resource control.236 Although MEND was 
never a fully coherent entity—its membership fluctuated and various groups invoked the 
name to their own ends—the mutually reinforcing actions of the loose-knit movement 
succeeded in pressuring the PDP to nominate an Ijaw vice president and concede 
substantial state patronage streams to Niger Delta militants.237 This success flowed from 
specific elements of Nigeria’s provisioning pact: its grievance-responsive distribution 
logic, the decentralized autonomy of substate elites, and its near total reliance upon, and 
thus susceptibility to disruptions of, oil revenue. 
One week after Asari’s arrest, roughly 100 members of the NDPVF executed a 
retaliatory piracy event—the first of its kind—in which they conducted an 8-boat 
simultaneous assault on Chevron’s Idama oil production platform and took 8,000 bpd of 
production capacity offline.238 The attack was a dramatic display of a new militant 
seaborne capacity; the scale of its disruption (and international attention) would quickly 
escalate as these capabilities expanded under the wider MEND umbrella.239 MEND’s first 
successful attacks occurred in January 2006 involving coordinated assaults to shut down 
115,000 bpd of production at Shell’s EA offshore oil platform, kidnapping four of its 
workers, and launching a simultaneous operation that caused extensive damage to the Trans 
Ramos Pipeline that stop 100,000 bpd from flowing to the Forcados offshore export 
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terminal.240 A few days later, MEND militants attacked Shell’s Benisede flow station, 
killed 16 people, and reduced output capacity by another 106,000 bpd.241 In the span of a 
week, MEND attacks had taken roughly 15% of Nigeria’s oil exports offline.242 A tentative 
ceasefire was reached with the central government on February11, but immediately fell 
apart as federal forces conducted an aerial bombing of several Ijaw villages while 
purportedly pursuing oil bunkering barges.243 In response, on February 18, MEND 
conducted three simultaneous operations to attack and disable the Forcados offshore export 
terminal, the Ekeremore-Yeye manifold, and the Escravos-Lagos gas pipeline; thereby 
“shutting in” 477,000 bpd, or roughly 20% of Nigeria’s export capacity in a single day.244 
In addition to the damage to existing production capacity, the MEND’s introduction of 
politically motivated pirate attacks against offshore oil infrastructure caused international 
oil companies to question the security of future investments in offshore exploration and 
investment for future production, which thereby exacerbated the potential financial toll on 
the central government, and its myriad patronage networks.245 
MEND published a set of formal demands after their initial attacks in January, and 
called for the release of the prominent Ijaw community members who had been arrested, 
the withdrawal of federal forces from the Niger Delta, the payment of an existing $1.5 
billion ruling against Shell Oil Company for environmental damages, and 100% “resource 
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control” of all oil revenues at the state level.246 In the following months, the resource 
control demand was reduced to 50%, but additional demands were added, for increased 
political representation for the Niger Delta, training and jobs in the oil industry, and 
deliberate efforts to improve the region’s socioeconomic conditions and reduce 
marginalization.247  
As attacks continued through the early months of 2006, MEND succeeded in 
achieving its stated goal of reducing Nigeria’s oil export capacity by 30%, a total reduction 
of 500,000 to 600,000 bpd, which resulted in over $2 billion of lost oil revenues by mid-
year.248 As these staggering losses mounted, the Nigerian Senate formally blocked 
President Obasanjo’s bid for a third term in May 2006. MEND’s sophisticated, 
infrastructure-devastating, and highly visible piracy attacks, contributed to frustrating the 
incumbent President’s third term ambitions, which thus opened the vice presidency to a 
southern politician, while increasing the likelihood that a Delta politician would be elevated 
to this patronage rich position, in line for the ultimate prize—the presidency—eight years 
later.249 MEND’s disruptive activity continued to escalate as the December 2006 primaries 
approached—with at least five piracy events against oil industry targets in October and 
November—and Chief Clark’s Ijaw protégé Goodluck Jonathan was nominated vice 
president.250 MEND continued to conduct kidnappings and infrastructure attacks to 
showcase their grievances through the April 2007 election, while a wide range of militant 
groups were simultaneously employed to rig ballots and intimidate voters across the Niger 
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Delta on an unprecedented scale.251 President Umaru Yar’Adua and Vice President 
Goodluck Jonathan won election and were sworn in on May 29, 2007.  
Having achieved their objectives of securing patronage inclusion at the national 
level, oil disruptions were now counterproductive to maximizing the flow of state-provided 
rents to Niger Delta elites; thus, Jonathan and Clark had new incentives to quell the militant 
unrest and restore oil output. In response to MEND’s demands, Asari and Chief 
Alamieyeseigha were released from prison, and the government held a “Niger Delta 
Summit” to address grievances.252 Early rounds of pre-summit negotiations failed to yield 
meaningful results based on several factors. First, although the Delta’s political godfathers 
could now expect to be placated with traditional mechanisms of patronage owing to the 
national-level access their militant proxies had helped them achieve, their militant proxies 
had established highly-profitable, independent mechanisms of resource accumulation 
through oil bunkering, kidnapping, and localized protection rackets for oil companies.253 
As a result, Delta elites exercised decreasing levels of control over militant activity, while 
militants came to recognize that they held leverage—independent of their former political 
sponsors—to negotiate for their own patronage rewards from the central government. 
Second, the government hoped that after Asari’s release from prison, he would be able to 
reassert influence over his former militant sub-commanders to articulate consolidated Delta 
demands and internally enforce negotiated militant disarmament. However, while Asari 
had been in prison, MEND sub-commanders had grown accustomed to independent 
regional authority, and more importantly, the sizable revenue streams they derived through 
regular oil worker kidnappings, oil theft operations, and through localized security 
contracts with oil companies. Thus, in initial negotiations, it was Government Oweizide, 
better known as Tompolo, of Western MEND, not Asari, who was able to claim the title of 
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“Grand Commander of MEND” by uniting a spectrum of Delta militant factions with the 
prospect of collective patronage bargaining.254 
When these negotiations failed to satisfy MEND demands, attacks resumed with a 
higher degree of intensity and coordination, especially with respect to sophisticated piracy. 
Amidst a surge of dozens of low-level piracy incidents from May 2007 to May 2008, 
MEND-affiliated militants conducted at least six high profile pirate attacks against offshore 
drilling platforms, offshore export terminals, floating production storage and offloading 
units (FPSOs), and floating storage and offloading units (FSOs). The attacks caused 
growing concern among international oil companies, whose fears were exacerbated by 
MEND’s June 2008 coordinated assault on Shell’s Bonga FPSO facility 75 miles offshore, 
which shut in 225,000 bpd, and thereby cut Nigeria’s oil production to its lowest level in 
25 years, and demonstrated the most expansive reach to date.255 A government report later 
estimated that from January to September 2008, pirate attacks and associated land-based 
attacks on oil infrastructure cost the state $23.7 billion in revenue. By May 2009, MEND’s 
ongoing attacks on land and sea had cut Nigeria’s overall oil production by more than one 
million bpd from production levels five years earlier, which represented a 40% 
reduction.256 The government’s Joint Task Force launched a fresh wave of assaults on 
militant camps that month, which prompted MEND to unleash a wave of devastating piracy 
attacks that culminated in an audacious, multi-vessel assault on the Atlas Cove import 
terminal in Lagos, the country’s economic capital, previously insulated from direct attacks 
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by MEND’s militant camps 300 miles to its southeast.257 With this single pirate attack on 
Atlas Cove, MEND disabled 35% of Nigeria’s capacity for refined imports that directly 
impacted a wide cross-section of Nigeria’s domestic economic activity; a dramatic 
expansion of its disruptive capacity.258 The same day as the Atlas Cove attack, the 
government dropped charges against Henry Okah, one of the most prominent MEND 
figures jailed since February 2008. Three days later, MEND declared a ceasefire in 
response to a government proposal for a Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP), which 
would provide a monthly stipend, skills training, and civil reintegration counseling to 
militants who demobilized and disarmed.259  
Nearly all the major militant leaders accepted the amnesty once it became clear that 
the PAP provided them far greater patronage opportunities than a traditional 
decommissioning, disarmament, and rehabilitation (DDR) process. While typical DDR 
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programs seek to dissolve militant bonds with their prior organizations and supplant them 
with education and civil integration, the Niger Delta PAP channeled monthly stipend 
payments for militants through their former commanders. This stipend served to reinforce 
militant dependence on commanders and preserve the integrity of militant organizations 
for the continuation of criminal activities, while elevating their political profile. Structuring 
PAP payments in this way also afforded militant commanders enormous self-enrichment 
opportunities, both by claiming exaggerated numbers of militants—in the case of Ateke 
Tom who claimed 10,000 militants while having roughly 1,000—and by embezzling a 
share of payments intended for their militants.260 Despite the inflated militant numbers, 
PAP records indicate that the number of post-amnesty training participants eventually rose 
to match the number of claimed fighters, which suggested that the records were either 
falsified to justify overpayment to training providers, or that commanders apportioned the 
excess vocational and educational opportunities to new clients that thereby allowed 
commanders to expand their personal patronage networks and enhance their political 
influence, or both. In total, the PAP cost the government approximately $140 million per 
year in stipends and an average additional cost of roughly $240 million per year for training 
and rehabilitation programs.261 
On top of the direct patronage payouts to militants and commanders participating 
in PAP, the government also offered lucrative pipeline security contracts to four leading 
militant commanders with $22.9 million/year to Tompolo, $9 million/year to Asari, and 
$3.8 million/year each to Ebikabowei “Boyloaf” Victor-Ben and Ateke Tom.262 The fact 
that the scale of oil theft increased by as much as 500% after these contracts went into 
effect, and that central government forces in the Delta have been widely reported to share 
in the profits from the illicit oil trade suggests that these “security contracts” carried 
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implicit government consent and political protection for militant leaders to semi-formalize 
oil theft operations as another form of patronage concession; so long as militants agreed to 
discontinue their crippling infrastructure attacks.263 Of the patronage avenues presented to 
militants, it was government permissiveness toward, or complicity in, oil theft that 
represented the largest diversion of state resources; estimated in 2013 to have accounted 
for $3–8 billion/year before global oil prices declined.264 
Thus, MEND’s introduction of high-profile pirate attacks to augment earlier land-
based disruption tactics allowed it to cripple oil export capacity systematically on an 
unprecedented scale while simultaneously demonstrating a credible threat to offshore oil 
infrastructure and personnel previously insulated from militant activity. To stem the vast 
revenue losses MEND was inflicting—roughly $77 billion in lost revenue in 2005–2008 
alone—the government faced mounting financial incentives to placate militant demands 
and would ultimately choose to coopt them in the state’s provisioning pact to avoid 
suffering greater losses.265  
Although MEND did not accomplish its goal of increasing the Niger Delta’s formal 
“resource control” from 13% to 50%, its deliberate use of high-profile piracy allowed the 
group to achieve virtually all of its other objectives: the release of key Ijaw prisoners, 
securing national-level political representation with Goodluck Jonathan as vice president 
and later president, and greater opportunities for inclusion in the oil industry through the 
PAP’s job training program and a vast expansion of parasitic pipeline security contracts. 
In place of formal “resource control” for the region, militant commanders were granted 
access to lucrative new mechanisms of informal patronage through the PAP, pipeline 
security contracts, and official complicity in the expansion of oil theft activities.  
While the amnesty does not explicitly endorse the piracy, oil theft, or other 
criminality that has followed, oil theft is higher within 50 km of militant camps that 
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participated in the amnesty program (Figure 6) and therefore supports the assertion that 
that these camps enjoy political protection to engage in criminal pursuits.266 This research, 
confirmed by other NGO field work, shows that the locations of militant camps—and often 
their affiliation to a particular godfather or politician—is well known to the local 
community and to the federal military forces deployed to the region.267 It also shows that 
militants who did not participate in the amnesty are still able to continue criminal 
operations from known locations without government suppression. 
 
Figure 6. Niger Delta Militant Camps268 
The lesson to Niger Delta militants from the MEND mobilization was that the 
government would eventually respond to large-scale oil industry disruptions with palliative 
patronage allocations, albeit only after violent and often indiscriminate military 
interventions had failed. Of the available means for militants to scale disruption rapidly to 
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a level at which the government would negotiate instead of retaliating, militants came to 
recognize that pirate attacks on waterfront and offshore infrastructure could be especially 
effective. While attacks against land-based pipelines had a disruptive effect, numerous 
land-based pipelines funnel into a small number of waterfront or offshore export terminals 
where the disruptive effect of attacks can be much higher. In addition, the adoption of pirate 
tactics for seaborne infrastructure attacks and kidnappings challenged long-held 
assumptions that offshore oil infrastructure and personnel were insulated from militant 
threats, and therefore, garnered amplified international media attention while imposing 
elevated pressure on the Nigerian government for swift remediation. With these lessons in 
mind, militant leaders would later employ deliberate waves of politically motivated 
piracy—operating from their known, but politically protected havens—on at least two 
more occasions. 
While the amnesty deal successfully reduced attacks on oil infrastructure by 
coopting most of MEND’s prominent militant commanders, several smaller militant 
factions refused the amnesty and continued operating under the MEND banner. The intent 
of holdouts—with Henry Okah as their most prominent backer—was to press the 
government for broader concessions ostensibly to address the root causes of Niger Delta 
unrest. However, shortly after the first round of talks concluded between MEND 
representatives and President Yar’Adua in November 2009, the president died and 
Goodluck Jonathan served out his term before being elected to a full term in April 2011. 
With Jonathan’s selection as the PDP’s presidential nominee, who faced stiff internal 
resistance from powerful northern godfathers (who maintained that the north was due 
another term in the presidency under the party’s informal regional rotation policy); he faced 
increased pressure to demonstrate that he could contain unrest in his home region.269 
Seeking to capitalize on this delicate political climate, an amnesty-rejecting faction 
of MEND—led by Sotonye “Tony Obese” Kaneji Ikiba and allegedly supported by Henry 
Okah—conducted a series of nine pirate attacks from July to November 2010 in which 
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international oil workers were kidnapped from offshore facilities and vessels. While these 
attacks lacked the sensational scale of the pre-amnesty offshore infrastructure attacks, the 
kidnapping victims included nationals of Canada, France, Germany, Ghana, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Lithuania, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United States, and therefore, 
garnered an elevated degree of international interest, and corresponding pressure on the 
Jonathan government. Competing analyses suggest these pirate kidnappings were designed 
to either undermine Jonathan’s presidential bid or press for additional patronage 
allocations.270 Thus, to demonstrate control over Niger Delta unrest in support of his 
presidential bid, Jonathan surged federal forces into the region to suppress amnesty 
defectors. To further that end, he coordinated Henry Okah’s October 2010 arrest in South 
Africa for his alleged role in a MEND car bombing, while “Tony Obese” was captured in 
November 2010.271 
Between patronage payoffs for militants who took the amnesty deal, increased 
federal enforcement to contain those who rejected it, and militant recruitment for land-
based election violence and manipulation, piracy in Nigerian waters declined from a high 
of 40 incidents in 2008 to just 10 in 2011, while kidnappings at sea fell from 39 individuals 
in 2008 to none in 2011.272 Demonstrating an effective capacity to mitigate militant 
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activities, and with oil production recovering to near pre-MEND levels, Jonathan went on 
to win both his party’s nomination and the presidential election. Shortly after winning the 
election, however, Jonathan—with Chief Clark serving as his principal advisor in Abuja—
began to funnel vast new patronage to Ijaw co-ethnics at all levels of government. This 
patronage included expanding PAP benefits and providing amnesty, stipends, and training 
to an additional cohort of militants who had not been included in the initial program. The 
PAP was originally designed to last five years (2009–2014), which cost an average of $60 
million/year. With the expansion, the end date was removed and program costs grew to an 
average of $445 million/year in 2011–2015.273 
In addition to the nearly $40 million/year that went to the four dominant militant 
leaders for pipeline security contracts, of which roughly 60% went to Tompolo, the 
Jonathan government awarded two maritime security contracts to Global West Vessel 
Specialists Nigeria Ltd. (GWVSL), of which Tompolo is allegedly the beneficial owner. 
The first contract was worth $3.8 million/year for GWVSL to purchase and operate 
maritime patrol vessels on behalf of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety 
Agency (NIMASA), while the second contract paid GWVSL $103.4 million to provide 10 
years of maritime surveillance and enforcement services. Under these contracts, GWVSL 
purchased six retired Hauk-class missile-torpedo boats from the Norwegian Navy and a 
2,500-ton Norwegian Navy support vessel in an illicit arms deal that resulted in the 
conviction of a Norwegian Navy officer, the arrest of four British intermediaries, and the 
establishment of a small privately owned navy in the hands of a former MEND 
commander.274 
Piracy incidents rebounded after the 2011 election, with 26 kidnappings in 2012, 
and a series of brazen hijacking incidents in which tankers laden with refined petroleum 
were captured by Nigerian pirates in the territorial waters of neighboring states, and sailed 
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back to Nigerian waters where their cargo mysteriously vanished. As discussed in the next 
section, these attacks differed from previous ones; rather than seeking to take oil production 
off-line as a means of rent-seeking, they were directly profit-motivated, or rent-
accumulating. The sophistication of these attacks suggests that they also enjoyed elite 
complicity, possibly at very senior levels of the government. The type of patronage-
seeking, politically motivated piracy displayed by MEND returned once more after the 
election of President Buhari in 2015.275  
c. Resurgence of Rent-Seeking Piracy and a Piracy-Enhancing Political 
Settlement: the Niger Delta Avengers (2015–2016) 
Buhari’s upset of Jonathan in the 2015 election was, among other factors, a 
reflection of a growing wave of popular resentment with the scale of government 
corruption, and the failure of the PDP to enforce internal party discipline and its 
commitment to ethnic regional balancing, which saw many high level patrons defect to 
Buhari’s APC. Buhari immediately began to crack down on the bloated patronage 
mechanisms that Jonathan had provided to the Niger Delta, especially to his favored Ijaw 
kinsman Tompolo. He confiscated GWVSL’s ships and terminated its maritime security 
contracts, cancelled Tompolo’s pipeline security contracts, and issued an arrest warrant for 
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Tompolo on 40 counts of fraud for the alleged embezzlement of $171 million through his 
security contracts.276 
In addition, Buhari announced that all amnesty stipends would be reduced by 70% 
for one year and then phased out entirely. In response, a new militant group, Niger Delta 
Avengers (NDA), began a systematic campaign of oil infrastructure disruption in January 
2016 that slashed Nigerian oil outputs to nearly 30-year lows after just three months of 
sustained attacks. Although many of the attacks were conducted against land-based 
infrastructure, the NDA also conducted several high-profile seaborne attacks including a 
sophisticated underwater attack against a critical 48-inch sub-sea pipeline that fed Shell’s 
Forcados export terminal and subsequently took 15% of Nigeria’s exports offline. When 
the line was repaired, the NDA repeated the attack in May and again in June 2016. 
Ironically, these attacks were likely facilitated by the vocational skills—including diving, 
welding, boat building, maritime technology, and industrial automation—that had been 
provided under the amnesty program. After NDA militants attacked Chevron’s Okan 
offshore platform in May 2016, both Chevron and Shell shut down all their operations in 
the region and evacuated their personnel. As attacks continued to mount, President Buhari 
eventually came to the same conclusion Yar’Adua had in 2009, that the state lacked the 
capacity to suppress the piracy incidents through coercion and that a next-best solution was 
the continuation of the amnesty’s patronage inclusion. Thus, by May 2017, Buhari had 
restored the amnesty payments. In the end, the NDA’s attacks allowed it to negotiate 
successfully for the continuation of the amnesty program—that remains ongoing in 2020, 
 
276 Ebiede, Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 21–22; Ebiede, Langer, and Tosun, “Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration,” 3–5; Liang, “CAS-Global Ltd. and the Private Nigerian Coast Guard 
Fleet; Ralby, Downstream Oil Theft—Global Modalities, 23; LeVan, “Reciprocal Retaliation and Local 
Linkage,” 18–20; Rotimi T. Suberu, “Strategies for Advancing Anticorruption Reform in Nigeria,” 
Daedalus 147, no. 3 (2018): 185–186; Jessica Moody, “The Niger Delta Avengers: A New Threat to Oil 
Producers in Nigeria,” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 12 (2016): 6–8; Dirk Steffen, “Who are the Niger Delta 
Avengers?” Center for International Maritime Security, June 14, 2016; Ulf Laessing, “Seawater Pipeline 
Attack Heralds Fresh Trouble in Nigeria’s Delta,” Reuters, March 4, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-nigeria-delta/seawater-pipeline-attack-heralds-fresh-trouble-in-nigerias-delta-idUSKCN0W61DT; 
Stakeholder Democracy Network, Pipeline Surveillance Contracts in the Niger Delta (London: Stakeholder 
Democracy Network, 2019); Okafor-Yarwood et al., Stable Seas, 42. 
99 
six years after its envisioned conclusion—and the continued use of pipeline security 
contracts as mechanisms for patronage payouts.277 
Following the NDA’s campaign, Nigerian elites across ethnic and party lines 
appear resigned to the conclusion that the most expedient way to manage Niger Delta 
unrest is to incorporate militants into the state’s provisioning pact—in what Schultze-Kraft 
terms a pax criminalis—with a sustained stream of formal amnesty payments and 
acquiescence to their pursuit of minimally disruptive illicit accumulations that include rent-
accumulating forms of piracy and non-destructive oil theft.278  
d. Summary 
The competitive electoral access to central state rents that accompanied the 
transition to civilian rule in 1999 served to decentralize access to patronage and therefore 
prompted Niger Delta godfathers and political aspirants to employ Niger Delta militants as 
political enforcers and foot soldiers. Political power brokers eventually expanded their 
militant tactics to include politically motivated piracy attacks. Nigeria’s patrimonial 
structure—both grievance-responsive and dependent on oil rents—proved to be especially 
susceptible to pirate attacks that were both highly disruptive to oil revenue and framed in 
the language of regional grievance. As a result, Niger Delta godfathers were able to secure 
formal access to national-level patronage spoils with the election of Vice President 
Goodluck Jonathan. 
In the process, however, militants came to recognize their ability to employ piracy 
tactics independent of their political godfathers to negotiate their own access directly to 
centrally dispersed patronage. Thus, in response to the piracy-articulated grievances that 
followed Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the vice presidency, the state was eventually 
forced to negotiate new patronage opportunities for major militant networks through the 
stipends, training, and jobs of the amnesty program, parasitic pipeline security contracts, 
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and the latitude for organized criminal networks to continue to operate from safe havens in 
the Niger Delta. The criminal activities of these politically protected militants 
predominantly revolve around minimally disruptive forms of oil theft (upstream 
diversions, and excess liftings) and profitable forms of piracy. From 2010–2014, these new 
pirate attacks, as detailed in the next section, predominantly focused on petroleum tanker 
hijackings, but the reputational costs to the government were among the reasons Buhari 
attempted to crack down on Niger Delta militants in 2015. In the pax criminalis that 
emerged following the NDA’s 2015–2016 destructive campaign, petroleum tanker 
hijackings have subsided, while kidnapping piracy attacks have proliferated in their place. 
As a result, piracy levels remain high, while their form has adapted to the acceptable 
bounds of militant inclusion in the state’s provisioning pact. 
2. Rent-Appropriating Piracy 
Rent-appropriating piracy is a byproduct of relationships between political patrons 
and militant clients that engender elite permissiveness toward illicit forms of rent 
accumulation and thereby embolden sophisticated forms of profit-motivated piracy. Rent-
appropriating forms of piracy emerged in Nigeria in response to the post-1999 political 
incentives to mobilize militants in pursuit of decentralized patronage capture. Politically 
protected militants engaged in three types of rent-appropriating piracy: unsophisticated 
opportunistic piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and cargo hijacking. The operational 
sophistication required for the latter two forms is often even higher than in rent-seeking 
forms of piracy since financial gains can only be realized after housing hostages and 
negotiating ransoms or transporting and selling stolen cargo. Given the challenges involved 
in moving or concealing hostages and large quantities of illicit goods without government 
interdiction, these forms of rent-accumulating piracy are generally restricted to countries 
in which pirates enjoy some degree of acquiescence or complicity from elites.  
a. Seaborne Kidnappings-for-Ransom (2006–Present) 
Following the 1999 elections, militants who had been sponsored by state and local 
elites to secure electoral victories enjoyed political protection to engage in oil theft and 
non-destructive harassment of oil company operations. The latter included protection 
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rackets guised as “security contracts” and kidnapping oil company employees to elicit 
community development projects or jobs for co-ethnics. While these disruptive activities 
existed prior to 1999, they had been more extensively suppressed by the military 
government. The symbiotic political relationships that emerged between local elites and 
militants in response to the Fourth Republic’s incentives for patronage capture permitted 
militants to operate on a larger scale and with greater impunity. Although this 
environmental permissiveness led to an increase in piracy attacks that included occasional 
kidnappings, the rise of sophisticated kidnapping-focused piracy syndicates did not arise 
until the emergence of MEND in 2006. In the years since, their operations have continued 
to evolve into a multi-faceted rent-appropriation enterprise with enduring support from 
local elites and tacit acquiescence from the central state.279 
The development of sophisticated kidnapping syndicates in the Niger Delta was 
facilitated by their utility to MEND’s larger rent-seeking goals. While MEND’s attacks 
were driven by rent-seeking objectives, its kidnapping of international oil workers (on land 
and sea) began to generate profits as oil companies negotiated for the safe release of their 
employees. Although these profits were theoretically incidental to rent-seeking objectives, 
and MEND publicly refuted accepting ransom payments before the release of hostages, 
militant sub-units in Bayelsa and Rivers states seized on the opportunity to accumulate 
substantial profits; reports estimate more than $1 billion in ransoms paid for the release of 
oil workers from 2004 to 2007, and $3 billion from 2007 to 2009.280  
As noted previously, following the implementation of the PAP all forms of piracy 
in Nigerian waters initially declined. However, as Goodluck Jonathan solidified his hold 
on the presidency in 2011, global oil prices reached unprecedented highs and government 
revenue soared. Flush with resources, and engaging in what some scholars have described 
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as a campaign of “economic revenge” for Ijaw exclusion since independence, Jonathan’s 
administration oversaw a flurry of new patronage opportunities directed to Ijaw co-ethnics, 
including state-facilitated purchase of a $2.5 billion oil bloc, opaque oil lifting contracts, 
easily corruptible oil-for-product swap agreements, preferential access to oil import 
licenses, and fraudulent fuel subsidy.281 At the same time, militants began to regroup and 
remobilize under a new post-amnesty status quo in which rent-appropriating forms of 
piracy were a tolerated, or even encouraged, means of off-budget resource diversion to the 
Niger Delta. Over the course of 2012 and 2013, kidnapping levels therefore rebounded to 
nearly the same levels as during the peak of MEND operations.282  
Consistent with the rent-accumulation hypothesis, kidnapping trends continued to 
mirror political dynamics. As was the case prior to the 2011 election, kidnappings levels 
(and overall piracy) declined in advance of the 2015 election to just six kidnappings in 
2014 as militant attention shifted to electoral mobilization. Although Delta militants made 
overt threats to return to a MEND-style insurgency if Jonathan was not reelected, their 
reaction to Buhari’s electoral victory was muted, as evidenced in both press statements and 
the gradual return to 19 kidnappings in 2015, as militants initially tested the limits of 
Buhari’s tolerance for their rent-appropriation. Following the suspension of amnesty 
payments in early 2016, however, the resumption of rent-seeking propelled kidnapping to 
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65 in 2017, well beyond the previous peak.283 As the amnesty program resumed, 
kidnappings reverted to purely rent-accumulating, which declined to 40 in 2018 and 48 in 
2019, but remained much higher than the profit-motivated levels observed during the 
Jonathan presidency.284 This decline can be explained by three factors. First, the Buhari 
government’s capitulation to the NDA set new boundaries for permissible rent-
accumulation activities. Second, the decline in oil prices reduced the profitability of oil 
bunkering networks ashore, which pushed profit-seeking militants towards a greater 
involvement in kidnapping. Third, the scale of profits associated with these kidnappings 
has spawned a thriving criminal ecosystem in parallel, especially with respect to hostage 
negotiations where local politicians and self-described “ex-militant” commanders take a 
cut of ransom payments in return for their services as intermediaries with supposedly rogue 
factions of kidnappers to secure the release of hostages.285 That local elites receive a direct 
financial benefit from kidnapping negotiations reinforces their incentives to allow 
kidnappers to operate unfettered by government intervention.  
b. Tanker Hijackings (2011–Present) 
Vessel hijackings have occurred sporadically in and around Nigerian waters since 
as early as 1996; however, 2011 marked a dramatic shift in both the number of attacks and 
their analytical significance. From 1996 to 2010, 23 recorded hijackings occurred in the 
Gulf of Guinea. In all but one case, vessel seizure was incidental to other pirate objectives: 
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robbing valuables from the crew, dock worker labor disputes, pressuring oil companies for 
community concessions, kidnapping for ransom, ransoming the vessel, or stealing a vessel 
as a mode of transportation to attack an offshore oil platform.286 
This trend abruptly changed on December 24, 2010 when Nigerian pirates hijacked 
an Italian tanker, Valle di Cordoba, while it was anchored in Benin’s waters roughly 20 
miles from Cotonou and 60 miles from Lagos. The pirates forced the tanker to sail to an 
“undesignated position” where they spent nearly three days discharging approximately 
5,000 metric tonnes (MT) of refined petroleum—worth roughly $4 million—into a smaller 
vessel before releasing the ship and its crew.287 A private firm’s analysis of attacks in the 
following three years (2011–2013) suggested that at least 87 attempts had been made to 
replicate this archetype, of which 34 succeeded in hijacking their target vessel.288 
Although not all succeeded in offloading their target cargo, they collectively stole more 
than 117,000 MT of refined products, with a market value greater than $100 million.289 
Although a 2012 analysis concluded that in all successful cases of petroleum tanker 
hijacking by Nigerians to that point, a large percentage began outside Nigerian waters, 
predominantly in the waters of Benin and Togo.290 In 2011 and 2012, 23 attacks were 
conducted on tankers in Benin’s waters and 15 in Togolese waters, yet when hijackings 
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were successful, the tankers were either forced to sail to Nigerian waters, or to the open 
ocean where their cargo was transferred into smaller vessels destined for Nigeria.291  
This mode of piracy—in which ships cargoes are hijacked for profits—is among 
the most organizationally challenging. The complexity of cargo hijackings is distinguished 
from that of kidnappings in that the former rely on the exploitation of a broader set of 
infrastructural and institutional support systems. A successful petroleum hijacking tends to 
involve an organizing principal actor who makes up-front capital investments and 
assembles a group of necessary agents to execute a pre-arranged plan. Available evidence 
suggests that in the petroleum hijackings that have occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, pirates 
are likely hired agents of a politically connected organizer.292 In contrast to kidnappings, 
it is much more important for petroleum theft organizers to have access to privileged 
shipping information to conduct an effective target selection. Where kidnappers often have 
the freedom to select lucrative targets of opportunity, petroleum hijackers need to know 
specifically what grade and quantity of fuel will be on board at a specified time so that the 
appropriate buyers can be identified and arrangements for transfer and storage made. They 
also need access to the target ship’s intended schedule and routing so that pirates can be 
directed to intercept it effectively at sea. In addition to the fast intercept boats required for 
most forms of piracy, petroleum hijackers also need to have or take control of a fuel-
carrying vessel into which they can offload the stolen cargo, and at least some of the pirates 
need to have sufficient expertise to conduct a technically demanding ship-to-ship transfer 
at sea.293 Subsequently, the cargo can either be transferred to licit storage tanks ashore 
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through a formal import jetty or it can be mixed into another tanker’s cargo at sea.294 In 
either case, the vessel that pulls in to offload the stolen fuel at the import jetty will need to 
present forged documentation (bills of lading, quality and quantity certificates, and import 
permits) and have a pre-arranged deal to offload the fuel into one of the on-site storage 
farms from which it can then flow freely into the licit market.295  
In 2012, the captured leaders of two petroleum-hijacking cells , whoseparately 
claimed that “top government officials” bankrolled their operations and orchestrated the 
participation of officials of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the NNPC that 
provided target vessel details (location, destination, schedule, and cargo) while bribing 
numerous security agencies to avoid interference. Once the tankers were hijacked, the 
pirate commanders said they transship the petroleum into smaller vessels to deliver the 
stolen fuel to onshore tank farms. In the case of these commanders, they independently 
named several “traditional leaders” with ownership stakes in several participating tank 
farms. Although the names of these traditional leaders were not disclosed, subsequent 
reports show that the 2012 hijacking of the product tanker Anuket Emerald (led by one of 
these captured commanders) resulted in the delivery of 3,000 metric tons of stolen 
petroleum via a chartered intermediary vessel, MT Grace, to a tank farm owned by a former 
Minister of the Interior, Emmanuel Iheanacho.296  
While this trend quickly gained momentum between 2011 and 2013, hijackings 
began a quantitative decline in 2013 while beginning to shift away from petroleum 
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hijacking toward crew-targeted ransom kidnappings. While petroleum hijacking declined, 
those that did occur migrated to more distant hunting grounds. The fist petroleum hijacking 
in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters occurred in 2012, a tanker in Gabon’s waters was taken in 2013, 
and in 2014, Nigerian pirates hijacked tankers in both Ghana and Angola.297 The 
downward trend continued in 2014 with only five successful cargo hijackings reported, of 
which three involved significant transfers of petroleum (or in one apparent outlier case, 
crude oil).298 Hijackings continued to decline with only one success in 2015, and in 2016, 
the Nigerian Navy interdicted what would have been the only successful petroleum 
hijacking of that year.299 In 2017, no successful hijacking-for-cargo incidents were 
reported and after a brief uptick of two petroleum hijackings in 2018, three would-be 
incidents in 2019 were successfully interdicted by naval patrols in the region.300 
As the decline in petroleum hijackings occurred, overall piracy levels remained in 
an upward trajectory, as kidnapping-motivated hijackings expanded from 2012––2014 to 
supersede petroleum hijacking as the primary piracy concern across the region.301 Given 
the persistence of profit-motivated piracy—simply shifting from one form to another—the 
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decline of petroleum hijacking does not appear to signify that militants are facing exclusion 
from the post-amnesty provisioning pact. In fact, the shift may be related to major domestic 
events in 2012 during the “Occupy Nigeria” movement that opposed the government’s 
removal of fuel subsidies. At nearly the same time, the Nigerian House of Representatives 
conducted an investigation into fuel subsidy fraud. The initial report and subsequent 
investigations showed that the government allocated oil import contracts to numerous 
“politically exposed persons” who collectively received $6.5 billion for refined petroleum 
deliveries for which no valid records exist. In some cases, the investigation found that the 
companies had provided false documentation (bills of lading, quality and quantity 
certificates, and import permits) as the basis for fraudulent subsidy claims, while other 
companies collected subsidy payments with no documentation of delivery at all. As 
investigations, audits, and criminal prosecutions progressed starting in January 2012, 
scrutiny of illicit trafficking and tangible enforcement measures began to take hold across 
the Niger Delta.  
It is not clear if there was a broader patronage shift going on concurrently with the 
protests and these reports or if the House investigation was designed to demonstrate the 
governments newfound diligence in response to the protests against elite appropriation of 
oil resources. In either case, these reports leave open the possibility that petroleum 
hijacking was being sponsored by “politically exposed persons” who were leveraging the 
flow of stolen petrol to increase their access to subsidy payments. Although it is equally 
possible that petroleum hijackers were independently piggy-backing on the lax port 
enforcement that had developed in response to the much larger operations being run to 
siphon billions of dollars from the subsidy fund. With that in mind, it appears that before 
investigations began in January 2012, monetizing stolen fuel by importing it through 
official jetties may not have been very challenging. Such a shift would help explain why 
petroleum piracy declined, yet while forms of piracy persisted after tighter regulatory 
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measures went into place in the ports, thereby demonstrating the continuity of militant 
inclusion in the post-amnesty provisioning pact.302 
C. CONCLUSION 
Since independence, the structures of the formal Nigerian state and its informal 
patronage distribution mechanisms have evolved in response to the competing multipolar 
interests of a highly fractionalized set of elites. While their individual interests remain 
exceedingly fragmented, they have consistently aligned in support of an elite provisioning 
pact that, lubricated by oil revenues, serves as the fundamental connective tissue between 
them. The management of formal and informal rules that govern the provisioning pact’s 
distributional channels remains contentious; however, successive iterations of structural 
federal design and political party organizational constructs have delivered in the Fourth 
Republic the longest period of civilian rule in Nigeria’s post-independence history. The 
administrative decentralization of the state, paired with large, statutory revenue 
distributions—especially to oil-producing states and local governments—have 
successfully diluted the hegemony of the First Republic’s ethno-regional blocs and 
mitigated serious threats of secession. However, these statutory revenues have also created 
powerful new incentives to capture elected office at the local and state levels. The 
application of the “federal character” system to all facets of government has similarly 
succeeded in empowering ethnic minority groups politically excluded at independence, but 
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it has simultaneously hardened ethnicity as the most salient political characteristic around 
which political competition revolves.  
Meanwhile, the internal organizing principles common to both political parties that 
have captured the presidency in the Fourth Republic have interacted with the formal 
structures of the post-1999 state in unpredictably toxic ways. The extension of the federal 
character principal to internal zoning rules of key party posts—in excess of constitutional 
requirements—has intensified episodic incentives for extreme levels of competition while 
continuing to reinforce ethnic identities as the currency of distributional competition. 
Additionally, the strategy of open elite recruitment—wherein local elites compete for 
upward party mobility by demonstrating local political domination and the broadest 
clientelist distribution networks with the help of godfathers and private political militias—
openly promotes violent ethnic outbidding at the local level and the mobilization of 
increasingly powerful militant groups. 
In exchange for the essential role that militants play in establishing party dominance 
at the local level—and by aggregation, political power at the state and federal levels—
central party leadership and the federal government are incentivized to acquiesce to a 
degree of illicit rent-accumulation by militants. However, left to their own devices, 
militants have demonstrated the capacity to expand illicit accumulation channels to such a 
degree that they can mobilize against the state to seek greater access to patronage. This 
scenario is especially true in the Niger Delta where the presence of vulnerable oil 
infrastructure allows militants to exert tremendous coercive power on the oil revenue-
dependent state. 
The incentives of this system therefore produced ethnic militias in the 1999 
elections that enjoyed the political protection of local elites to engage in independent rent-
accumulation, predominantly through crude oil theft and the kidnapping of oil company 
employees. These groups continued to mature their criminal endeavors until they were re-
energized as political foot soldiers in the 2003 electoral cycle before returning to their 
former criminal pursuits, yet with enhanced organization and financial capacity and the 
continued protection of political backers. 
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As the episodic competitive incentives of internal party zoning heated up in 
advance of the political open season expected in the 2007 electoral cycle, godfathers and 
local elites began to jockey for position to signal their inclusion value to national PDP 
leadership. To this end, various existing Ijaw militias came together under a common 
umbrella organization known as MEND. Emboldened by their common cause, MEND 
militants adopted a high-profile oil disruption campaign to exploit the state’s dependence 
on vulnerable oil infrastructure. This campaign’s effectiveness was enhanced by the 
incorporation of sophisticated, rent-seeking pirate attacks—against both oil infrastructure 
and in kidnapping international oil workers—such that PDP leadership responded to the 
powerful grievance signaling by selecting an Ijaw, Goodluck Jonathan, as its vice 
presidential nominee for the 2007 election.  
With their immediate political objectives accomplished, MEND militants—having 
enriched themselves on the theoretically incidental financial rewards of oil worker 
kidnappings, and enjoying political protection from local elites and godfathers to gorge 
themselves in oil bunkering revenues—found themselves in a commanding position to 
continue their campaign against the federal government to press for their own private rent-
accumulation interests. After a display of their capacity and will to destroy Nigeria’s oil 
export capacity systematically, the federal government relented in 2009 to a Presidential 
Amnesty Agreement as a means to coopt militants by including them in the state’s broader 
elite provisioning pact. Not to be confused with a traditional DDR campaign, this program 
would come to form an enduring channel of pseudo-statutory federal payments, along with 
a raft of discretionary state patronage allocations and the state’s acquiescence to continue 
to pursue illicit forms of non-destructive accumulation. 
At this point, pirate activities shifted from rent-seeking motivations to rent-
accumulating motivations. To this end, they employed two lucrative piracy outlets to 
complement their land-based oil bunkering activities, kidnapping-for-ransom (both ashore 
and at sea) and petroleum tanker hijacking. These channels of piratical rent accumulation 
netted millions of dollars; however, by 2012, institutional vulnerabilities upon which 
petroleum hijacking was based began to harden. Thus, as petroleum hijacking declined, 
kidnapping attacks at sea continued to escalate.  
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With the change in presidential administration in 2015, the foundations of the post-
amnesty provisioning pact was called into question. In response, the Niger Delta Avengers 
mounted a MEND-like destruction campaign that yielded a negotiation with the new 
administration to preserve the terms of militant inclusion in the state provisioning pact 
along with an indefinite extension of the amnesty program and continued state 
acquiescence to non-destructive illicit rent-accumulation. 
Thus, in the course of structural evolutionary design in both the formal framework 
of the Nigerian state and the internal political part balancing rules, attempts to dilute ethnic 
competition at the national level in the post-1999 Nigerian state created perverse incentives 
for ethnic militant mobilization to serve as a fundamental building block of political 
mobilization for state and federal power. In so doing, the Fourth Republic has created a 
systemin which militants have accumulated their own bases of power and eventually 
negotiated their inclusion in the broader elite provisioning pact. As such, they remain free 
to engage in rent-accumulating piracy so long as it does not threaten the oil revenue stream 
that feeds the national provisioning pact. Nigeria’s elite accumulation strategies and 





A. PATRONAGE STRUCTURE 
Standing in contrast to Nigeria’s decentralized political power and diffuse resource 
distribution, Angola’s political authority and patronage are tightly controlled by a 
centralized party-state, and more precisely, by its president. 
1. Introduction 
Angola’s arrival at what Soares de Oliveira calls a “hyper-centralist” system was 
the product of several factors: a legacy of centralized colonial administration, the polarizing 
effects of an extended post-independence civil war, the alignment of party and state 
leadership with an interconnected “creole” elite, and the persistence of existential threats 
from internal and external competitors over the course of nearly three decades of civil 
war.303 The exigencies of war induced an already tight-knit cohort of elites to form a 
protection pact in which they incrementally ceded greater political and fiscal authority from 
the party-state structures of the ruling MPLA to the office of the presidency, initially under 
the leadership of Agostinho Neto from independence in 1975 until his death in 1979, then 
more extensively over the course of José Eduardo dos Santos’ rule from 1979 until 2017. 
This transition of power occurred both formally—through successive constitutional 
changes that incrementally shifted power from the party and government to the president—
and informally as the president established direct control over state oil revenues and 
parallel mechanisms of government administration. To preserve his dominant role in this 
system, dos Santos satiated core elites with generous, but reversible patronage 
opportunities, cultivated a political fluidity, and adopted a parallel administrative system 
that undermined the mobilization of elite competitors institutional capacity that could 
balance against presidential authority, limited the organization of civil society to state-
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sponsored and presidentially controlled outlets, and employed an expansive state security 
apparatus.304 
2. Legacy of Colonialism  
As in many African countries, the legacy of colonialism exerted a profound 
influence on Angola’s post-independence political and social structures. Three facets of 
colonial influence are particularly relevant to the centralization of the post-independence 
Angolan state and its rent management practices: the development of a cosmopolitan 
“creole” elite during the first 300 years of colonial rule, the subsequent imposition of a 
centralized and authoritarian Portuguese colonial bureaucracy, and the corresponding 
implementation of an oppressive state security apparatus.  
First, the ethos and objectives of post-independence ruling elites were heavily 
influenced by the status attained by “creole” elites in the early colonial period. From the 
founding of Luanda in 1576 until the conclusion of the Berlin Conference in 1885, the 
Portuguese colonial administration was structured to support limited objectives in its 
coastal enclaves, with minimal oversight and staffing from Lisbon. These conditions 
fostered the emergence of a social class of mixed-race, urban elites who played a major 
role in local commerce, actively participated in the colonial administration, and self-
identified as members of a “modern” Euro-Atlantic community that rejected the 
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“backward” traditions of the African hinterlands.305 Following the Berlin Conference, 
Portugal took a more proactive role in colonial administration, as it worked to establish 
effective control of Angola’s inland territories, and by the time the authoritarian Salazar 
regime came to power in Lisbon in 1926, the influence of the creole mestiços had been 
relegated to a middle-strata beneath the growing white settler population. The government 
of Antonio Salazar hardened the second-tier status of the Afro-Portuguese mestiços with 
the strict definition of a legally distinct social class—assimilados—who, while more 
privileged than “uncivilized” indígenas, remained formally subordinate to white settlers. 
The disenfranchised creole elites played a central role in the formation of anti-colonial 
movements in the 1940s and 1950s, including the creation of the MPLA in 1956, which 
would join other movements in a violent insurgency to expel Portuguese rule in 1961. 
While the MPLA’s goal of rejecting the direct role of the Portuguese colonial government 
was common to the other anti-colonial movements, a distinguishing feature of the heavily 
creole-influenced MPLA was its desire to achieve Angola’s acceptance and integration in 
the Euro-Atlantic community through the rejection of “backward” traditions and a pan-
Angolan embrace of a modernized, integrated society. The pursuit of these goals 
subsequently served as a key motivator and justification for the MPLA’s post-
independence centralizing tendencies towards a protection pact.306 
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Second, the direct-rule format that the Portuguese colonial administration adopted 
from 1926 until independence in 1975 established a centralized bureaucratic framework 
that the MPLA would inherit at independence. The “New State” was established between 
1930 and 1933 by the Salazar regime to centralize all Portuguese colonies under a unitary 
governance framework in Lisbon, which dispensed with earlier models of limited 
autonomy. The “New State” established strict administrative, budgetary, and economic 
controls to restrict dependence on foreign capital and impose a centrally directed 
development plan that would promote a closed, Lusophone mercantilist system. In the 
process, the Salazar government deployed a new, “professionalized” colonial civil service 
from Lisbon that displaced local settler populations and further relegated the mestiço/
assimilado class to middle and low-level positions. State-directed economic activity 
included forced labor requirements for unassimilated indígenas, centrally controlled 
production initiatives for agriculture and raw material extraction, and import restrictions to 
make the colonies a guaranteed market for refined products from Portugal. This state-
directed model of economic development necessitated a sprawling, centralized 
bureaucracy that permeated the Angolan colony and disenfranchised the urban mestiços 
and the rural traditional rulers—sobas—who had previously exercised a degree of 
autonomy in their respective spheres. This authoritarian, centralized mode of colonial 
governance would continue until the Portuguese haphazardly relinquished colonial 
authority to the ambiguously defined “Angolan people” on November 11, 1975.307 
Unlike British and French colonial transitions that incorporated years of deliberate 
preparation, Portugal’s colonial exit was hastily conceived after Portuguese army officers, 
weary from more than a decade of suppressing colonial independence movements, 
mounted a coup in September 1974. Just three months later, the Alvor Accord provided a 
precarious transitional framework to hand power to a coalition of three warring nationalist 
movements to share control of the colonial structure the Portuguese left behind. Despite 
the distinct, regionally defined support bases of each of the three nationalist movements, 
they shared a similar, but mutually exclusive, goal of achieving unitary dominance across 
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the whole of Angola’s territory. With competing visions of singular control and a shared 
aversion to power-sharing compromise, by August 1975, the transitional government 
collapsed. As it did, the MPLA quickly established control over Luanda and populated the 
colonial capital’s remaining government framework with its own adherents. In October 
1975, South African forces crossed into Angola to lead a UNITA advance on Luanda and 
secure de facto control before Portugal’s departure in November; however, Cuban forces 
reinforced the city and cemented the MPLA’s control over the capital as the Portuguese 
departed. Although the MPLA would go on to modify the administrative structure it 
inherited progressively, it did so from a centralized starting point that was well-suited to 
the superimposition of the MPLA’s Marist-Leninist ideology and facilitated the subsequent 
evolution toward greater centralization.308 
Third, the Portuguese’s use of invasive state security mechanisms to suppress anti-
colonial movements drove dissidents to seek refuge abroad—where they made inroads with 
sympathetic communist movements—while the success of these oppressive tactics set a 
precedent that the MPLA would later adopt for its own ends. Thus, Portuguese state 
security inadvertently encouraged the MPLA to adopt a centralized structure of governance 
that would later employ even more invasive state security tactics to preserve its control 
over Angola.309 The Portuguese deployed about 35,000 troops to Angola from the 
Metropole between 1961 and 1974, which peaked at 43,000 in 1967, and was 
complimented with modern weaponry and air power. The Portuguese counterinsurgency 
campaign also recruited 27,000 Angolans into military service, and deliberately employed 
them to exacerbate inter-ethnic rivalries as a means of undermining independence 
movements largely built around regional ethnic identities. In addition to establishing a 
tradition of heavy domestic militarization, the independence war’s impact on society was 
further magnified by the 1967 implementation of a resettlement program that forcibly 
moved more than one million rural peasants into fortified villages to cut insurgents off 
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from material support and recruitment. The Portuguese security services placed spies and 
informants in each of the resettlement villages to monitor insurgent activities. While these 
techniques were successful in undercutting the momentum of the independence 
movements, the forced resettlement project devastated rural agricultural productivity and 
heightened peasant dependence on state-controlled urban centers. The decline of peasant 
agricultural production was accompanied by a relaxing of foreign capital prohibitions that, 
with militant activity relegated to peripheral harassment attacks, paradoxically facilitated 
colonial Angola’s most successful period of economic development amidst an ongoing 
insurgency. The economic successes of this period were primarily driven by large-scale 
capital investments in commercial farming and the extraction of minerals and oil, whose 
centralized operations were well-suited to state oversight and a post-independence 
transition to state control. Thus, when the MPLA took control of Luanda and the remnants 
of the Portuguese administration in 1975, it saw little reason to abandon a set of 
demonstrably effective centralized and oppressive state security tools—including large-
scale military mobilization, a pervasive state security apparatus, and the use of resettlement 
programs—that could be weaponized against its competitors, UNITA and FNLA. The 
MPLA, having lived under these mechanisms, made it particularly adept at expanding its 
application to its elite protection pact, with the help of the communist state security experts 
who would soon be advising this movement.310 
3. Post-Independence Centralization  
Unlike the secessionist aims that drove the Nigerian civil war, the Angolan civil 
war was defined by the unwavering commitment of the MPLA and UNITA elites to secure 
control over the entire state under their mutually exclusive, but equally personalized visions 
of rule. The winner-take-all nature of the conflict therefore yielded additional incentives 
for MPLA elites to band together in an exclusionary protection pact under a centralized 
authority. Given the MPLA’s overt leanings to Marxist-Leninist ideology in pursuit of this 
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goal, it received extensive support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and it was therefore 
able to establish itself as the militarily dominant nationalist group during the war of 
independence. In the wider geo-political context of the Cold War, the expansion of 
communist influence alarmed the United States, which threw its support behind the FNLA 
and later UNITA. Mirroring the direct support of Cuban combat troops to the MPLA, and 
as part of its wider effort to undermine Namibian separatism, the apartheid South African 
government provided extensive military support to UNITA, on several occasions that 
resulted in direct combat between South African and Cuban forces on Angolan territory. 
External support heightened destructive capacity on both sides and facilitated a decade’s 
long military stalemate. When the Soviet Union and the United States shifted their support 
in favor of a negotiated settlement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MPLA and UNITA 
remained focused on mutual elimination. The persistent post-independence warfare that 
waxed and waned from 1975 until UNITA’s ultimate defeat in 2002 was punctuated by 
recurring moments of existential urgency for both sides, and thereby, provided an impetus 
and justification for continued rent centralization, the personalization of rent management, 
and a disciplined and exclusionary approach to patronage distribution. While similar trends 
can be seen on both sides, this section traces the centralization that occurred within the 
MPLA given its enduring control over the Angolan state.311  
The MPLA’s first major step toward post-independence centralization followed a 
failed coup attempt by a prominent party member, Nito Alves, in 1977. With the aid of 
Cuban forces, President Neto survived the coup, and then used it to justify a violent internal 
purge of the MPLA’s ranks. In the “rectification campaign” that followed, party 
membership fell from 110,000 in 1977 to 16,500 in 1979, a mere 0.2% of the 
population.312 The coup and its aftermath cemented two key MPLA characteristics that 
facilitated enduring centralization. First, the MPLA members who remained after the purge 
were acutely aware that their continued access to state power was now wholly dependent 
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on their visible loyalty to President Neto. Second, the MPLA demonstrated that its control 
could be secured with the direct military support of Cuban and Soviet allies rather than 
popular support. The only public goods the MPLA needed to provide to maintain stability 
were a stable safe haven from UNITA predation and a minimum level of urban 
infrastructure. The insulation of the MPLA from popular accountability, and the discipline 
imposed on the remaining MPLA party members, permitted President Neto to enact 
constitutional revisions that would formally centralize state power in the executive while 
diminishing the balancing capacity of the legislative and judicial organs of the state. 
Specifically, four rounds of constitutional revisions from 1977–1978 incrementally gave 
the president the sole authority to nominate and remove provincial commissioners, the sole 
authority to nominate and remove the Prime Minister and other members of government, 
diverted the day-to-day day governance functions of the Council of Ministers and the 
Council of Revolution to two presidentially managed commissions, increased presidential 
oversight of provincial commissioners by integrating them in the Council of Ministers, and 
ultimately, abolished the positions of Prime Minister and Vice Prime Minister entirely. 
Additional centralizing changes under Neto’s rule included a restructuring of judicial 
authorities under presidential authority that included broad latitude to impose the death 
penalty based on ambiguous criteria and presidential control over access to international 
education grants for the children of connected party members.313 Having signaled his 
alignment with Soviet and Cuban strategic goals and broader ideology, Neto was 
empowered to continued centralizing and personalizing state power with far less regard for 
internal party resistance or popular discontent.314 
Despite Neto’s move to align the MPLA ideologically with its foreign backers, the 
MPLA was still required to pay the Soviet Union for the military hardware it imported, and 
to bankroll the Cuban forces deployed to prop up the regime. The reliable flow of financial 
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resources needed to maintain this critical support, depended upon tight control of the oil 
rich enclave in Cabinda. Within a month of independence, the MPLA—backed by Cuban 
forces—secured and fortified control over the Cabinda region, which it would retain 
uninterruptedly despite challenges from the FNLA, UNITA and the Cabinda Separatist 
Movement Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Portuguese: Frente para a 
Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda) (FLEC).315 However, it lacked the technical expertise 
to extract the oil resources efficiently. Thus, Neto carved out an exception for the oil 
industry within the broader Marxist-Leninist economic model, and provided assurances to 
western oil companies that their investments would be protected, so long as they kept the 
oil revenue reliably flowing to fund the MPLA’s war effort. With UNITA’s control over 
Angola’s diamond producing region, the MPLA was heavily dependent on the viability of 
oil income to sustain its power. Petroleum Law 13/78 gave the national oil company—
Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (Sonangol)—extensive authorities to 
manage international business relationships and oil revenues, under the sole oversight of 
the president, who shielded Sonangol from the kinds of internal patronage inefficiencies 
that plague Nigeria’s Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).316 Instead of 
distributing superfluous Sonangol jobs as patronage, Neto mandated strict adherence to 
technocratic standards, the development of long-term Angolan technical capacity to 
manage oil contract negotiations and company operations, and demanded that the 
maximization of oil revenues serve as Sonangol’s core mandate. In 1976, Sonangol’s staff 
was therefore confined to roughly 100 technocrats. As straightforward as these decisions 
seem, they are an anomaly among sub-Saharan oil producing states that typically prioritize 
patronage exploitation over efficient, revenue optimization management practices. 
Denying such patronage opportunities was only possible because of Neto’s firm control of 
both the party and Sonangol, and the existential threat UNITA posed. For their part, MPLA 
elites recognized that excessively disruptive rent seeking competition among them could 
undermine the resources necessary to defeat UNITA and preserve their access to elite 
spoils. They therefore adopted a protection pact in which they consented to support 
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personalized rule and patronage discipline imposed by Neto and his successor José 
Eduardo dos Santos. That said, shielding Sonangol from inefficient patronage practices and 
optimizing its technical efficiency to maximize revenue did not mean that Sonangol would 
operate autonomously. The centralization of control over oil resources in the presidency 
gave Neto and his successor José Eduardo dos Santos, total discretion to apply oil 
revenues—representing 80% of Angola’s revenue—to state projects, personal interests, or 
targeted patronage allocations as they saw fit.317 
When Neto died in 1979, the MPLA selected dos Santos, whom MPLA elders 
believed would be easy to bend to their will, to succeed him. However, shortly after 
assuming power, dos Santos used constitutional revisions to shift broad legislative power 
from the government to the MPLA politburo in a move cleverly designed to both satisfy 
party elites and subordinate them to presidential oversight. At the same time, dos Santos 
established effective control over all legislative acts at both the central and local levels, 
modified the role of provincial commissioners to be direct representatives of the president 
instead of the People’s Assembly, and assumed autonomous control over all Angola’s 
foreign economic affairs, which had previously been managed by the party. As they had 
under Neto, MPLA elites maintained their protection pact to support dos Santos’ 
centralized control of the state in the face of a mutually recognized existential threat. 
Following a major South African incursion supporting a UNITA advance in 1982, dos 
Santos successfully argued for vaguely defined “emergency powers” that allowed him to 
establish a parallel structure of governance through regional military councils, overseen by 
a presidentially administered Council for Defense and Security whose unlimited authority 
over military, political, economic, and social matters superseded all other organs of the 
state or the party. Dos Santos achieved acquiescence for these changes through the adept 
manipulation of elite personalities and interests while employing a series of carrots and 
sticks. On one hand, he leveraged the incentives of selective party expansion to 30,000 
members, with the corresponding access to patronage from state-run enterprises (other than 
Sonangol) and the tacit endorsement of illicit economic activities (other than in the oil 
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sector) by MPLA members. On the other, he employed a vast network of intelligence and 
state security services—professionalized by Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern Bloc advisors—to 
monitor rivals and suppress dissenters. Thus, by the time the MPLA held its Second Party 
Congress in 1985, dos Santos had amassed enough party control to displace the party’s 
elder elites from the politburo and achieve what Vidal describes as his “peak of 
administrative centralization and power concentration…as President of the Party, Head of 
State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.”318 
Although dos Santo’s extreme concentration of power was sustained by mutual elite 
interest in their protection pact, elites still demanded a degree of patronage access. With an 
eye to extending his centralized control after the war’s eventual end, dos Santos sought to 
marginalize autonomous bases of elite power that could challenge his rule, and in 
successfully doing so, he prevented the kind of decentralized power accumulation that 
encouraged rent-seeking piracy in Nigeria. He therefore struck a careful balance of political 
consensus, alliance formation, and patronage management among the interconnected elites 
from the party, the government, and the military-managed parallel state while preserving his 
authority over each of them. Especially with respect to staffing the vastly powerful parallel 
governance system he created, dos Santos selected outsiders who lacked independent 
political legitimacy that could be mobilized against him. An Angolan academic described 
dos Santos’ preference to select “isolated men without retinue” to wield the powerful levers 
of the parallel system, and who, according to Soares de Oliveira, were preferably “whites, 
mestiços, foreigners, Angolan descendants of Cape Verdeans and Saotomeans, former 
fraccionistas (dissidents) from the 1977 Nito faction, and UNITA escapees,” that could hope 
to hold little independent authority outside what dos Santos explicitly provided them. At the 
same time, to preserve the party’s image as the legitimate foundation of governance and its 
relevance as the hub of the broader elite protection pact, if these presidentially entrusted 
power brokers or prominent military figures were not already senior party members, they 
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would be brought into the MPLA and expedited up the party hierarchy to duly mirror their 
level of presidential influence. Similarly, when presidential favorites experienced a falling 
out, they were relegated to lower duties in the party; yet they were rarely excluded entirely, 
and they often would be reincorporated to senior positions after a period of cooling off. The 
party therefore provided a structure in which current presidential favorites mixed with other 
party factions and developed mutually reinforcing bonds and dependencies that heightened 
the risk to individual defectors. Vidal credits dos Santos’ maintenance of these interlinked 
elite relationships in preventing the Angolan military from seizing its broad authority to 
establish itself as an autonomous challenger to presidential, party, or state power as occurred 
in Nigeria.319 Ensuring that elites were on constantly shifting terrain also mitigated 
opportunities for mobilization against the president and helped dos Santo’s maintain party 
discipline and preserve his own longevity.320 
The MPLA’s war-induced protection pact reinforced dos Santos’ longevity and 
centralized control over patronage channels that allowed him to take a long view to the 
management of elite coalitions and patronage distributions; however, dynamic global 
economic and geo-strategic trends also required him to adapt his strategies to maintain elite 
support and preserve control. The collapse of oil prices in 1986 coincided with growing elite 
dissent over the failures of agricultural and industrial state-owned enterprises. The illicit 
activities on informal markets in which MPLA elites had engaged was similarly failing to 
provide sufficient revenue generating opportunities, and by 1987, elite consensus had shifted 
toward market liberalization and privatization of state enterprises to improve domestic 
economic performance while opening new avenues to patronage. This liberalization and 
privatization was closely followed by the withdraw of Cuban and South African forces as 
the Soviet Union and the United States began to push for a negotiated settlement to the war. 
With the civil war in deadlock and the loss of foreign support to continue fighting, the MPLA 
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and UNITA reluctantly bowed to international pressure in the 1991 Bicesse Accord and 
agreed to hold elections for a unified multi-party democracy.321 
When the MPLA won what international observes declared a free and fair election, 
UNITA rejected the results and resumed the conflict. In agreeing to elections, the MPLA had 
formally abandoned the one-party state model, but with UNITA’s unilateral departure from 
the new government, dos Santos was free to cement an equal degree of centralized autonomy 
as he had exercised over the one-party state, while now enjoying nearly universal 
international recognition. The MPLA therefore remained the only politically relevant party 
in the new government, and although retaining centralized control over the new government 
framework required dos Santos to expand patronage distributions to a degree, the 
continuation of the conflict obviated the need to expand public goods while preserving the 
continuity of the MPLA’s tight-knit party structure and war-justified protection pact that 
allowed him to avoid mass clientelist distributions. In the transition to a market economy 
while continuing the war without its foreign backers, dos Santos established new patronage 
opportunities with the privatization of state enterprises, selective access to foreign exchange 
exploitation, and an array of new contracts to support the war effort through arms deals and 
mercenary contracts, including an array of financial, legal, and administrative support 
services. While Angola’s formal institutions lacked the international credibility to support 
the scale of contracts needed to privatize a successful war effort, dos Santos instead used a 
series of oil-backed joint ventures that borrowed Sonangol’s name and reputation to finance 
arms deals, mercenaries, and foreign advisors. Although oil revenues that flowed from 
Sonangol supported these joint ventures, oil operations remained insulated from patronage 
disruptions, while the distribution of the revenue they generated through the expanded 
patronage machine of Sonangol-backed joint ventures remained at dos Santos’ sole 
discretion. As he had done in the one-party state, dos Santos continued unpredictably to cycle 
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patronage spoils between elites to undermine their individual ability to balance against him 
while preserving centralizing incentives for disciplined party compliance.322 
The civil war ultimately ended in 2002 after government forces killed UNITA’s 
leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the remainder of the UNITA leadership surrendered. Given 
UNITA’s decisive military defeat, dos Santos’ MPLA-dominated government had little 
reason to expand patronage inclusion beyond a core set of UNITA elites. At the same time, 
the end of the war eroded the survival-induced imperative for MPLA elites to adopt a 
protection pact and continue to support dos Santo’s highly centralized rule. That is not to say 
that MPLA elites abandoned the notion that their collective action was more profitable than 
open rent-seeking competition, they still had much to lose if the MPLA lost its electoral 
mandate to remain in power. The preservation of centralized power after the war therefore 
evolved to a hybrid of both a protection pact and a provision pact in which dos Santos 
channeled expanded patronage benefits within the confines of the MPLA to buy their 
continued support, while MPLA elites continued to support dos Santo’s rule so long as he 
demonstrated the capacity to keep the MPLA in power.  
Fortunately for dos Santos, the elimination of combat expenditures freed vast state 
revenues to be applied to new patronage opportunities that coincided with the rebuilding the 
country’s war-ravaged infrastructure. As he had done since the 1990s, dos Santos leveraged 
Sonangol-backed joint ventures to control the flow of patronage opportunities amidst the 
reconstruction patronage boom. Although the scale of patronage expenditures reached 
unprecedented levels, dos Santos continued to restrict the most lucrative access to a small 
circle of trusted elites carefully while continuing to use a vast internal intelligence apparatus 
to prevent the development of decentralized threats to his authority. Many of these patronage 
opportunities came in the form of access to state-backed businesses in sectors insulated from 
external competition by restrictive state licensing. While these opportunities were 
enormously lucrative for the select elites who got access, virtually none of them developed 
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into competitive, self-sustaining enterprises. By virtue of their heavy dependence on 
generous state support, they posed little threat of empowering independent elite challenges 
to dos Santos’ authority.323 
Buoyed by unprecedented post-war oil profits, dos Santos maintained an iron grip on 
state and party authority with control over an expanded, but still highly centralized system 
of patronage distribution that accompanied lavish state infrastructure investments. In the 
midst of this post-war domination, dos Santos championed a consequential constitutional 
revision in 2010 that eliminated direct elections of the president and instead made 
presidential selection a function of party selection by the majority winner of legislative 
elections that thereby solidified a winner-take-all form of “democracy” in which executive, 
legislative, judicial, and country-wide provincial authority were all decided by a single 
election. Given the extensive electoral advantages available to an incumbent ruling party that 
controls every facet of government and can divert state oil revenues to party objectives, the 
constitutional change was envisioned to allow the MPLA to sustain its uncontested 
hegemony over the “democratic” state. However, when global oil prices crashed in 2014, the 
Angolan state faced financial distress under the weight of debt amassed by gratuitous 
reconstruction projects designed to feed patronage networks and attract popular support. The 
austerity measures that followed the crash all but eliminated many state services, which 
imposed the greatest toll on middle and low-income populations while MPLA elites 
continued to enjoy protected access to parallel exchange rates that further undermined the 
state’s financial situation. As popular discontent quickly mounted, and although dos Santos 
continued to supply patronage benefits to satisfy the elite provision pact, support from MPLA 
elites evaporated as his unpopularity began to threaten the MPLA’s continued hold on elected 
rule, and thereby, posed a threat to its core elite protection pact. In 2016, dos Santos 
announced that he would retire from the presidency, but by that point, his power had declined 
so precipitously that the MPLA successfully blocked both of his preferred successors and 
compelled dos Santos to name the party’s choice of João Lourenço instead. Since coming to 
power, Lourenço has embarked on a fierce anti-corruption campaign to marginalize members 
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of dos Santos’ inner circle while empowering his own loyalists. Although Lourenço’s 
“reforms” have been notable for their overt assault on dos Santos’s closest allies, most 
indications suggest that the anti-corruption campaign has merely shuffled the ordering of the 
existing elite strata to break dos Santos’ influence and centralize Lourenço’s control over a 
nearly identical MPLA patronage system rather than pursuing decentralizing reforms.324 
B. LINKS TO PIRACY 
Although existing models of piracy indicate that Angola and Nigeria share a similar 
risk profile, the high degree of centralization and presidential control over Angolan patronage 
has played a key role in blocking the causal pathways observed in Nigeria. First, the Angolan 
patronage system is defined by a protection pact that limits distribution to a small circle of 
loyal elites while proactively suppressing dissenting voices. This pact fundamentally differs 
from Nigeria’s provisioning pact in which patronage is widely distributed to sustain central 
legitimacy and serves as a conflict mitigation strategy that both incentivizes and rewards 
grievance signaling by dissenters and outsiders. Thus, while piracy and other militant proxies 
can serve as useful tools of competition within Nigeria’s fluid and contestable patronage 
ecosystem, they hold little prospective value in the face of an exclusionary Angolan system 
more likely to respond with violent suppression than negotiated patronage inclusion. 
Second, the centralized and exclusionary nature of Angolan patronage actively 
undercuts the accumulation of decentralized reservoirs of political or financial power that 
may be used to balance against the center. In contrast to Nigeria, where control over the 
central state’s mechanisms of patronage changes hands frequently—either through periodic 
military coups, or more recently, through regular, highly competitive electoral transitions—
the MPLA has maintained uninterrupted control of the government for 45 years since 
independence, with dos Santos serving as president for 38 of those years. Without the rotation 
of patronage control seen in Nigeria, and the persistent threats posed by 27 years of civil war, 
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dos Santos was empowered to discipline the distribution of patronage benefits among a small 
group of cohesive Angolan elites at the exclusion of peripheral actors. As a result, Angola 
lacks an equivalent of the widely distributed, independently powerful, and mutually 
competitive network of autonomous godfathers that developed in Nigeria. While Nigerian 
elites openly compete to capture centralized authority and establish decentralized 
mechanisms of patronage accumulation that they can continue to exploit once out of power, 
the MPLA party structure provides a forum that moderates internal elite competition while 
preserving the unified framework of a protection pact that discourages individual elite 
defections, overt forms of rent-seeking, or leveraging proxy actors that may disrupt efficient 
rent generation, especially from the oil industry. Without the sponsorship or political 
instrumentalization of competing elites, would-be Angolan pirates lack access to politically 
protected safe havens from which to operate or a politically motivated sponsor to assist in 
overcoming the organizational and financial entry costs of venturing into sophisticated piracy 
operations.  
Third, dos Santos’ centralized control over the military and state security services, 
paired with the exclusionary interests of the MPLA’s elite protection pact, permitted and 
incentivized him to respond to militant rent-seeking in Cabinda with overwhelming state 
repression rather than needing to rely on a strategy of grievance-mitigating patronage 
inclusion or other political compromise. In similar fashion to Niger Delta militants seeking 
greater resource control, the FLEC has, since Angolan independence, conducted attacks on 
government forces, attacked oil infrastructure, and kidnaped oil industry employees to exert 
pressure on the Angolan government. Although FLEC’s founding narrative is based on 
secession of an independent Cabinda from the Angolan state, as the region’s oil revenues 
grew and it became clear that FLEC’s organizational capacity was grossly inadequate to 
secure full independence from the MPLA-controlled unitary state, its periodic resumption of 
insurgent attacks can be seen as attempts at rent-seeking signaling similar to that of Niger 
Delta militants. Thus, the history of suppressing Cabinda’s separatist movement highlights 
how the centralized design and discipline of MPLA’s patronage system—a protection pact 
focused on optimizing rent generation, regulating rent-seeking behavior, and restricting rent 
distribution—responded to FLEC’s disruptive activities most prominently with violent 
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coercion, and occasional examples of targeted elite cooption, which prevented FLEC’s 
activities from metastasizing into prolific at-sea kidnapping and high-profile pirate attacks 
on oil infrastructure that have come to characterize the Niger Delta, despite motive and 
permissive conditions in Cabinda, which Chapter II indicates would otherwise support such 
an evolution.325  
Until 1966, the MPLA supported the administration of Cabinda as an autonomous 
federal state; however, following Gulf Oil’s discovery of major offshore oil deposits in that 
year, the MPLA shifted its stance to advocate that Cabinda be fully subsumed into the unitary 
state framework. As early as 1964, MPLA militants had been conducting guerilla attacks 
against Portuguese forces in Cabinda, and by the time the MPLA formally created its military 
wing, People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Forças Armadas 
Populares de Libertação de Angola) (FAPLA), it was well positioned relative to competing 
forces of the FNLA and UNITA. After the 1974 coup in Lisbon, the Portuguese government 
briefly favored a plan by which FLEC would govern Cabinda as part of a Zaire-Angola-
Cabinda federation, but soon reversed its position in favor of a unitary state under centralized 
control from Luanda. The Portuguese military then began detaining prominent FLEC leaders 
who threatened a transition to unitary rule and allowed FAPLA to occupy Cabinda a full year 
before independence. Recognizing the importance of Cabinda’s oil resources to finance the 
coming war for control of Angola, as well as the survival of their elite protection pact, by 
June 1975, FAPLA had pushed out the remaining FNLA and UNITA presence and—in 
parallel fashion to the Portuguese suppression of independence movements—began to hunt 
down remaining FLEC elements proactively, and as such, forced much of its leadership into 
exile. Signifying Cabinda’s enormous importance to sustaining the MPLA regime, the first 
squadron of fighter jets to arrive from Cuba in December 1975 was directed to reinforce 
FAPLA positions there. Thus, from the very outset of the civil war, until their departure in 
1991 in accordance with the Bicesse Accords, Cuban forces played an important role in 
ensuring that the MPLA was able to retain control over Cabinda’s oil resources by halting 
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UNITA advances and suppressing FLEC attempts to attack oil infrastructure and 
personnel.326  
At a time when Nigeria was experiencing its first wave of criminally motivated piracy 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s—as the oil boom triggered an influx of ships to Nigerian 
ports that fell prey to rapidly organizing criminal cells—the potentially vulnerable ports of 
Cabinda and Soyo remained heavily guarded by well-disciplined FAPLA and Cuban forces. 
That is not to say that FLEC was inactive or irrelevant during this time—it conducted 
numerous kidnappings and attacks on oil infrastructure and security forces—however, the 
centralized nature of the MPLA’s patronage structure incentivized it to respond to FLEC’s 
disruptive activity with force rather than palliative clientelist distributions. The FAPLA and 
Cuban deployments to Cabinda were expensive endeavors, especially considering the 
competing demand for scarce military resources to combat UNITA in other parts of Angola. 
While the MPLA might have employed a lower-cost short-term solution of coopting FLEC 
leaders to dissuade disruptions by including them in a more decentralized patronage network, 
doing so would have altered the power dynamic Neto and later dos Santos enjoyed in the 
existing protection pact, and made it vulnerable to the continuous distributional demands of 
a provisioning pact. It fundamentally rejected such a shift in dealing with FLEC (as well as 
UNITA and the FNLA) in favor of a longer-term vision of hegemonic control supported by 
tightly centralized rent control. As a result, by the time Cuban forces departed in 1991, and 
Angola prepared for the 1992 elections, the MPLA government had credibly demonstrated 
an enduring will to suppress FLEC forces and dissenting political voices in Cabinda 
violently. In the process, it marginalized the capacity of FLECs leaders to accumulate 
resources or establish protected havens that would facilitate the mobilization of pirate 
attacks.327 
The internationally imposed move to multi-party democracy under the Bicesse 
Accords of 1991 had the potential to disrupt the centralized patronage system in a way that 
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might have served as an inflection point towards piracy-inducing decentralization. In 
anticipation of a closely contested election in 1992, dos Santos attempted to attract Cabindan 
support with an offer of limited autonomy and a commitment to divert 10% of the region’s 
oil revenues to local development. While such a deal might have created a pathway for 
decentralization similar to Nigeria, FLEC leaders rejected the proposal and the MPLA went 
on to win the election without concessions to FLEC and without its electoral support. When 
UNITA rejected the results and restarted the war, the MPLA resumed de facto single party 
control of the nominally democratic government, while FAPLA essentially became the 
“unified” Armed Forces of Angola (FAA). The MPLA was therefore able to continue its 
centralized hegemony without having to alter the foundations of its protection pact. However, 
the MPLA’s loss of its foreign sponsors and FAPLA’s disproportionate pre-election 
demobilization relative to UNITA put it in a vulnerable position that UNITA and FLEC 
would attempt to exploit. Within a year, UNITA seized control over 80% of Angola’s 
territory—including, for the first time, the Soyo oil facilities at the mouth of the Congo 
River—leaving the internationally recognized MPLA government confined to its enclave 
fortresses of Luanda and Cabinda. FLEC also seized on the MPLA’s momentary weakness 
to disrupt Chevron’s operations in Cabinda, and to attack company busses and convoys, 
bomb its facilities, and kill, injure, and kidnap multiple foreign employees. However, by 
1994, the MPLA government had replaced Cuban and Soviet support with an array of private 
military contractors, foreign intelligence advisors, and refreshed military hardware. Now 
enjoying an UN-recognized election mandate, the MPLA-controlled government began to 
push UNITA back and solidified its marginalization of Cabinda’s distributional demands. 
The MPLA therefore emerged from the transition to electoral politics in a similar position to 
that it enjoyed beforehand; it remained a tight-knit group of elites with a common interest in, 
and ability to secure, centralized authority and limited patronage distributions outside of its 
protection pact. As a result, FLEC leaders continued to be deprived of opportunities for 
decentralized patronage accumulation and the independent political authority to carve out 
protected coastal havens that would allow militants to transition from their sporadic land-
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based attacks to the more operationally sophisticated and resource-intensive demands of 
piracy.328  
Following the end of the war in 2002, the MPLA could no longer use UNITA’s 
military threat as basis to secure popular acquiescence to its exclusionary system of 
governance, distribution, and limited public investment. Since the sustainment of the 
MPLA’s de facto single-party control of the state now depended on periodic electoral 
victories, it took steps to elicit broader popular support both within and outside traditional 
MPLA strongholds. One of the most visible examples was the expansion of the party to five 
million members by the 2012 election, up from 65,000 in 1990, as the party abandoned 
Marxism-Leninism, and 550,000 in the run-up to the 1992 elections. Although party 
membership was no longer a guarantee of patronage access, it was a prerequisite for access 
to expanding pool of patronage-allocated jobs with modest incomes in the civil service or a 
state-backed company. With previous war expenditures now free to redirect towards 
patronage in the form of reconstruction contracts and new state-backed business 
opportunities, the MPLA coopted select UNITA elites with inclusion in its hybrid protection/
provision pact to divide its primary political opposition.329  
Unlike the strategy of cooption and patronage expansion used with former UNITA 
members, the MPLA was unwilling to risk decentralized power accumulation in Cabinda. 
Unlike UNITA, FLEC had never been able to balance against MPLA power, which drove an 
elite cost benefit calculus that favored investments in coercion rather than a potential 
commitment to long-term cooption. The MPLA therefore excluded FLEC leaders and the 
population of Cabinda from most post-war inclusion avenues and instead chose to invest in 
more aggressive measures of state repression. In contrast to Nigeria, where the deployment 
of 3,000 federal forces to a Niger Delta region of roughly 30 million people had to carefully 
avoid disrupting the interests of politically powerful local godfathers while trying to impose 
 
328 Reed, Crude Existence, 51–52, 141–142; Martin, “The Front (s) for the Liberation of Cabinda in 
Angola,” 216–219; Hodges, Angola, 14–15; Soares de Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Land, 15, 124–
125; Messiant, 106–122. 
329 Soares de Oliveira, 17–20, 121–122; Reed, 40, 54, 102, 142–144, 152–153, 168–171, 199–202; 
Vidal, “The Historical-Sociological Matrix,” 165; Janes, “Angola—Armed Forces”; Janes, “Nigeria—
Armed Forces”; McGregor, “Nigeria Expands Its ‘War on Terrorism’ to the Niger Delta,” 8. 
134 
federal will, Angola’s FAA deployment of 50,000 soldiers to “pacify” 300,000 politically 
disempowered Cabindans faced no such hinderance. The overwhelming size of the FAA 
deployment to Cabinda should not been seen as a purely military explanation of the differing 
piracy outcomes. The Nigerian military is larger than its Angolan counterpart is. The order 
of magnitude difference in the size of troop deployments reflects differences in patronage 
structures. While Nigeria’s decentralized system empowers local actors to contest central 
authority both politically and through the mobilization of militant proxies that include pirates, 
Angola’s tightly controlled and centrally managed patronage system denies the formation of 
decentralized reservoirs of local power that can challenge centralized political will to exert 
the kind of decisive coercion displayed in Cabinda.330 
In 2007, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence officer turned energy analyst identified 
the waters off Cabinda as a hospitable environment for FLEC to adopt MEND’s tactics of 
piratical political signaling.331 Nevertheless, from 1991–2019, the International Maritime 
Bureau recorded only 25 actual or attempted piracy incidents in Angola’s waters, nearly all 
of which involved petty crime in Luanda’s anchorage.332 The ASAM database contains 
incident descriptions for 19 of the 25 events, of which 79% were conducted while the ship 
was at anchor. Of the attempted pirate attacks conducted while a ship was underway, only 
the 2014 MT Kerala hijacking—perpetuated by sophisticated Nigerian pirates—was 
successful. Where reports include the number of pirates, 50% involved two or fewer 
individuals, and only four instances cited the involvement of more than one boat, which 
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suggested low levels of organization. Adding to the conclusion that most Angolan piracy is 
subsistence-based petty crime against ships at anchor, in all but one ASAM-recorded 
incident, successful incidents were limited to opportunistic theft, with MT Kerala as the sole 
exception.333 
Although it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions from the few recorded piracy 
incidents in Angolan waters, two recent instances show that both permissive environmental 
factors and pro-piracy motives are present, and that Angola’s centralized long-term rent 
management system has effectively prevented these from proliferating. The 2014 hijacking 
of the fuel-laden MT Kerala by Nigerian pirates venturing into Angolan territorial waters 
confirmed Angola’s vulnerability to pirates able to overcome financial and organizational 
entry costs. At the time of the attack, the Angolan Navy had no patrol vessels in seaworthy 
condition to pursue the slow-moving tanker on its 1,300 nautical mile journey back to 
Nigerian waters, even as it made at least three stops to offload stolen cargo of diesel fuel 
along the way. This incident supports the conclusion that Angola has not needed an effective 
naval force to deter homegrown pirates, precisely because it has effectively undercut their 
organization capacity by denying them the decentralized bases of political power and 
financial resources upon which Nigerians pirates rely.334  
In apparent fulfilment of the 2007 warning that FLEC might adopt MEND’s tactics 
of targeting offshore oil infrastructure as means of rent-seeking political signaling, in May 
2016, five FLEC militants boarded a Chevron oil platform in Cabinda’s waters. The incident 
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occurred less than three months after dos Santos declared that he would be stepping down as 
president, and therefore, might have been a deliberate signaling attempt to compete for 
patronage inclusion amidst the MPLA’s leadership shuffle. Although some of the remaining 
and highly factionalized FLEC leaders would go on to denounce the attack, it demonstrated 
a degree of local will that could be scaled to wider adoption of political signaling piracy if 
the centralized patronage system did not inhibit access to greater financial and organizational 
capacity. So far, Lourenço has maintained the tightly controlled hybrid protection/
provisioning pact, even as he attempts to displace dos Santos’ networks with his own, and 
he has continued the same exclusionary policies toward Cabinda as his predecessor. 
Consequently, no additional offshore FLEC attacks have been reported as of this writing.335 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Angolan patronage system was established by a tight-knit group of cohesive 
elites, incentivized by an existential and prolonged wartime crisis to cede a degree of 
individual authority toward the adoption of a protection pact. That pact enabled the 
concentration of authority around a central leadership figure with the capacity to discipline 
inefficient rent-reeking activity and apply a long-term strategy to the management of 
patronage distributions. Since the survival of that regime depended on the availability of oil 
rents, its leaders deliberately elected to pursue coercive investments to capture the oil-rich 
enclave of Cabinda decisively rather than adopting a distributive strategy of cooption. In 
doing so, MPLA elites deprived the region of decentralized bases of political power or 
financial resources that could be mobilized in the kind of rent-seeking grievance signaling 
that evolved to include piracy in Nigeria.  
  
 
335 Ed Cropley, “Rebels Alive and Kicking in Angolan Petro-Province, Oil Workers Say,” Reuters, 
June 14, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/angola-oil-security/rebels-alive-and-kicking-in-angolan-
petro-province-oil-workers-say-idUKL8N1952C9; Julianne Geiger, “Angola Could Face Niger Delta-Style 
Oil Threat,” UPI Energy News, June 15, 2016, https://www.upi.com/Energy-News/2016/06/15/Angola-
could-face-Niger-Delta-style-oil-threat/3711466017708/; Arbucias, “Sabotage or Appropriation?,” 82; 
Dionne Searcey, “Angolan President, in Power Nearly Four Decades, Says He’ll Step Down,” New York 
Times, March 11, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/africa/angolan-president-in-power-
nearly-four-decades-says-hell-step-down.html; Roque, Angola’s New President, 19. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. PATRIMONIAL PIRACY? 
This thesis set out to determine the degree to which variation in elite rent 
accumulation strategies and patronage structures in Nigeria and Angola could explain the 
difference in piracy incidence in the waters surrounding the two countries. The analysis 
suggests that the decentralized mechanisms of Nigeria’s elite provisioning pact, especially 
during the Fourth Republic, have played a strong role in encouraging the development of 
piracy. Conversely, Angola’s tight-knit elite protection pact, embedded in MPLA rule since 
1975, has centralized state authority and patronage management in a way that is piracy 
inhibiting. 
1. Nigeria 
The Nigerian state relies on a vast web of patronage distributions, through formal 
and informal channels, as a means to purchase some degree of elite cohesion amidst highly 
fractionalized and competing multipolar interests. The failure of the First Republic (1960–
1966) as a result of fissures between its highly autonomous and ethically dominated 
regional governments, followed by the state’s devolution into a short, but brutal civil war 
(1967–1970), served as foundational experiences that have heavily informed the evolution 
of Nigeria’s formal and informal institutions since. The notion of ethnic fairness and 
national balancing, known as “federal character,” has become deeply ingrained in the 
national psyche and has informed an incremental administrative devolution of both 
political authority and resource allocation to state and local governments. 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, founded in 1999, has 36 states and 774 local 
government areas that receive statutory financial distributions from the federal 
government. The administrative devolution and statutory allocations were intended by 
constitutional framers to mitigate the kind of ethnic conflict that led to civil war; however, 
the resources and autonomy afforded to these openly contestable elected offices, combined 
with federal character incentives for ethnic grievance articulation, have created especially 
negative externalities when paired with internal political party organizational rules. The 
138 
party’s use of rotational power sharing is also a well-intentioned mechanism of ethnic 
balancing, but it episodically heightens incentives for ethnic grievance articulation, while 
the party’s use of open elite recruitment encourages local elites and godfathers to militarize 
local electoral contests along ethnic lines to demonstrate party viability. The unintended 
outcome of these interactive stimuli is the development of ethnically aligned militant 
groups that serve as unofficial but fundamental building blocs of the competitive electoral 
landscape.  
Due to the reliance of local power brokers on these militants to capture government 
offices, and their statutory resource distributions, the militants enjoy broad political latitude 
to engage in criminal rent accumulation between electoral cycles. In addition, when 
political party zoning opportunities arrive, local and regional power brokers are 
incentivized to find ways to amplify militant grievance signaling. It was in such conditions 
in late 2005 that MEND was created, and it began to employ highly destructive forms of 
piracy as a rent-seeking tool by early 2006. Upon achieving its rent seeking goals, it 
reverted to sophisticated forms of rent-accumulating piracy. These pirate attacks both 
emerged from and are sustained by Nigeria’s unique arrangement of elite rent accumulation 
strategies and patronage structures. 
2. Angola 
In contrast to Nigeria’s diffuse and factionalized elites, political authority and 
patronage mechanisms in Angola are tightly bound up in a close-knit cadre of elites who 
have formed the core of the MPLA’s elite-party-state nexus since 1975. The MPLA’s 
uncommon degree of centralization was built upon a legacy of colonial administration, an 
extended post-independence civil war, and the alignment of party and state leadership with 
an interconnected “creole” elite. The exigencies of nearly three decades of war induced an 
already tight-knit cohort of elites to form a protection pact in which they incrementally 
ceded greater political and fiscal authority from the party-state structures of the ruling 
MPLA to an even tighter core group in the office of the presidency. From there, President 
dos Santos (1979–2017) established direct control over state oil revenues and developed 
parallel mechanisms of government administration answerable only to him. He proactively 
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curbed elite fractionalization by satiating core elites with generous, but reversible, 
patronage opportunities, while undermining mobilization of elite competitors, limiting 
civil society organizations, and employing an expansive state security apparatus. 
This centralized control allows the president to prevent the accumulation of 
decentralized reservoirs of political or financial power that may be used to balance against 
the center. As a result, would-be pirates do not have a ready network of godfathers who 
can provide start-up capital to overcome entry barriers. In addition, the framework of 
Angola’s protection pact does not reward grievance signaling as does Nigeria’s 
provisioning pact, so rent-seeking forms of piracy hold little prospective value. Lastly, the 
Angolan state has both the military capacity and the political will to suppress dissenter 
mobilizations. Thus, unlike in Nigeria where the state is unable to employ its full coercive 
capacity in the face of local elite opposition, the Angolan state has no incentive to accept 
the reputational and inefficiency costs that rent-accumulating forms of piracy would 
introduce. As a result, the centralized form of the Angolan elite-party-state nexus is well-
suited to inhibit piracy. 
B. RISK OF FUTURE PIRACY 
The existing structures of power and patronage in Nigeria and Angola provide 
insights to how recent events and future inflection points might impact the incidence of 
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
1. Nigeria 
With President Buhari’s reelection in 2019, it appears that the parameters of the 
post-NDA provisioning pact with Niger Delta militants will remain intact at least until the 
next election in 2023. Current conditions suggest that militants are still regularly engaged 
in hijacking-for-ransom piracy with scattered examples of hijacking-for-cargo piracy. The 
latter likely remains permissible within the provisioning pact, but operational constraints 
may make it less desirable than hijacking-for-ransom at this time. Other Niger Delta 
activities that appear to be tacitly sanctioned include oil theft and artisanal refining.  
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With respect to the upcoming election, historical piracy spikes coincided with the 
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2019 presidential elections; however, they notably did not spike 
around the 2011 and 2015 elections. This irregularity suggests a possible pattern in which 
Niger Delta piracy spikes in advance of all elections except those in which a south-south 
candidate is running for president (as was the case with Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 and 
2015). It stands to reason that in years when a co-ethnic politician is running for president 
(Niger Delta militants are concentrated in the south-south region), the prospect of co-ethnic 
victory (and its attendant patronage spoils) gives pirates an incentive to restrict their 
activity so their candidate can campaign on the ability to stabilize volatile situations. In all 
other cases, piracy appears to act as a rent-seeking, political-signaling tool used to justify 
patronage inclusion when distributional norms are subject to election-induced 
renegotiations.336  
The 2023 elections will be the next opportunity to test this correlation hypothesis, 
depending on the region(s) from which presidential candidates are selected. Based on the 
informal power rotation within the leading political parties, it is unlikely that either will 
nominate a south-south politician as a presidential candidate in 2023. However, the 
informality of the zoning rules leaves room for political maneuvering, especially following 
the upset victory of President Buhari’s APC party in 2015, which displaced and weakened 
the PDP party machine that had maintained control from 1999–2015. The heightened 
competitive pressures between the parties could lead to new adaptations in zoning 
interpretations.  
2. Angola 
Recent analysis suggests that the corruption purges President Lourenço has 
employed since coming to power in 2017 are designed to bolster the MPLA’s popular 
legitimacy by displacing core allies of former President dos Santos but without altering the 
fundamental centralization of presidential power. If this is indeed the case, it is very likely 
that the MPLA’s elite protection pact remains intact, and Lourenço—having established 
 
336 Future study on this topic would complement Daxecker and Prins’ recent work comparing piracy 
and substate electoral trends. Daxecker and Prins, “The Politicization of Crime,” 375. 
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full control over the military and state security apparatus—is equally empowered by the 
remaining MPLA elites to engage in the violent suppression of rent-seeking defectors who 
might undermine the existing patronage architecture. However, the MPLA still faces 
mounting electoral risks as oil prices remain low and the economy is further depressed by 
COVID implications.337 
At this stage, it stands to reason that the MPLA may not be able to continue its 
election-backed domination of the government indefinitely. The MPLA’s margin of 
electoral victory has been gradually eroding since the end of the war, winning 82% of the 
vote in 2008, 72% of the vote in 2012, and 61% of the vote in 2017.338 If the MPLA is 
indeed defeated in the next set of elections in 2022, or in a future election, it is impossible 
to predict how a competing regime may choose to manage elite competition and rent 
centralization. It is reasonable to imagine that a future government could be built upon a 
weak coalition of fragmented elites who lack a unifying imperative to develop a protection 
pact, in which case, their coherence is more likely to be based on a provisioning pact that 
may serve to induce the kinds of competitive elite rent seeking behavior that led to 
sophisticated piracy in Nigeria. However, a new coalition of elites may simply work to 
coopt the framework of the existing centralized system and coalesce into a new protection 
pact, especially given the advantages that concentrated powers can provide in the service 
of whatever long-term interests a new elite pact may intend to pursue. In that case, the 
development of decentralized elites would be unlikely, and piracy events would likely 
remain infrequent and unsophisticated. 
  
 
337 Shaxson, “Angola’s Quadruple Bonanza,” 4; Alencastro, Alencastro, Angola under Lourenço, 4–
12; Roque, Angola’s New President, 3–6, 8–20. 
338 Vidal, “The Historical-Sociological Matrix and Ethos,” 165–169. 
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